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Abstract: The general process view of learning, which guided research into learning for the first half of this century, has come
under attack in recent years from several quarters. One form of criticism has come from proponents of the so-called biological
boundaries approach to learning. These theorists have presented a variety of data showing that supposedly general laws of
learning may in fact be limited in their applicability to different species and learning tasks, and they argue that the limitations
are drawn by the nature of each species, adaptation to the particular requirements of its natural environment. The biological
boundaries  approach has served an important critical function in the move away from general process learning theory, but  it is
limited  in its ability to provide an alternative to the general process approach. In particular, the biological boundaries approach
lacks generality, it is in some respects subservient to the general process tradition, and its ecological content is in too many cases
limited to ex post facto adaptive explanations of learning skills. A contrasting, ecological approach to learning, which can
provide a true alternative to general process theory, is presented. The ecological approach begins by providing an ecological task
description for naturally occurring instances of learning; this step answers the question: What does this animal learn to do? The
next step is an analysis of the means by which learning occurs in the course of development, answering the question : How does
the animal learn to do this? On the basis of such analyses, local principles of adaptation are formulated to account for the
learning abilities of individual species. More global principles are sought by generalization among these local principles and may
form the basis for a general ecological theory of learning.
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During the first half of this century, psychologists
invested an enormous effort in the search for a general
theory of learning. Underlying that effort was the
belief that all forms of learning could be explained in
terms of some fairly small set of general principles. A
variety of such principles was proposed, and although
their respective merits were widely debated, there was
no serious disagreement with the view that some set of
general principles existed that would eventually
explain all of the phenomena of learning. The general
learning theorists of that era held not only that there is
a set of general principles applicable to all learning,
but also that all examples of learning are manifestations
of an underlying general process. That is, they
believed that whenever animals learn, not only can we
always account for what they do in terms of the same
set of principles, but we will also find that they are
doing the same sorts of things (e.g. forming stimulus-
response associations).
In recent years, a number of authors (e.g. Seligman
1970; Bolles 1970; Rozin & Kalat 1971; Shettleworth
1972; Hinde 1973) have taken issue with the general
process approach to the study of learning, arguing that
many instances of learning provide evidence of rather
specialized processes — adaptations to the specific
demands of the environments inhabited by different
animals. This view, which is discussed in more detail
below, has been dubbed the "biological boundaries
approach" to the study of learning. Its proponents have
provided a number of important criticisms of the
general process tradition, but it will be argued in a later
section that their contribution is limited in the extent to
which it can offer an alternative to that tradition. In
particular, the biological boundaries approach has, in
many of its formulations, denied the possibility of
general principles of learning with the same vigor that
it has denied the existence of general processes. Yet the
search for general principles must surely be one of the
most important aspects of any scientific endeavour.
Any denial of their existence in a particular field of
inquiry should be accepted only after all possible
alternatives have been explored.
This paper discusses one approach to the study of
learning that may be a viable alternative to both the
general process tradition and the newer biological
boundaries approach. It is an ecological approach to
the study of learning — one that seeks its general princi-
ples in the relationships between animals and their
natural environments, rather than in the characteristics
of animals alone. The ecological approach will be
contrasted with both the biological boundaries
approach, from which it differs in the importance
attached to the search for general principles of learn-
ing, and the general process tradition, from which it
differs in the importance attached to ecological consid-
erations in the study of learning. A more detailed
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discussion of the theory that underlies the ecological
approach has been published elsewhere (Johnston &
Turvey 1980).
Some terms and distinctions
A few terms should be defined at the outset. The term
"environment" will be used to refer to those aspects of
the physical, biological, and social world with which an
animal interacts (Mason & Langenheim 1957), rather
than the location, or type of location, that it inhabits.
Ecologists will recognize this usage as being closer to
the concept of "niche" than to the concepts of "hab-
itat" or "biotope" (Hutchinson 1967; Whittaker, Levin
& Root 1973). While humans and rats may share
similar habitats, such as cities and farms, they occupy
very different environments within those habitats. The
"natural" or "normal" environment of an animal will
refer to that which it occupies by virtue of its phylog-
eny and species-typical ontogeny; statistically, one
might define it as the modal (i.e. typical) environment
of members of a species or population (Miller 1977).
When the unqualified term "environment" is used in
this paper, the qualification "natural" will always be
implied.
The emphasis here (and in other ecologically
oriented discussions of behavior) on animals' natural
environments sometimes leads to misunderstandings. It
is often thought, mistakenly, that any study that
subjects an animal to conditions that deviate from its
natural environment cannot qualify as "ecological."
This belief misrepresents the role of the natural envi-
ronment in ecological study, in which atypical or
artificial conditions are often employed to advance our
understanding of the relationship between an animal
and its natural environment. Although the goal of
ecological study is always to explain relationships with
the natural environment, the experimental use of un-
natural environments may be an important means of
attaining that goal. This point will be elaborated later
in this paper.
The distinction between general principles and
general processes is also important to the arguments of
this paper, and so I will briefly explain what is meant
by it. Consider the following example, modified from
Cabanac (1974). The thermal relationship between a
homeothermic animal and its environment may be
described by the following equation:
Qprod Qgain -  Qloss = 
0
, ( 1)
where Qprod = metabolic heat production, Qgain =
radiative, convective, and conductive heat gain from
the environment, and Qloss, = radiative, convective,
conductive, and evaporative heat loss to the environ-
ment.
Equation 1 expresses a general principle about ther-
moregulation that is true for homeothermic animals
over some range of environmental temperatures char-
acteristic of each species. Under different thermal
regimes, various physiological and behavioral processes
are initiated so that the principle in Equation 1 remains
true, but in different animals, and in the same animal
at different times, different processes will occur. For
example, with an ambient temperature of 40°C, the
thermal balances of a man and a dog will both obey
Equation 1, and both do so in part because of processes
that increase evaporative heat loss. However, in man
these processes include sweating (but not panting).
whereas in the dog they include panting (but not
sweating). By the same token, the man's thermal
balance will also obey Equation 1 when the ambient
temperature is 15°C, but now the processes involved
will include shivering, which increases metabolic heat
production, rather than sweating.
The distinction between the principle expressed in
Equation 1 and the processes by virtue of which the
principle holds may be made as follows. Processes are
events or series of events that are said to occur, to
terminate, or to be observed. Those associated with
learning may usually be described in either behavioral
or physiological terms; physiological descriptions are
conventionally said to underlie or reduce behavioral
descriptions. Principles, on the other hand, are formal
or informal statements about processes, relations
among processes, or relations between processes and
sets of external conditions. We speak of principles as
being true, as being violated, or as being formulated .
The aim of theories is, in general, to explain or predict
processes by means of principles.
The acceptance of a general principle such as that
expressed in Equation 1 need imply nothing about the
generality of the processes by virtue of which it holds .
In the preceding example there are some thermoregu-
latory processes that are very general (such as vasocon-
striction and vasodilation) and others that are restricted
to only a single species (such as putting on warm
clothing). In a precisely analogous way, the search for
general principles of learning does not commit one to
the view that all learning reflects a general process
(such as the formation of associations), and doubts
raised as to the purported generality of certain
processes of learning need not lead one to question the
possibility of finding general principles.
The ecological approach to learning discussed in this
paper shows how a search for general principles of
learning may be undertaken quite independently of
any assertions as to the existence of general processes.
As will become clear in the final sections of the paper,
the nature of the empirical research mandated by the
ecological approach is radically different from that
currently being undertaken by the majority of workers
in animal learning.
Contemporary approaches to the study of
learning
To attempt anything like a comprehensive survey of
the current state of the psychology of learning would
far exceed the scope of this paper, and the following
account is intended only to highlight certain trends in
the field that are particularly relevant to my arguments
in the remainder of the paper. The reader interested in
a more thorough treatment of the issues is referred to
Rescorla & Holland (1976) or Jenkins (1979) for a brief
account, and to Bitterman, LoLordo, Overmier &
Rashotte (1979) for a more comprehensive survey.
One of the primary differences among modern
workers in the field of learning is in the importance
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that they attach to ecological and evolutionary consid-
erations for the study of learning. For many years, the
study of behavior was strongly influenced by a tacit
belief in the complete separability (both conceptual
and experimental) of learning and instinct - a belief
that had, and continues to have, profound and far-
reaching effects in both biology and psychology (Kuo
1929; Lehrman 1970; Oppenheim, in press). On this
view, instinct provides an animal with the capability of
responding to situations that are typical of its natural
ecology, whereas learning enables it to cope with
atypical or unusual events. It is not surprising, given
this conceptual position, that in the study of learning,
little heed was paid to the subjects' natural ecology, and
that subsequent development of the field left no room
for ecological considerations to be taken into account.
I doubt that many modern students of learning
would argue in favor of a learning-instinct dichotomy,
but it can hardly be denied that the field as a whole
continues to reflect the dichotomy, at least insofar as
ecological considerations are denied any theoretical or
methodological representation in the study of learning.
Since about 1970, arguments have been presented
against the ecologically arbitrary nature of work on
learning, echoing the earlier concerns of such authors
as Tinbergen (1951) and Lehrman (1962), and current
opinion is clearly divided between those who argue
that ecological differences among species are impor-
tant to our understanding of their learning abilities and
those who believe that such differences are of no great
theoretical significance. Two current approaches to the
study of learning that reflect these two points of view
may be identified.
Miniature theories of learning. Most modern students of
learning acknowledge that the concern of earlier theo-
rists with large-scale theories, each of global applicabil-
ity, was too ambitious. Attention has now turned to the
construction of smaller-scale theories, each dealing
with a restricted range of learning phenomena - a
development that was anticipated by Tolman (1949).
The work of Rescorla (1972; Rescorla & Wagner 1972)
on classical conditioning, of Sutherland & Mackintosh
(1971) on discrimination learning, of Kamin (1968;
1969) on expectancy theory, and of Bolles (1971; 1972)
on avoidance learning, is representative of such minia-
ture theories. With few exceptions, primarily Bolles
(1970; 1971), the proponents of this approach have
paid little attention to ecological considerations in their
analysis of learning. The methods that they employ for
the study of learning are ecologically arbitrary in just
the same way as were those employed by the general
theorists of a generation ago, and theoretical analyses
continue to offer no recognition of the different ecolog-
ical circumstances with which each animal species
must deal and to which it has become adapted as a
result of natural selection. If anything, there is perhaps
less interest now than previously in using laboratory
investigation to determine how animals learn about the
world in which they live (cf. Hull 1937). Indeed, the
major difference between those working on the devel-
opment of miniature theories and the general learning
theorists of the past would seem to be procedural rather
than conceptual, as Revusky (1977, p. 2) suggests:
"These students of learning typically believe' in the
general process approach in principle, but feel that the
only practical methodology, at least for the time being,
is to construct theories limited to narrow situations and
effects. "
Although these theorists are certainly aware of
species differences in learning ability, it is unclear what
role, if any, they expect such differences to play in the
completed theoretical formulation. One prominent
modern learning theorist, M.E. Bitterman, has devoted
much of his research effort to an analysis of differences
in learning ability among different animal species
(Bitterman 1975; 1976; Bitterman & Woodard 1976).
Of all the work being carried on in the tradition of
general learning theory, Bitterman's comparative anal-
ysis is perhaps where one might most expect to find an
interest in exploring the ecological correlates of learn-
ing, since few other investigators are so explicitly
concerned with interspecies differences. That even his
work reveals no such ecological content strongly
suggests that the nonecological traditions of the field
will not give way easily.
Biological boundaries of learning. Of more direct rele-
vance to the present discussion is the second modern
approach to the study of learning; the so-called "bio-
logical boundaries" approach. This approach draws its
main support from various recalcitrant data, obtained
in studies of conditioning, that appear to contradict
several major assumptions of general process learning
theory. The best known of these data is the finding of
Garcia & Koelling (1966) that rats will readily learn to
avoid sweet-tasting water if its ingestion is paired with
toxicosis, but not if ingestion is paired with foot-shock.
By contrast, avoidance of water that is associated with
an audio-visual stimulus can be learned by pairing its
ingestion with shock but not with toxicosis. This result
contradicts the principle of equivalence of associability
of stimuli (Seligman 1970), according to which it is
possible to pair any noxious US (unconditioned stimu-
lus) with any CS (conditional stimulus) to produce
aversion. Other findings (Garcia, Ervin & Koelling
1966) showed that delaying toxicosis for up to two
hours following ingestion still resulted in learning to
avoid the sweet-tasting water. Again, this contradicts
the principle that the US and the CS must be tempo-
rally contiguous if learning is to occur (Seligman
1970).
Since the publication of Garcia's original findings,
and of papers by Seligman (1970) and Rozin & Kalat
(1971) emphasizing their theoretical significance, there
has been a dramatic increase in the number of taste-
aversion studies (see Riley & Baril 1976). These studies,
taken together, strongly support the view that the
avoidance of noxious foods is mediated by different
cues in different species. Many of the results suggest
that the nature of the effective cues is determined by
the way in which food is typically selected by members
of a particular species. Thus quail (Wilcoxon, Dragoin
& Kral 1971) and vervet monkeys (Johnson, Beaton, &
Hall 1975), which may rely on visual cues in food
selection, are able to learn to avoid noxious food on the
basis of visual as well as gustatory cues. For the rat, a
nocturnal scavenger, presumably visual cues are rarely
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available in the context of food selection, and so the
ability to associate such cues with subsequent illness has
never been selected for in the evolution of this species
(Rozin & Kalat 1971).
Although studies of taste-aversion learning have
provided the bulk of the evidence in favor of the
biological boundaries approach, substantial support has
also come from studies of other forms of learning.
Bolles (1970; 1971) has reviewed a wealth of evidence
from the instrumental avoidance literature, which
shows that rats will learn to make certain avoidance
responses (such as running away or jumping out of the
shock box) far more readily than others (such as turning
a wheel or pressing a bar). Bolles proposes that each
species possesses a limited number of species-specific
defense reactions (SSDR's) that it uses under natural
conditions to protect itself in any aversive situation,
independently of any specific learning [see Bolles &
Fanselow: "A Perceptual-Defensive-Recuperative
Model of Fear and Pain" BBS 3(2) 1980]. Only if the
instrumental response required in an experiment
permits the subject to use an SSDR to escape or avoid
shock will learning occur. Complementary data, using
food reinforcement in an operant conditioning para-
digm with hamsters, are provided by Shettleworth
(1975). Certain responses, such as digging, rearing, and
scrabbling, can be reinforced by food, whereas others,
such as face-washing, scent-marking, and grooming,
may actually be depressed under food reinforcement.
Shettleworth argues that the responses that can be
reinforced are those that would normally occur in the
context of feeding behavior in this species.
There are many other examples of such biological
boundaries to learning ability, for which the reader
may consult Breland & Breland (1961), Seligman
(1970), Seligman & Hager (1972), Shettleworth (1972),
and Hinde & Stevenson-Hinde (1973).
Theoretical implications of the biological boundaries
approach. At present there is no clear agreement on the
implications of the biological boundaries criticism for
the future development of learning theory. Some inves-
tigators (e.g. Bitterman 1975; Malone 1975) clearly feel
that its impact on the general process view will be
minimal. Others are more receptive but offer no very
clear vision of the directions in which the psychology of
learning should proceed. Thus Kimble (1973, p.12)
acknowledges that "biological variables of many sorts
have important messages for the psychology of learn-
ing," but he does not say what he perceives these
messages to be, or how psychology should respond to
them.
A few learning psychologists have responded more
directly to the criticisms of the biological boundaries
approach. Logue (1979) has reviewed the data from
studies of taste-aversion learning and concludes that
most require no radical reformulation of the accepted
laws of learning, although some do require important
quantitative modifications to those laws, especially in
regard to the speed of acquisition and the long delay
over which aversions may be formed. Logue concludes
her review with a call for a more balanced approach to
the study of learning: "This view recognizes the exis-
tence and utility of general laws of learning, but it also
recognizes the necessity of acknowledging and investi-
gating the dissimilarities in the learning of different
species and the learning of different tasks. Otherwise
we are likely to assume generality where none exists"
(Logue 1979, pp. 290-91).
The heart of most current learning theory is associa-
tionism (Rescorla & Holland 1976; Jenkins 1979), and it
is therefore not surprising to find a serious attempt
being made, by LoLordo (1979), to defend the princi-
ple of equivalence of associability against the claim
that some associations are more easily formed than
others. LoLordo presents a careful methodological cri-
tique of many of the experiments on which the biologi-
cal boundaries criticism draws. He concludes that very
few of those experiments demonstrate the selective
formation of associations, and that the selective effects
that they do reveal may be attributed to nonassociative
phenomena such as cue salience, attention, and differ-
ential response elicitation.
LoLordo's analysis is especially interesting. If his
defense of associative equivalence is correct, then it is
possible to identify a wide range of selective nonasso-
ciative processes, of manifest importance to learning,
that it is unconvincing to dismiss as mere species-
specific "contaminations" (Schwartz 1974). If these
processes have a major influence on an animal's ability
to learn, as they apparently do, then our theories should
reflect this fact and not view them as peripheral to
"true" (i.e. associative) learning. It is, of course, quite
legitimate for particular theories or investigators to
focus their attention on associative rather than nonasso-
ciative phenomena, but if this is allowed to become the
bias of the entire field of animal learning, then thee
theories that result are likely to be of rather limited
explanatory scope (Rescorla & Holland 1976).
There is lack of agreement among the critics as well'
as the defenders of traditional learning theory as to
what the biological boundaries criticism implies for the
study of learning. Seligman (1970), for example,
proposed a dimension of preparedness (similar to the
notion of belongingness proposed earlier by Garcia &
Koelling, 1966) for ordering associations according to
the ease with which they may be formed. Somewhat
arbitrarily, he delineates three types of association -
prepared, unprepared, and contraprepared - and
suggeststhat each type may have its own laws governing
the formation of associations. The concept of prepared-'
ness is a purely descriptive one, since there is nothing to
tell us which associations are prepared until after we I
have demonstrated a certain ease of formation
(Schwartz 1,974). Nor, having demonstrated this, and
identified certain associations as prepared, is it clear
that very much has been gained over the general
process account. The most that the concept of,
preparedness seems to offer is an additional variable in
the equations of learning (see Schwartz (1974) for
further criticisms of preparedness). [See also Eysenck:
"The Conditioning Model of Neurosis" BBS 2(2)
1979.]
Bolles's (1970; 1971) concept of the species-specific
defense reaction (SSDR) has already been discussed
Although it appears at first sight to refer to a restricted
type of prepared association (i.e. that certain avoidance
responses are learned more easily than others), the
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SSDR concept is in fact somewhat more predictive
than that of preparedness. We could, in principle,
determine from naturalistic observation which re-
sponses an animal actually uses as SSDR's and then
make predictions as to the ease with which various
escape and avoidance responses could be acquired
under experimental conditions. Although the applica-
bility of the SSDR concept is limited to escape and
avoidance conditioning, a similar concept could be
developed for application to other forms of learning,
such as that studied by Shettleworth (1975). In this case
one would identify species-specific feeding behaviors,
for example, and predict that these should be more
easily reinforced by food than other, nonfeeding
behaviors. However, the approach of testing predic-
tions based on concepts like the SSDR has not yet been
tried.
While Seligman and Bolles clearly hold out hope that
some principles of learning, albeit of restricted general-
ity, will be found to apply across species, other biologi-
cal boundaries theorists seem much less optimistic. The
dominant impression to be gained from the discussions
of Hinde (1973) and Shettleworth (1972), for example,
is that whatever principles of learning may be formu-
lated, they are most likely to be limited in their
applicability to one or a few species and situations. On
this view, research inspired by the biological bounda-
ries approach would consist largely in cataloging
constraints on the learning abilities of each species of
interest:
While it seems to be possible to delineate certain
kinds of constraints on learning, it is probably not
possible to predict where they will operate by
translating directly from one case to another.
However, as research in this area progresses, it may
well become possible to characterize the constraints
on learning and the cases in which they occur much
more explicitly (Shettleworth 1972, p. 59).
Rozin & Kalat (1971) occupy a position that is much
closer to that which I shall develop in later sections of
this paper. They stress the importance of considering
learning as a component of an animal's adaptation to
the specific requirements of its environment, but they
are also quite optimistic about the emergence of at least
some generality from these diverse data:
Given the constraints on adaptation produced by
basic properties of the nervous system, the cost of
evolving specializations, and the fact that most
species face a common set of problems, we doubt that
a separate learning mechanism would exist for every
situation, or that there would be separate laws for
each species (Rozin & Kalat 1971, p. 481).
The view to be developed later in this paper is similar
in spirit to that of Rozin and Kalat but, as will be seen,
differs from it in some respects.
An important recent contribution to the biological
boundaries debate has been made by Revusky (1977).
Revusky is a strong proponent of general process theory
who has met the challenge posed by taste-aversion
studies head on. His own experimental work has
focused on the long delay between stimulus (taste) and
reinforcement (illness) over which taste aversions can
be formed (Revusky & Garcia 1970; Revusky 1971),
and he has attempted to show that this phenomenon is
compatible with a general process account of learning,
in contrast to the claims of uniqueness by Seligman
(1970) and Rozin & Kalat (1971). Revusky (1977) is
especially concerned, and rightly so, with the lack of
any attempt by biological boundaries theorists to
provide an alternative framework to general process
theory within which we might search for general
principles of learning:
The basic evidence used against general process
learning theory seems to be lists of phenomena which
do not fit into a known general process framework.
Critics who use such "evidence," particularly Hinde
(1973), do not seem disturbed by the fact that few of
these phenomena can be explained by means of any
other reasonably rigorous approach (Revusky 1977,
p. 11).
Rozin and Kalat and other neoevolutionary [i.e.
biological boundaries] learning theorists aggrandize
minor science, the study of the particular, at the
expense of extremely important science, the study of
the general (Ibid., p. 10).
Like Logue (1979) and LoLordo (1979), Revusky is
concerned to defend the assertions of general process
theory by showing that many of the apparently
contrary data may be accounted for in general process
terms. An alternative response is to view the work of
biological boundaries theorists not only in terms of the
criticisms that it raises against general process theory,
but also as suggesting an alternative approach to the
study of learning that adopts a different point of
departure from that of general process theory. Rather
than starting from the position that the varieties of
learning reflect an underlying general process, but one
which may perhaps be modified in accordance with
particular adaptive requirements, we might start with
an explicitly ecological perspective on the problems of
learning. In adopting such a perspective, we would be
acknowledging the validity of the biological bounda-
ries criticism, but using ecological considerations as a
primary motivation in the study of learning rather than
as a set of secondary, and largely peripheral,
constraints. An approach of this kind would provide a
framework that can motivate a search for general
(ecological) principles of learning but that does not
require allegiance to the associationist tradition, or to
any other general process view. As these general princi-
ples become elucidated, we will be able to tackle the
separate question of whether they reflect an underly-
ing general process.
The question then arises whether the biological
boundaries approach itself might not provide such an
ecological alternative to the general process tradition.
There are three main reasons for believing that it
cannot, and these are discussed in the next section.
Limitations of the biological boundaries
alternative to general process learning theory
Lack of generality. It may be the case, as many critics
of general process theory imply, that there will be very
few interesting generalizations to be made about learn-
ing, because of the wide diversity of phenomena that
are revealed when learning is studied from a more
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naturalistic standpoint. If that were to prove true, it
would be extremely surprising, for there is a wealth of
phenomena that have been studied from an ecological,
naturalistic point of view and that have nonetheless
yielded significant general insights. The literatures on
population dynamics, predator-prey relationships,
social organization, and evolution all show substantial
theoretical development, based in large part on the
study of particular, natural instances (see Mayr 1963;
J. M. Emlen 1973; Alcock 1979). In some cases, general
principles have been found to reflect general processes,
and in others they have not. Given the primitive state
of our knowledge about learning outside the general
process tradition, it seems unduly defeatist at present to
deny the existence of general principles. A far more
productive strategy would be to admit that general
principles may exist, although we cannot at present see
what they are, and to consider how we might best go
about searching for them.
In fairness to those whose work is being criticised, it
should be admitted that part of the problem is to
dislodge a weight of tradition that insists on the exis-
tence of general processes and to draw attention to
adaptive specializations of learning that have been
overlooked in the past. It is, however, much easier to
dethrone a dominant paradigm, especially a long-lived
one, if one has a viable alternative to offer (Kuhn
1962), and the biological boundaries theorists do not
appear to have such an alternative.
Subservience to the general process tradition. Perhaps
the greatest drawback to the biological boundaries
approach is that it is less an alternative to general
process theory than an addendum. As Revusky (1977,
p. 12) points out, the very use of terms like "bounda-
ries" and "constraints" implies that there is something
(a general process?) that is being constrained. This is
more than just a semantic observation: The two main
theoretical proposals of biological boundaries theo-
rists — Seligman's (1970) concept of preparedness, and
Bolles's (1970) concept of the SSDR — look much more
like supplements to the appropriate portions of general
process theory than alternatives. A reasonable response
by the general process theorist would be to continue the
development of his general theory and to leave it to
others to detail its application to particular species or
ecological situations.
If the development of the poison-avoidance litera-
ture is a good indication of the kind of experimental
work that is to support the biological boundaries
approach, then we may also point to a methodological
subservience to the general process tradition. Although
some scientists may still believe in the conceptual
neutrality of methodology (i.e. that "facts" exist to be
"collected" by a convenient methodology, like collect-
ing pebbles on a beach), this view has been almost
universally abandoned, with good reason, by modern
philosophers of science (see Kuhn 1962; Hanson 1969;
Medawar 1969; Lakatos 1970). Methodology interprets
the world, and it does so in terms of the theoretical
predilections of its designers. Most of the experimental
designs in the poison-avoidance literature are minor
variants on themes developed by Pavlov, Thorndike,
and their intellectual descendants. These designs were
chosen for the study of learning precisely because they
are biologically arbitrary (e.g. Thorndike 1911, p. 30
and to prevent the subjects from relying on "the
helping hand of instinct" (ibid) in solving the problems
posed. This is not to say that modern psychologists
necessarily subscribe to a separation of learning and
instinct; but in searching for an alternative to (rather
than merely a criticism of) general process theory, it
seems counterproductive to employ the methods that
have been sanctioned by that theory. There is a very
real danger that these methods force an interpretation
of the world in the very theoretical terms to which we
seek an alternative.
An illustration of the power of the general process
tradition is provided by the introduction to a recent
poison-avoidance study by Galef & Osborne (1978).
They sought to investigate the hypothesis that aposo-
matism (bright coloration) in many poisonous insects is
an adaptation to the ability of potential predators to
learn to avoid such prey, which implies that predators
should indeed demonstrate the appropriate learning
ability. Clearly that is just the kind of hypothesis whose
investigation might promote a biological alternative to
general process theory. Having presented their hypoth-
esis, the authors discuss their choice of an experimental
species:
The choice of a species in which to test the preceding
hypothesis poses something of a problem. It might
well be argued on ecological grounds that, given the
rationale for the present studies, Rattus norvegicus
would be a particularly inappropriate choice. Not
only have we failed to find evidence in the literature
that rats encounter aposomatic prey in the wild, but
in addition it is well established that rats feed most
frequently in hours of darkness when visual cues are
difficult to utilise. On the other hand, models of
poison avoidance learning in the psychological
literature most frequently treat the rat as rep-
resenting the general mammalian case, from
which, for example, one extrapolates to poison
avoidance of humans or that of coyotes. The taste
aversion learning of other species is by contrast
viewed as, to some extent, idiosyncratic and
specialized.
Thus the species chosen for the present work is
necessarily undesirable from either the psychological
or the ecological point of view. Because the work
described below was more directly addressed to
questions concerning the proximal causation of
behavior than its function, we made the ecologically
inappropriate choice of subject species (Galef &
Osborne 1978, p. 908; emphases added).
Given the rationale for the study, the reference to
"proximal causation" in the last sentence can only
imply a belief in some general process underlying
poison avoidance, which is equally well revealed by
studying any form of poison avoidance in any species.
Although this may be a somewhat extreme example, it
illustrates the power that general process theory may
have to constrain experimentation in the absence of
any alternative theoretical framework.
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Ex post facto adaptive explanations. It is extremely
difficult to test hypotheses about the presumed adap-
tiveness of a biological trait, especially when it is not
amenable to direct manipulation, as in the case of a
learning ability. Unfortunately, it is very easy to think
up plausible adaptive stories about almost any charac-
teristic of an organism, and such stories tend to prevent
any real ecological interpretation of the characteristic
in question. This is widely recognized as a persistent
deficiency in much evolutionary writing (Ghiselin
1974); in some areas, such as the rapidly developing
field of sociobiology, it has reached epidemic propor-
tions (Lewontin 1979). [See also Ghiselin: "Categories,
Life, and Thinking" BBS 4(2) 1981 (forthcoming).] 
A primary aim of the biological boundaries
approach to learning is to offer an explanation of
learning in terms of its contribution to an animal's
adaptation to its environment — an aim that it shares
with the ecological approach that is developed later in
this paper. However, if such explanations are to be
truly revealing, they must be based on analysis, not
solely on conjecture (although conjecture may of course
be a source of fruitful hypotheses), and such analysis
has been lacking in the biological boundaries approach.
Thus, while it may be reasonable to argue that primates
can learn to associate visual cues with nausea because
they normally select food on the basis of such cues
(Johnson et al. 1975), in the absence of an empirical
demonstration of how primates do in fact select food,
this remains a hypothesis, not an explanation. Similarly,
the fact that hamsters can be reinforced with food for
digging, scrabbling, and rearing may be due to the
occurrence of such actions during feeding (Shettle-
worth 1975), but this needs to be demonstrated by
observations of naturally occurring behavior.
It may be objected that the adaptiveness of such
learning phenomena is either self-evident or readily
apparent from casual observation, and that there is no
need for detailed and time-consuming ecological anal-
ysis. Claims of self-evidence in science are of course
best treated as hypotheses, since they often turn out to
be false. Inferences about adaptiveness based on casual
observation should likewise be treated with extreme
caution, since it has proved difficult even to define
criteria for identifying adaptive behavior (Hinde 1975;
Lewontin 1978; Gould & Lewontin 1979; Glutton-
Brock & Harvey 1979). The adaptiveness of Batesian
 mimicry, in which a noxious model is mimicked by a
palatable species, might be considered "readily appar-
ent," and yet, despite detailed ecological study (e.g.
Brower, Cook, & Croze 1967), it is only recently that
convincing evidence of that adaptiveness has been
forthcoming (Jeffords, Sternburg & Waldbauer 1979).
It is true that an experienced investigator can often
make accurate inferences about the adaptive value of
an animal,s behavior, but the ease with which incor-
rect, though plausible, adaptive stories may be devised
(Lewontin 1979) suggests strongly that such inferences
should be framed as hypotheses rather than as explana-
tions. As more complex forms of learning attract the
attention of biologically motivated investigators, the
1 fingers inherent in ex post facto adaptive explanations
1 will increase.
A sketch of an ecological approach to the study
of learning
If it is agreed that science should aim for generality of
explanation, then, other things being equal, a single
theory of learning is to be preferred over a variety of
models of limited applicability. My aim in the remain-
der of this paper is not to attempt to formulate a
general theory of learning, but rather to indicate how
such a theory might be sought. My argument is that, to
do this, we must follow the lead of those who claim that
learning is to be understood in terms of adaptation. At
the same time, we must avoid arguing, as some have
done, that particularity of process implies particularity
of principle, as urged in the introduction to this paper.
If we can do this, then we will be able to discover
whatever general processes of learning may exist, but
we will not overlook important adaptive specializations
of learning, which is the major criticism voiced by
biological theorists against general process learning
theory.
The question of central importance in the ecological
approach to learning is: What do animals learn and
how do they learn it? The first part of this question
(What do animals learn?) reflects a concern with the
problems faced by animals in their natural environ-
ments; the second part (How do they learn it?), with
the ways in which experience contributes to the solu-
tions of those problems. The general process approach
has concerned itself almost exclusively with the second
part of the question. Anything that an animal can
learn, regardless of whether or not it actually does
learn such a thing under natural conditions, might be
selected for study by a general process theorist; his
choice would be constrained by convenience (Skinner
1950) and tradition, not by any consideration of
whether the task is a natural one for the animal under
study. A similar emphasis is evident in other fields
concerned with the development of behavior. Gottlieb
has remarked on
. . . the banality of recurrent demonstrations of
experiential modification or experimental mod-
ifiability, when these demonstrations are attended by
a failure to relate the significance of such
modifications to the normal (usual) route or outcome
of species-typical development. . . . In the literature
on this topic, there seems to be the tacit assumption
that, if a given feature of neural or behavioral
development can be shown to be susceptible to the
influences of experience, then experience must
normally play a part in its ontogeny. (Gottlieb 1976,
pp. 48-49)
McCall (1977) expresses a similar point of view in
regard to developmental psychology.
Gottlieb's caution applies equally to the study of
learning: Simply showing that an animal can learn a
particular task does not allow us to say that it actually
does learn the task, or even any similar task, under
natural circumstances. In order to be able to make this
assertion, we must study the animal under natural
conditions, or under some close approximation to them
in the laboratory (Schneirla 1950; Miller 1977; Petrino-
vich 1979).
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Some readers will no doubt object that psychologists
are primarily interested in studying the mechanisms of
learning, rather than the ways in which those mecha-
nisms are employed under particular natural circum-
stances. It is frequently unclear what is to be under-
stood by the term "mechanism" in this context. Not all
persons- who declare such an interest are concerned
with the physiological bases of learning (one possible
definition of "mechanism"), and the term requires
some clarification before the strength of the objection
can be properly evaluated. However, whatever inter-
pretation is given, an important problem remains. The
objection implicitly assumes that there is some underly-
ing process (or processes) of learning that does not
change as a function of what the animal is learning to
do (that is, it assumes a fairly strong version of the
general process view). Such an assumption is absolutely
required of an argument which claims that "the mech-
anisms" of learning are equally well revealed by any
task situation, regardless of how closely it approximates
one that is a natural task for the animal. This assump-
tion is by no means logically necessary; in fact, it is a
very strong empirical claim that surely remains to be
demonstrated. While it may be true, it cannot be
assumed to be true. In searching for a general theory of
learning, we require an approach that can determine
the truth or falsity of that claim, rather than assuming
its truth.
If the assumption of a common mechanism underly-
ing learning is mistaken, then a serious problem arises
 with any approach that assumes it — namely, the
possibility of creating behavioral artifacts. The study of
behavior is a part of natural science and, as such, is
concerned with the explanation of natural phenomena.
Distinguishing natural from artifactual phenomena is
frequently very difficult in practice, but in principle it
is quite straightforward: Natural phenomena are those
that exist independently of our investigations of them.
When we make investigations, it is therefore important
to determine which of our observations reflect the
natural organization of the phenomena we are
studying, and which are artifacts that reflect only the
peculiarities of our investigative methods. When an
anatomist studies the structure of a particular cell type,
for instance, he may use various staining and fixing
procedures to highlight certain aspects of structure and
suppress others. It is well known to anatomists that the
incautious use of many of these procedures produces
artifacts that are highly reproducible and that can
easily be mistaken for natural phenomena. The study
of behavior, of course, carries with it no guarantee of
exemption from this danger. The fact that an animal
behaves in a regular and reproducible manner in an
artificial laboratory environment does not mean that
what we observe in such an environment necessarily
demonstrates anything about the natural organization
of behavior. The regularities observed may be imposed
on the animal's behavior by the characteristics of the
situation and may have nothing whatever to do with
the regularities of natural organization that we seek to
describe and explain.
This danger has been pointed out by Seligman
(1970) and Petrinovich (1979), and the ecological ap-
proach strives to avoid it by ensuring that the phe-
nomena of learning that we study are natural ones-
that they do in fact exist independently of our investi-
gations of learning. Such an approach therefore begins
by analyzing each example of learning as an adaptation
to a natural environment, rather than introducing
adaptive considerations after the fact of laboratory
studies (see the preceding remarks on ex post facto
adaptive explanation).
The conception of adaptation. The concept of adapta-
tion is central to any ecological study; it is a formal
statement of the intuition that biologists have had since
well before Darwin that animals are in general very
well equipped to cope with the demands of their
environments. In pre-evolutionary biology, that fact
was seen as the result of providential design; since
Darwin, it has been interpreted as the outcome of
natural selection. Despite its importance in ecological
study, and in biology in general, finding a broadly
acceptable definition of adaptation has proven very
difficult (see Bock & von Wahlert 1965; Dobzhansky
1968; Brandon, 1978; Lewontin 1978; Bock 1980). The
most complete analysis of adaptation is that provided
by Sommerhoff (1950; see Johnston & Turvey 1980).
In Sommerhoff's account, an animal's adaptation to
its environment is expressed in terms of its ability to
attain a set of goals in that environment. The nature of
those goals depends, of course, on the animal under
study; they might include orientation to a nest site,
capture of a certain kind of prey, courtship of a mate,
or defense against certain predators. In general, they
comprise whatever states of affairs must be brought
about, typically recurrently, in order that the animal
may survive and reproduce. The animal's ability to
attain those goals depends upon various physiological,
anatomical, behavioral, and/or developmental charac-
teristics that together constitute the biological support
for adaptation, and the analysis of particular cases of
adaptation involves the specification of the pertinent
characteristics. The technical and conceptual difficul-
ties involved in such endeavors are considerable and
have been discussed by Hinde (1975), Lewontin (1978;
1979), Gould & Lewontin (1,979), and others.
Two points that have been stressed by recent
authors' are particularly relevant to the present discus-
sion. The first of these is that not all characteristics of
an organism necessarily contribute to the biological
support for adaptation, and those that do may not be
optimally designed for the adaptive role that they play .
Characteristics may be vestigial, such as the vermiform
appendix in man, or they may show adaptively neutral
variation, such as eye or hair color. Even in the case d
adaptive characteristics, there may be internal
constraints on development or on the organization of
the genome that preclude selection of an optimal;
design in the course of evolution (Lewontin 1978). The
ecological study of learning must therefore take very
seriously the possibility that not all forms of behavior or 1
behavioral change can be considered to be adaptive.
The fact that an animal can learn to perform a task is
no guarantee of an adaptive role for either the task or
the learning ability.
The second point is that adaptation is an inherently
relational concept: When we speak of some character-
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istic of an organism as being adaptive, we necessarily
imply an environment to which it is adapted. If we are
to reach an understanding of learning as, or in terms of,
adaptation,' then we must pay close attention to the
nature of the environments to which particular kinds of
learning are adaptations (Slobodkin 1968; Slobodkin &
Rapoport 1974).
The nature of the environment: task description. Like
all other approaches to the study of learning, the
ecological approach seeks an answer, or set of answers,
to the question: "How do animals learn?" But from the
ecological point of view, we see that the question
cannot be answered in that form. Different animals
have different adaptive relationships with their envi-
ronments, and so the question must be broken down
into two questions, to be answered separately for each
animal species. The first of these takes the form: "What
are the behavioral problems that this animal must solve
in adapting to its environment?" The second question
takes a more familiar form: "How does the animal
learn to solve those problems?"' Not only are questions
of the first kind equal in importance to those of the
second, they also clearly have logical priority. To draw
an analogy, if we were to ask how to design a bridge, an
engineer's first question, of necessity, would be: "What
is it that you wish to bridge?" A question of this kind is
a request for a task description, and task descriptions
play an important and fundamental role in the ecologi-
cal approach to the study of learning.
The term "task description" comes from the litera-
ture of artificial intelligence (e.g. Simon 1969). In order
to write a program to solve a particular problem, one
requires a detailed analysis of what the problem is. In
many cases (for example: Compute 2 + 2) the task
description is quite straightforward. In other cases (for
example: Play a good game of chess) writing the task
description may be a major part of the whole endeav-
our. The problem of writing task descriptions for
learning is far more likely to resemble the latter of
these two examples than the former (see further
below).
The claim that descriptions of "What?" are logically
prior to and as important as analyses of "How?" has
been made by Gibson (1966) in his ecological theory of
perception, and before him by Brunswik (1952).
Gibson points out that, outside the psychological labo-
ratory, animals (including humans) do not perceive
brief, isolated flashes of light; rather, they perceive
objects and events that are revealed by patterns of
stimulation in a dynamically changing, richly textured
optic array. He argues that it is surely an empirical
question whether the means by which we perceive the
former stimuli are the same as those by which we
perceive the latter, and that in order to answer this
question we need to know what is being perceived in
the natural case. That is, we need a task description for
the perceiving organism. [See also Ullman: "Against
Direct Perception" BBS 3(3) 1980.]
My argument in regard to learning is similar to
Gibson,s in regard to perception. In order to answer the
question "How does this animal learn?", we must first
ask "What does it learn to do?" (see also Petrinovich
1979).
Task descriptions in the study of learning. It must not
be supposed that the formulation of task descriptions
for the study of learning will be an unproblematic
enterprise. On the contrary, determining in useful
detail what it is that animals learn is likely to require as
much effort and ingenuity as that already devoted to
the question of how they learn. Several authors have
seriously addressed the issue of task descriptions
(although not by that name) in their studies of learning,
and a brief consideration of some of them will illustrate
what may be involved.
Charlesworth (1976; 1978; 1979) has studied the
nature of the problems typically encountered by young
(2- to 4-year-old) children in their home environments.
As part of a larger research program designed to
analyze the "survival or adaptive value of intelligence"
(Charlesworth 1979, p. 212), the description of those
problems corresponds to the task-description stage of
an ecological study of learning. It answers the question:
"What are the problems that young children typically
solve?" Further research will clearly be needed to
determine how children learn to solve those problems,
but Charlesworth's research already suggests that seri-
ous concern with task descriptions may lead to a
picture of the child's intelligence rather different from
that provided by the traditional approaches. For exam-
ple, he notes that "very few instances of complex
problems, such as those used in psychological testing
or tool-using studies, were observed" (Charlesworth
1979, p. 214; emphases added).
The work of S. T. Emlen on the development of
migratory orientation in the indigo bunting (Passerina
cyanea) is perhaps a paradigmatic example of the
ecological approach to the study of learning (reviewed
by Emlen 1972; 1975). The first studies in Emlen's
research program (Emlen 1967a; 1967b) involved the
task-description stage; they answered the question
"What behavioral problems are involved in migratory
orientation for the indigo bunting?" The bunting is a
nocturnal migrant; by placing mature, ecologically
experienced birds under a planetarium dome during
the normal migratory season, Emlen was able to arrive
at a precise description of the orientation skill. Briefly,
configurational information distributed over groups of
stars, especially those within about 10° of the pole star,
provides the basis on which the bird selects an initial
migratory direction (Emlen 1967a; 1967b). Arriving at
the task description required information on the
species' habits and life history to determine what
orientation cues might be available to it, together with
experimental manipulation to determine which of
those cues are actually used for orientation. On the
basis of this ecological task description, Emlen was able
to proceed with an investigation of the second question:
"How is this orientation skill learned?" (see below).
It is interesting to contrast the ecological approach in
the study of learned orientation in a particular species
with that adopted by traditional learning theorists in
the study of learned orientation as a general, supra-
specific problem. When Small (1901) used mazes in his
studies of rat learning, he did so on the plausible, though
so far as I know undemonstrated, assumption that a
maze is a close approximation to the burrow systems in
which rats live — that is, he attempted to set up a task
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description for this kind of learning. Subsequent devel-
opment of Small's work eliminated most of the ecologi-
cal content of the task description and reduced the
problem to one of "behavior at a choice point" (Tol-
man 1938). The relation of the logical conclusion of this
development (the T maze) to any problem actually
faced by the rat is obscure and has certainly received
no attention by general process theorists. The methodo-
logical trend in this area of learning research has been
to emphasize the logical structure of the task to the
complete exclusion of its ecological structure. That
animals normally learn about logic is, I think, debat-
able, although if they learn anything at all, they must
learn about their ecology. Since different species have
different ecologies, they may well learn different
things, even within the general domain of orientation.
The orientation problems faced by a rat and by a
migrating bunting are very different, and it is not clear
that anything is gained by attempting to strip them of
their ecological content and reduce them to problems
of logic. My general point is supported by Lynch's
(1961) classic study of human orientation in cities,
which demonstrated that the ecological structure of a
city may be much more important than its geometric
structure in determining how people find their way
around. The geometric structure of a city is ecologi-
cally neutral in the same way the logical structure of a
learning task is. [Cf. Olton: "Hippocampus, Space and
Memory" BBS 1(3) 1979, and O'Keefe & Nadel: The
hippocampus as a cognitive map, BBS 2(4) 1979.]
What general guidelines do these examples offer for
the construction of task descriptions? It is of central
importance that task descriptions start with the study
of the animal,s behavior under natural, species-typical
conditions, but it is unlikely that naturalistic observa-
tion can provide all the required information. In many
cases, experimental study will be necessary, especially
to determine the sources of information in the environ-
ment with respect to which the behavior of interest is
controlled. Some readers may feel that the requirement
of naturalistic observation limits the ecological study of
learning to individuals who have the necessary training
and interest in the field study of behavior; but, in fact,
many of the data from which task descriptions could be
constructed are already available in the ethological
literature. In particular, the problems of orientation
and feeding have long been the concern of behavioral
ecologists, and numerous excellent studies of the ways
in which these problems are solved in many different
species have been published (see J.M. Emlen 1973;
Brown 1975; Alcock 1979). The ecological study of
learning need not be forestalled by any lack of data on
which to base task descriptions.
Local principles of adaptation by learning. The provi-
sion of a task description for behavior is only the first
stage, albeit a most important one, in an ecological
approach to the study of learning. Having answered
the question "What does this animal learn to do?", we
can approach the question that is of central importance
to any student of learning: "How does it learn to do
that?"
Generally speaking, the answer to this question
involves a specification of the contributions of experi-
ence to the development of behavior (as given by the
task description) and an analysis of the means by which
such experience has its effects (ultimately, though not
necessarily immediately, in physiological terms). More
specifically, we might seek information on any of the
following points (this is not an exhaustive list):
1. What are the necessary and sufficient experiential
conditions for the normal development of this behav-
ior? '112. Is the experience required, or most effective, at
certain times if learning is to occur?
3. How do different experiences interact in the
development of the behavior?
4. How does the development of one behavior inter-
act with that of another?
5. In what ways does early learning constrain learn-
ing that is possible in later life? In particular, is the
acquisition of certain behavioral skills necessary before
others can develop?
6. Are the effects of experience primarily maintain-
ing, facilitative, or inductive?' (Gottlieb 1976).
Because the behavior whose development is being
analyzed has been given an ecological task description
(e.g. feeding in a certain manner on certain foods), the
kind of analysis implied by the above questions is
implicitly undertaken in an adaptive framework. The
fact that these questions reflect an ecological/adaptive
approach to the analysis of learning must not, of course,
be taken to mean that their answers demonstrate the
adaptiveness of either the behavior or the means
whereby it is learned. Determining the adaptiveness of
learning is an extremely difficult theoretical and exper-
imental problem (Tinbergen 1963; Hinde 1975;
Lewontin 1978) that will not be considered here. A
partial treatment of this problem will be published
elsewhere (Johnston, in press).
The kind of analysis implied by the six questions
listed above, and others like them, deliberately blurs
the distinction between development and learning
(Johnston, in preparation). The concept of develop-
ment as a passive unfolding or maturation under
genetic control has been almost universally rejected on
the basis of repeated demonstrations that nearly all
development shows some important dependence on
experiential factors (see Kuo 1922; Lehrman 1953;
Schneirla 1956; Gottlieb 1976; Oppenheim, in press).
In more recent usage, "development" has come to
imply the ontogeny of species-typical behavior,
whereas "learning" often refers to the acquisition of
the highly artificial kinds of behavior studied within
the general process tradition. (This is, of course, a
question of emphasis rather than of definition.) If the
ecological approach to learning is to be successful, it is
clear that this distinction can no longer be maintained.
Many of the phenomena traditionally analyzed as
instances of "development" will undoubtedly turn out
to have important implications for an ecological theory
of learning and should not be excluded from the scope
of such a theory by arbitrary definition (Johnston &
Turvey, in press).
A few words should be said here concerning the
methodological approach required for an ecological
analysis of learning. There is nothing in the ecological
attitude that precludes the use of artificial situations for
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the study of learning. Indeed, without manipulating an
animal,s environment, it is clearly impossible to deter-
mine the role of various kinds of experience in the
development of its behavior. The ecological approach
does demand, however, that such artificial situations be
used to test hypotheses about learning as it occurs
naturally, rather than serving as objects of study in
themselves. The insights to be gained from the use of
artificial conditions depend on the contrast with devel-
opment under normal circumstances, and the defini-
tion of normal circumstances must obviously be based
on ecological description (Gottlieb 1976, pp. 48-9;
Miller 1977).
The aim of the analyses I have been discussing is to
provide a set of local principles of adaptation for each
species, behavior. The ecological task description for
each behavior of interest specifies the nature of the
adaptation to be accounted for; it describes the way in
which the animal solves a particular adaptive problem,
such as feeding, orienting, or communicating with
conspecifics. The aim of the analysis is to specify how
this solution is reached in the course of development.
The results of the analysis might be expressed as a
model (not necessarily formal), which is an explicit
statement of the principles by which the animal
achieves its ontogenetic adaptation to some aspect of its
environment. These principles are termed "local"
because there is no way to determine, without further
analyses of other species, whether they apply to more
than the single species in which they are described. The
problems of arriving at more general principles of
learning are discussed in the following section.
A good example of the way in which the search for
local principles of adaptation may be carried out is
provided by Gottlieb's (1971) studies of the develop-
ment of auditory species identification in ducklings.
Space precludes a comprehensive review of these very
extensive experiments; what follows is a selective
account. Incubator-hatched, maternally naive Peking
or mallard ducklings (Anas platyrhynchos) show a
strong tendency to approach the mallard maternal call
24 hours after hatching, preferring that call to the
maternal calls of other species (Gottlieb 1971). Selec-
tive approach to the conspecific call is clearly a skill of
considerable adaptive importance to young ducklings,
who rely on their mother for warmth and protection
for some time after hatching (Collias & Collias 1956;
Miller & Gottlieb 1978). Gottlieb's studies concern the
role of prenatal auditory experience in the develop-
ment of this species-typical auditory preference.
Normal Peking ducklings start to vocalize in the egg at
about 24 days of incubation, three days before hatch-
ing. Embryos that are surgically devocalized before
that time fail to show the normal postnatal auditory
preference for certain features of the maternal call, in
particular for the species-typical repetition rate of 4
notes/second (Gottlieb 1978). Since the embryos show
a selective response (diminution of bill-clapping; Gott-
lieb 1979) to the mallard call before the onset of
self-produced vocalizations (at about 22 days of incu-
bation), the role of those vocalizations is to maintain a
preexisting auditory preference (Gottlieb 1976). If a
tape recording of the embryonic call is played to
devocalized embryos, the postnatal preference for the
maternal call is reinstated (Gottlieb 1980), confirming
the role of self-produced stimulation in the develop-
ment of this adaptive behavioral skill.
Gottlieb,s results do not reveal the kinds of processes
that would be called "learning" by someone working
within the general process tradition, but they are the
kind of finding with which an ecological approach to
learning must be prepared to deal, since they demon-
strate an important role for experience in the develop-
ment of an adaptive behavioral skill.
A second example of the search for local principles
of adaptation comes from the work of Emlen (1972) on
the development of migratory orientation in the indigo
bunting (discussed earlier). Emlen (1969) found that
when young birds were prevented from viewing the
night sky in their first year (prior to the onset of any
migratory tendency), no directional preference was
exhibited in the following migratory season — an exam-
ple of an inductive effect of experience (Gottlieb 1976).
Further study (Emlen 1970) showed that exposure to a
rotating star field is crucial to the development of
normal directional preference; exposure to a stationary
star field does not support normal development. A
point of further interest is that it does not matter
whether the star field rotates about the normal pole star
(Polaris) or another star (Betelgeuse); birds exposed to a
star field rotating about Betelgeuse subsequently take
their bearings from that star rather than from Polaris.
These two examples illustrate two important points
that were made in the previous discussion. The first is
that ecological analyses of learning are based on
ecological task descriptions. The role of the task
description in Emlen's work has already been
described. In Gottlieb's research its importance is
shown by the fact that Peking ducklings will only
develop a preference for the species-typical call; expo-
sure to altered calls will not induce a nontypical prefer-
ence (Gottlieb 1980). Without a task description (i.e. an
answer to the question: "What preference normally
develops?"), it is clear that the development of audi-
tory preferences in this species would hardly have been
susceptible to an experimental analysis.
The second point concerns the use of artificially
modified environments in ecologically motivated
analyses of development: Both series of studies utilized
sophisticated experimental techniques, including surgi-
cal manipulations, to elucidate the role of experience in
these instances of development. I emphasize the latter
point because it is often believed, mistakenly, that the
ecological study of behavior is necessarily limited to
naturalistic observation and precludes experimental
analysis in the laboratory. What is precluded by the
ecological approach is the use of ecologically arbitrary
experimental designs for such analyses.
The results discussed here come from two illuminat-
ing lines of research out of many that might have been
selected. Other examples that illustrate the ecological
approach to the study of learning would include the
studies of bird-song learning by Marler and his
colleagues (Marler 1970; Nottebohm 1970; Marler &
Mundinger 1971; see Marler 1977, for some general
theoretical principles that may be drawn from this
work) and the many studies of feeding behavior that
have taken ecological data as a starting point (e.g.,
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Hogan 1977; Pietrewicz & Kamil 1977; 1979; Kamil
1978; Gray & Tardif 1979). [See also Toates: "Homeo-
stasis and Drinking" BBS 2(1) 1979.]
Global principles of adaptation. The discovery of local
principles of adaptation is clearly an enterprise of
considerable scientific importance in its own right. The
search for a general theory of learning, however,
demands that we also attempt to discover principles of
ontogenetic adaptation that apply to more than a single
species or situation. In the past, such global principles
have been presumed to be best revealed by isolating
the animal from the specific demands of its natural
environment. Implicit in this strategy is the assumption
that principles of learning apply to the animal alone,
hence that ecological considerations are peripheral to
an account of learning. By contrast, the ecological
approach views learning in terms of adaptation, so that
its understanding rests on an analysis of both the
animal and its environment. This strategy has been
explicit in the preceding discussions of task descriptions
and of local principles of adaptation. The search for
global principles demands an equally explicit ecologi-
cal strategy.
The probable importance of an ecological strategy in
accounting for learning as a natural phenomenon may
be seen by considering the general finding that
emerges clearly from many studies of learning that
have been conducted by ethologists: In many cases
where experience has been shown to play a role in
behavioral development, only normally occurring,
species-typical experience (that provided by the natu-
ral environment) permits the development of adaptive
behavior. Indigo buntings must be exposed to orienta-
tion cues early in development, but specific natural
cues (a rotating starfield) are required for normal
development of the orientation skill (Emlen 1970).
White-crowned sparrows will not develop song without
exposure to a song model, but that model must corre-
spond to the species-typical song; other songs will not
be learned (Marler 1970). Red-legged frog tadpoles
require early exposure to patterned substrates if they
are to acquire a substrate preference, but preferences
for a striped (natural) substrate pattern are acquired
more readily than preferences for a checkerboard
(unnatural) pattern (Wiens 1970).
It is very hard to see how a nonecological theory of
learning could ever account for all of the above exam-
ples without postulating various ad hoc exclusionary
rules to fit the manifest ecological constraints on each
species' learning ability. Whether an ecological theory
can give a satisfactory account of these examples
remains to be seen, but ecological principles of some
kind are clearly needed to reflect the special role that
the natural environment plays in each case. Many
examples of learning, it appears, are closely tailored to
the nature of the specific environments in which the
learners live. In the terminology of Bekoff & Fox
(1972), development is both environment-dependent
and environment-expectant, since it expects the partic-
ular environment on which it depends. Understanding
learning, therefore, requires description and analysis of
the environment that is learned about; it requires an
ecological approach to the study of learning as adapta-
tion.
By considering learning as an instance of adaptation,
we imply a viewpoint from which learning is seen as a
process that ensures a correspondence between an
animal's behavioral skills and the requirements of its
natural environment. From the point of view of adap-
tation, the animal and its environment stand to one
another in a complementary relationship, and follow-
ing the notation of Turvey & Shaw (1979), we may
write this relationship as:
Animal o Environment.
The terms "animal" and "environment" in such a
relationship are variables that range over a number of
species and ecological niches, respectively. To the
extent that animals are in fact adapted to their environ-
ments, the complementarity relationship o holds for
natural ecosystems (i.e. animals and their natural envi-
ronments). It may also hold for some artificial ecosys-
tems, since an animal may well be adapted to environ-
ments other than its natural one, but here I shall
consider only the natural case.
Typically, we would not attempt to specify all of the
aspects of organismic and environmental structure in
such a relationship. Rather, we identify some aspect of
the animal (such as its learning ability) as being of
special interest and describe that aspect in relation to
appropriate aspects of the environment. In the ecologi-
cal study of learning, basing analyses of learning on
ecological task descriptions helps to ensure that the
appropriate aspect of the environment has in fact been
described.
The problem that we face is that of replacing the
symbol o by a principle of learning that remains
invariant over all (or at least many) species; from the
preceding discussion it can be seen that this might best
be achieved by allowing "animal" and "environment"
to covary within the constraints imposed by the struc-
ture of natural ecosystems. On this view, general prin-
ciples emerge by virtue of the complementary diver-
sity among animals and their environments, not in
spite of the diversity among animals considered alone.
The increased generality that is provided by an
ecological approach to the analysis of animal structure
and function is well illustrated by Gordon Walls,s
classic volume, The Vertebrate Eye and its Adaptive
Radiation (1942). Roughly half of Walls,s book is
devoted to an ecological analysis of optic structure, in
which the problems of vision in different environments
(diurnal, nocturnal, aquatic, terrestrial, etc.) are
discussed with reference to the eyes of animals that
inhabit them. A number of interesting general princi-
ples emerge from this undertaking — principles that
clearly could not have emerged if the various species
had been considered in isolation from the environ-
ments to which they have become adapted. Walls does
not provide formal expressions of these principles, but
an informal example will suffice to make the point.
The shape of the lens shows considerable variation
among different species of vertebrates. In some, such as
man, it is greatly flattened, with a flatness index
(diameter divided by thickness) of about 2.7. In others,
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such as most fishes, it is more nearly spherical, with an
index of about 1.0. Broadly speaking, the lenses of
terrestrial animals are much flatter than are those of
aquatic ones, and an explanation of this diversity may
be given in ecological terms. In air, light is strongly
refracted at the cornea and needs only weak refraction
at the lens to reach a focus on the retina — hence a
flattened, weakly refracting lens in terrestrial verte-
brates. However, in water, light is hardly refracted at
all at the cornea and, in consequence, must be
refracted more strongly at the lens — hence a spherical,
strongly refracting lens in aquatic vertebrates. The
general principle implied here holds true in the case of
related species with contrasting habits: The spiny
anteater ( Tachyglossus), a terrestrial marsupial, has a
flatness index of 2.75, whereas the duck-billed platypus
(Ornithorhynchos), which is largely aquatic, has an
index of 1.4 (Walls 1942, p. 669). A particularly inter-
esting test case is the South American four-eyed fish
(Anableps). This animal has a remarkable ocular anat-
omy related to its habit of swimming on the water
surface with the top of its head protruding into the air.
Each eye has two pupils, one looking up into the air
and one down into the water. Light passing through
each pupil is focused onto a separate retina by a single
lens occupying the middle of the eyeball. The lens is
oblate, having a high flatness index when measured in
regard to the upward-looking (terrestrial) pupil and a
low index in regard to the downward-looking (aquatic)
pupil. The peculiar anatomy of the Anableps eye is
readily understood in terms of its natural habitat,
which lies at the interface of two environments with
very different optical requirements (see Walls 1942,
frontispiece and p. 434).
The general principle that explains variation in lens
shape in terms of the refractive properties of different
ecological media is unlikely to provide a full account-
ing of such variation, but it does illustrate the point that
a substantial amount of generality can be extracted
from structural diversity by an appeal to ecological
considerations. In the ecological study of learning, a
search for general principles requires a similar strategy.
Rather than being a search for invariant properties of
animals (as in the general process approach to learning)
it is a search for invariant relationships between
animals and their environments. Adopting such an
approach, we might find, for example, that the number
of encounters (trials) that an animal requires in order to
learn to avoid noxious food items is a function (possibly
complex) of the harmfulness of noxious items, the
relative frequency of noxious items, and the energetic
costs associated with the capture of a single food item.
The independent variables in such a general principle
are, of course, specified as part of the task description,
not on the basis of arbitrary laboratory manipulations.
Note that any such general principle is quite neutral
with respect to the existence of general processes of
learning, as was also the case with the thermoregula-
tory example discussed earlier. It might be that a
species whose environment includes very harmful
potential food items learns the identity of correct food
by "imprinting" food brought to it by its parents (and
hence presumably safe), whereas a species for whom
even the most noxious food item is relatively harmless
may learn more slowly, by means of "association."
Here "imprinting" and "association" are labels iden-
tifying local principles of adaptation that reflect
different underlying processes of learning. The general
principle is not made any less general by virtue of this
fact, and, of course, some (or even many) ecological
general principles may indeed reflect common
processes among the local principles on which they are
based. In the ecological approach, the existence of such
general processes becomes a matter for demonstration
rather than assertion.
The relationships among the three levels of ecologi-
cal inquiry into learning, task description, local princi-
ples of adaptation, and global principles of adaptation,
are illustrated in Figure 1. This figure emphasizes that,
in contrast to the biological boundaries approach, the
ecological approach is inherently ecological; ecological
considerations are not simply brought in after the fact
to explain data that do not accord with the general
process view.
An important point concerns the question of the
dimensions along which we should search for global
principles among a diversity of local principles of
adaptation. It would be premature to attempt to offer a
definitive answer to this question, but I shall briefly
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discuss three possible alternatives, which are not meant
to be either exhaustive or mutually exclusive.
The first lies closest to the spirit of the ecological
approach, as I have outlined it in this paper, and
involves searching along common task dimensions,
identifying principles of learning relevant to feeding,
orientation, habitat selection, social behavior, and so
forth. Each such task dimension defines, albeit crudely,
an aspect of the adaptive relationship between animal
and environment that is common to all those species in
which it can be identified. Searching for global princi-
ples along task dimensions thus seems a profitable
strategy for understanding learning in terms of adapta-
tion, which is a cornerstone of the ecological approach.
The second strategy is more familiar and is asso-
ciated with comparative psychology as it is tradition-
ally practiced — namely to search within taxonomic
groups, to identify mammalian, avian, reptilian, and
other principles of learning. The justification for this
strategy is well known: Animals that are descended
from a common ancestor presumably share characteris-
tics that reflect ancestral constraints on possible evolu-
tionary divergence. However, if a search along taxo-
nomic lines is to contribute to an ecological theory of
learning, it is important that the first two elements of
an ecological inquiry — namely task descriptions and
the elucidation of local principles of adaptation — play
a more important role than they do in traditional
inquiry (e.g. Bitterman 1975). It is not sufficient
merely to compare animals on an arbitrary array of
learning tasks. Rather, the tasks used should reflect the
real adaptive problems that the various species
encounter in their natural environments.
Finally, the third approach involves searching
within groups defined by habitat or general life-style —
that is, by evolutionary analogy rather than homology.
Thus, for example, we might look for general princi-
ples peculiar to arboreal animals, carnivores, migratory
species, or highly social animals. This again is a rela-
tively familiar comparative strategy, the aim being to
discover principles that reflect evolutionary analogies
in the abilities (in this case learning abilities) of
different animals that adopt similar life-styles. This
approach is an especially important source of informa-
tion on the nature of the selection pressures responsible
for the evolution of particular kinds of learning abili-
ties. Once again, it is important that the learning skills
among which such general principles of analogy are
sought be anchored in ecological task descriptions for
the particular species of interest.
I feel that all three of these alternatives will have
something to contribute to a final general ecological
theory of learning, since they provide insights into
three different kinds of generality that hold among
animals: adaptive, phylogenetic, and ecological.
Ethology and the ecological study of learning. The
study of animal behavior in relation to the natural
environment is often viewed as characteristic of the
field of ethology, although it is sometimes forgotten
that a number of psychologists have also adopted an
ecological approach in their studies of behavior (see
Miller 1977 for examples). Both by training and by
inclination, then, ethologists are well-equipped to
make important contributions to an ecological
approach to learning, as frequent reference to the work
of ethologists in this paper demonstrates. The essential
stage of task description is one where ethological
research has already provided a substantial body of
literature that can serve as the basis for the study of
whatever learning may be involved in these forms of
behavior. Many instances of learning, such as the
development of bird song, habitat selection, orienta-
tion, and prey capture, have attracted the attention of
ethologists, but such studies lack the conceptual unifi-
cation that might lead to the formulation of general
theoretical principles of broad explanatory power.
The psychological study of learning, while lacking in
ecological content, has strongly emphasized the desir-
ability of seeking such general explanatory principles.
Perhaps because psychology established its hegemony
in the field of learning theory at a time when etholo-
gists were largely concerned with the study of "instinc-
tive" behavior, ethologists have generally drawn
heavily on psychological theories in their discussions of
learning (e.g. Thorpe 1963; Lorenz 1965; 1969). Find-
ing those theories lacking in various respects, etholo-
gists have offered criticism, but little in the way of
alternatives (e.g. Lorenz 1965; Hinde 1973; cf. Mader
1977). It is clear that the ecological approach to learn-
ing advocated here will best be advanced by a synthesis
between the traditions of psychology and ethology in
regard to the study of behavior.
Concluding discussion
The ecological approach to the study of learning that I
have outlined in this paper offers a more radical
alternative to general process learning theory than does
the currently popular biological boundaries approach.
The latter has served a most important critical func-
tion, but, for the reasons discussed above, it seems to
have serious limitations as a true alternative to general
process theory. Let me therefore summarize the most
important characteristics of the ecological approach,
both theoretical and empirical, as contrasted with the
general process approach, on the one hand, and with
the biological boundaries approach, on the other.
The essence of an ecological approach to the study of
learning is the realization that animals learn, under
natural circumstances, to perform certain specific
kinds of behavior. These instances of learning consti-
tute the natural phenomena that it is the business of
learning theory, as a branch of natural science, to
explain. Unlike the general process approach, the
ecological approach makes no prior assertions as to the
existence of general processes underlying these various
instances of learning. It is the business of students of
learning to discover such processes, if they exist, rather
than to assume them as the basis for a program of
research. While it differs from the general process
approach in reserving judgment on the existence of
general processes of learning, the ecological approach
differs also from the biological boundaries approach in
being specifically concerned with the search for
general principles of learning. The ecological
approach, while fully endorsing the biological bounda-
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ries criticism, supplements that criticism with an alter-
native theoretical framework, quite distinct from that
of general process theory.
The ecological analysis of learning is carried out at
three different levels. The first anchors the analysis to
natural phenomena of learning by providing task
descriptions of what it is that animals actually learn in
the course of their development. Constructing a task
description requires that we study animals under natu-
ral or seminatural conditions, rather than merely
making reasonable guesses as to what animals actually
learn; there are many cases in which such descriptions
are already available in the literature. In some
instances of learning, constructing the task descriptions
may be just as difficult, and may require just as much
ingenuity, as analyzing the processes whereby learning
occurs - it is most important that the significance of
this element of the ecological approach be properly
appreciated.
Given a task description for a particular instance of
learning, the analysis continues with an investigation of
the various experiences that contribute to the develop-
ment of the skill in question, and the ways in which
these experiences have their effects. How such investi-
gations are to be carried out depends, of course, on the
particular instance of learning being examined. Several
exemplary studies are available in the literature; some
of these are described above. Developmental analysis
of this kind provides the basis for formulating local
principles of adaptation that explain how individuals of
a particular species learn to cope with the requirements
of their particular environment.
The insistence that we formulate local (species-
specific) principles of adaptation as a prelude to the
search for more general principles is an important
difference between the ecological and general process
approaches to learning. An equally important differ-
ence between the ecological and biological boundaries
approaches, both of which see a need for ecological
study of particular species, is that the ecological
approach advocates a third level of analysis: the search
for global principles of adaptation that apply to more
than a single species. This difference arises because
whereas many biological boundaries theorists despair
of finding unity within the wide diversity of animals,
the ecological approach seeks such unity in the comple-
mentary diversity of animals and their natural environ-
ments.
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NOTES
1. The points to be discussed do not represent original
insights by modern authors. They were well appreciated by
Darwin (1859) and by most subsequent evolutionary theorists.
However, they are commonly not appreciated in less rigorous
discussions of adaptation, and the authors cited must be
credited for explicitly stressing their importance.
2. I should point out that the view I am expressing - that
the components of an ecological theory of learning will be
principles of adaptation - is not to be confused with recent
proposals that the mechanisms of learning are analogous to
the mechanisms of natural selection, whereby adaptations
arise in the course of evolution (Staddon & Simmelhag 1971;
Campbell 1974; Staddon 1975; Glassman 1977). Whatever the
merits of that view, it imparts no ecological content to the
study of learning, and it has no bearing on the arguments at
hand.
3. Not all solutions to behavioral problems necessarily
involve learning, and a better formulation of the question
might be: "How, if at all, does the animal learn to solve these
problems?" It behooves the student of learning to select
problems for study that are likely, on the basis of collateral
evidence, to involve learning of some kind. However, it is also
well to recall that many apparently unlearned behavior
patterns, such as pecking by gull chicks (Hailman 1967) and
the following reaction in young ducklings (Gottlieb 1971),
turned out on close inspection to involve significant experien-
tial components.
4. These three kinds of effects are distinguished by Gottlieb
(1976). Maintaining experiences are required to support
continued development of a pre-existing skill. Facilitative
experiences enhance the development of a skill. Inductive
experiences are those in the absence of which the skill does
not develop at all.
Open Peer Commentary
Commentaries submitted by the qualified professional readership
of this journal will be considered for publication in a later issue as
Continuing Commentary on this article.
The next issue [BBS 4(2) 1981] contains two treatments of related
topics: Plotkin & Odling-Smee: "A multiple-level model of evolu-
tion and its implications for sociobiology" and Ghiselin: "Catego-
ries, life, and thinking. -
Principles of learning and the ecological
style of inquiry
Thomas R. Alley and Robert E. Shaw
Department of Psychology, University of Connecticut, Storrs, Conn. 06268
We applaud Johnston's advocacy of an ecological approach to
the study of learning and a search for general principles.
Moreover, his three-part categorization of approaches to
learning theory seems, on the whole, to be both fair and
useful. Despite our fundamental agreement with Johnston's
position, however, there are a few aspects of his paper that we
believe are in need of amendment.
We will focus on two of these issues in this commentary.
The first issue concerns the relative importance, from an
ecological perspective, of specifically understanding how and
why animals learn. Second, we would like to emphasize and
clarify an indispensible but often neglected characteristic of
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an ecological approach: the symmetry of descriptions entailed
by the fundamental postulate of organism-environment
mutuality (Shaw & Turvey in press; Turvey & Shaw 1979).
In light of the fact that Johnston advocates a search for
general principles of learning from an ecological viewpoint, it
is surprising that he declares "the question of central impor-
tance in the ecological approach" to be "What do animals
learn and how do they learn it?" (emphasis added). If (as an
ecological approach demands) learning is to be understood in
terms of adaptation - in terms of compatibility of an animal
and its natural surroundings - then the central question
should be "Why do animals learn what they learn?" While
both questions require a descriptive analysis of what animals
learn, the question of how they learn it focuses on the
processes of learning, whereas the question of why they learn
what they do focuses on the adaptive significance.
As Johnston and the "biological boundaries" people have
argued, there is reason to doubt the existence of general
processes of learning. On the other hand, that every (species-
typical) animal is adapted to its (natural) environment is a
fundamental tenet of modern evolutionary biology (Leigh
1971; Lewontin 1978). Given that a certain degree of fitness
holds between every animal and its natural environment, the
relationship of learning to fitness should be a prime target of
the search for general principles of ecologically-relevant
learning. Indeed, some very general principles of why
animals learn are already known. Learning, for example, is
more likely to contribute to behavioral patterns characterized
by a high degree of variability in the relationship between
stimulus conditions and the appropriate response (as in much
foraging behavior) than when there is a reliable relationship
between a stimulus pattern and a single adaptive response (as
in most intraspecific recognition). Generally speaking, learn-
ing is associated with long life spans, prolonged and intense
parental care, small litter size, large body and brain sizes, and
slow development (Gould 1977; Mayr 1974). In sum, learning
is (and from the viewpoint of evolutionary theory should be)
associated with the life-history strategy known as K-selection,
which means that learning will tend to play a significant role
in contributing to an animal's fitness to the extent to which
the species is subject to density-dependent selection in its
environment of evolutionary adaptedness (Gould 1977;
MacArthur & Wilson 1967).
An example of the second aspect of Johnston's paper that
we would like to amend occurs when he speaks of learning as
contributing to "an animal's adaptation to its environment"
(emphasis added). That learning is, on the whole, a form of
adaptation, is one of the fundamental principles of an ecologi-
cal or evolutionary approach to learning. But an animal
cannot, strictly speaking, be said to adapt to its environment
when "environment" is understood to be "those aspects of the
. . . world with which an animal interacts. -  An animal may be
said to adapt to its surroundings, but this process entails
change in those aspects of the world with which it interacts.
The "environment" of an animal, in the sense of its effective
environment, will itself be altered by learning (and by other
forms of adaptation). Indeed, a good way to characterize the
process of adaptation may be in terms of changes in the way
in which an organism interacts with and relates to its
surroundings.
A related weakness occurs when Johnston mentions the
"compatibility" between organisms and environments with-
out emphasizing that this is a mutual compatibility: orga-
nisms are fit for their natural surroundings, and the surround-
ings are fit for certain types of organisms. This mutual "fit" or
compatibility of organism and environment is the source of a
fundamental postulate of an ecological style of inquiry - a
postulate referred to by Shaw & Turvey (in press) as the
"Postulate of Reciprocal Contexts," for the mutual fit of
organism and environment is a reciprocal relationship requiring
ing that each be a context for constraining variations in the
other. Although Johnston has endorsed this symmetry postu-
late (cf. Johnston & Turvey 1980), his discussion of it in this
paper (see "Global principles of adaptation") is so brief as to I
be possibly misleading. The issue at stake concerns the fact
that the role symmetry postulates play with respect to general
principles is analogous to the role played by general principles
with respect to processes. Just as general principles (of learn-
ing) are invariant over diversely embodied processes, so are
symmetry postulates invariant over general principles or
laws.
That symmetry postulates provide a higher-order context
of constraint than general principles and, hence, logically
condition their form, has been accepted in science since
Einstein made symmetry postulates, rather than laws (general
principles), the cornerstone of relativity theory and the arbi-
ter of what form laws should take (Clark 1971; Wigner 19671
Whereas Newton saw symmetry conditions (conservation
principles) as guaranteed by natural laws, Einstein saw it the
other way around; the validity of laws were guaranteed only
when conservation principles held, and conservation princi-
ples were guaranteed only when certain symmetry conditions
held. For Newton, mass was defined in terms of force
(F = MA). From this formulation Newton expected that the
conservation of momentum would fall out (since momentum
is defined in terms of mass times acceleration). Unfortunate.
ly, although momentum under this guise is conserved in
many conditions, it is not conserved for high velocity colli-
sions. To preserve the conservation of momentum, mass needs
to be reformulated in accordance with a higher-order 1
symmetry postulate. As is well known, Einstein furnished
such a reformulation at the level of space-time, wherein
momentum is defined as an invariant vector quantity over all 1
frames of reference (Taylor & Wheeler 1966). Einstein r
turned the world of Newtonian physics on its head; instead of
formulating momentum in terms of laws, he formulated the
laws in terms of momentum considerations (conservation) and t
momentum considerations in terms of symmetry over frames t
of reference. By doing so, Einstein rid physics of those 1
mysterious entities called "forces" with which even Newton 
was unhappy.
Returning to learning theory, our point is this: There is a
strict analogy between learning processes and events (in
Einstein's sense), for both are classes governed by laws of
interaction. Similarly, there is a strict analogy between
general principles of learning and the laws of physics, for
both are governed by conservation conditions: fitness and
adaptation in the case of learning principles, and conservation
principles in the case of physical laws. The deepest
constraints, however, are symmetry postulates. Here the anal-
ogy is between the postulate of organism-environment
mutuality (the aforementioned "postulate of reciprocal
contexts") of ecological science and the space-time invariance
postulate of physical science.
Johnston, in stating that learning seen from an ecological
perspective is "a process that ensures correspondence
between an animal's behavioral skills and the requirements of 
its natural environment, - seems to have put the cart before
the horse. Because symmetry postulates are the guarantors of
general principles, learning principles must, from the ecologi-
cal perspective, be seen as being guaranteed by adaptation (a 
conservation condition), and adaptation must be seen as being
guaranteed by a deeper symmetry relation that necessarily
holds over ecosystems: that postulated by organism-environ-
ment  mutuality (Animal 0 Environment). Under this refor-
mulation of the problem, learning, like perception and action,
is construed as an activity of an ecosystem rather than as an
activity by an animal in an ecosystem (Turvey & Shaw
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1979).
In sum, we believe an ecological approach to learning
should, in its descriptions, concepts, and principles, strive to
maintain the inherent symmetry that exists between orga-
nisms and their environments. Taking this approach, such
misleading asymmetrical conceptions as that of an organism
adapting to its effective environment or econiche may be
avoided.
A theory of learning - not even déjà vu
George W. Barlow and Stephen E. Glickman
Departments of Zoology and Psychology, University of California, Berkeley,
Calif. 94720
There is an admirable and indisputable set of principles
presented in the Johnston paper: (1) The study of learning
should proceed from an analysis of the natural contexts in
which learning occurs; (2) Our views of the significant plastic-
ity of behavior should not be circumscribed by allegiance to a
too-narrow definition of learning boundaries as set by a few
laboratory paradigms; and (3) A view of learning that consists,
on the one hand, of traditional general-process theory and, on
the other hand, of a set of exceptions to the rules, is not viable.
From this point on, however, Johnston's article poses some
difficulties.
The fundamental problems result from Johnston's attempt
to establish the unique aspects of his own position by not
giving sufficient credit to the thoughts of his predecessors. It
is true that psychologists who are interested in learning have
been slow to move toward naturalistic field observation. It is
also true that some evolutionary biologists have by-passed the
intricacies of ontogenetic processes in behavior and moved
too quickly to outcomes. But it is no accident that many of the
exemplary cases of behavioral analysis presented here come
from biology. The three-level approach that is advocated
boils down to the what, how, and why that pervades evolu-
tionary biology. And it is important to stress that the founders
of ethology were first broadly trained biologists who then
turned their attention to animal behavior, applying the very
approach advocated by Johnston, though ethologists are
barely mentioned in Johnston,s article. Lorenz and Tinbergen
stressed repeatedly the need to make empirical observations
in nature and to formulate questions about processes in an
adaptive framework.
Now if it is correct that Johnston adopts the approach of
evolutionary biologists (read "ethologists") as the way to
discover a unifying set of principles of learning, then it is
difficult to understand how ethological "studies lack the
conceptual unification that might lead to the formulation of
general theoretical principles of broad explanatory power"
(we do not, incidentally, agree with the quoted, overly broad,
conclusion).
Actually, Johnston does not go far enough. He should
present a more thoroughly biological stance. He brings along
intellectual excess baggage. This is most evident in his treat-
ment of learning as a trait that exists in an environment
almost by itself. It would be far better to regard learning as a
facet of an integrated behavioral system, as ethologists have
done (see also the comments on Baupläne by Gould &
Lewontin 1979, cited by Johnston). Johnston's approach
allows one to write about simply going out and observing
learning as it occurs in nature, when in fact a central question
is the extent to which experience and genome are involved in
the elaboration of any behavior. There is, nonetheless, a
wealth of biologically relevant phenomena that are adaptive
in the immediate, learned sense, such as decision making
while foraging, the acquisition of cognitive maps of territo-
ries, and the identification of individuals. A completely
neglected area of research is the genetics of learning.
Johnston mentions the comparative approach almost in
passing. It deserves more attention because it contains the
recipe Johnston seems to be seeking, and because "compara-
tive" has meant such different things to psychologists and
evolutionary biologists. Biologists analyze phyletic lineages,
seeking to establish which traits are primitive, and which are
derived; there is a recognized methodology that has proved
effective despite the difficulties involved. The more primi-
tive, the more general. It is precisely this sort of program-
matic attack that can answer questions about the generality of
processes and principles.
The complementary approach is the truly ecological one. It
involves a careful search for correlations between ecology and
behavior, followed by hypothesis testing. The ecological vari-
ables include demographic considerations together with
distribution of, and access to resources (most of the time,
Johnston uses ecology when biology is closer to his meaning).
Such a two-pronged undertaking would clarify which aspects
of learning are due to shared ancestry (primitive, homolo-
gous) and which are due to convergent or divergent evolution
(derived, analogous). Questions about adaptiveness would
then seem less formidable.
The concept of adaptiveness troubles Johnston. The diffi-
culty, as we see it, is that a trait is designated as adaptive or
not adaptive (though it might also be neutral), which is pretty
much an either/or way of thinking. The concept of relative
fitness, estimated in terms of the number of offspring left in
the succeeding generation, offers a better means for under-
standing the situation, though just how one actually measures
fitness is not as simple as had been hoped. Nonetheless, fitness
has the advantage of varying over a range of unfit to highly
fit. The essential point, however, is not whether the behavior
is adaptive, or whether it affects fitness, but simply whether it
is a normal part of the animal's life, with an identifiable
function (task description).
The laboratory learning psychologists have also made a set
of contributions which still have significance for the prob-
lems. It is precisely because psychologists have identified
critical variables that literatures have developed in the fields
of bait-shyness, bird song learning, and imprinting, and that
they have had such an impact. Moreover, one can enrich the
study of learning or plasticity without discarding examination
of the nature of reinforcement, the timing of conditional
stimulus-unconditional stimulus (CS-US) intervals, the role
played by overt responding in the learning process, and the
like.
As regards the ad hoc nature of many recent attempts to
assign adaptive significance to laboratory observations, Johns-
ton again has a point. But he moves too quickly. The Shettle-
worth (1975) study is a notable example. Shettleworth discov-
ered that food reinforcers modify the rate of emission of some
"operants" but not of others. It is significant that she did not
stop at ad hoc speculations relating her results to the
presumed natural situation. Rather, she deprived hamsters of
food and observed the ensuing changes in the rate of emission
of these particular operants. Her results were consistent with
the idea that food-related operants were better controlled by
food reinforcement. This was not observing behavior in
nature, but it was not simple ad hoc reconstruction either.
The biological approach to the study of learning has the
potential of making an important contribution to evolution-
ary biology. Evolutionary theorizing has tended, of late, to
ignore behavioral processes and to concentrate instead on the
outcomes of behavior. The efforts of animal behaviorists may
be required to direct attention back to the evolution of the
mechanisms themselves. Learning phenomena provide excel-
lent material for a thoroughly evolutionary approach to the
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analysis of behavioral processes and could bring fresh insights
to the interplay of short-term (ontogenetic) and long-term
(phyletic) adaptation. In this sense, Johnston's article is an
important contribution.
Progress in well-established fields is sometimes saltatory,
but more often it is an almost imperceptible rearticulation of
existing findings and points of view. A given essay may seem
to differ little from its predecessors. Yet, after a decade of
such articles one can look back and perceive an important
change. Johnston's paper is presented as a major departure
from existing work in the field; it is instead a rearticulation.
Although the present paper is not as novel as one might wish,
it is in line with a significant move toward placing the study
of learning in an appropriately biological perspective. There
is room, however, for a still more radically biological
approach.
Linking the biological functions and the
mechanisms of learning: Uses and abuses
Patrick Bateson
Sub-Department of Animal Behaviour, University of Cambridge, Madingley,
Cambridge CB3 8AA, England
As an ethologist, I am fond of speculating about the functional
significance of behaviour. Looking at animals in the condi-
tions to which I think they are adapted helps to refine the
ideas. Some possibilities leap out of the bushes, so to speak,
while others that seemed so plausible in the armchair at home
are hastily rejected. To go further requires experiments of the
type that were so elegantly pioneered by Tinbergen (Tinberg-
en, Broekhuysen, Feekes, Houghton, Kruuk, & Szulc 1962).
All this is very much in tune with the first part of the
programme that Johnston has sketched out. However, the
second part, in which functional principles are to be trans-
lated somehow into an understanding of mechanism seems
much more obscure to me. On the face of it, the translation is
impossible. Would an ecological theory that told us how an
engine could be adapted for use in motor bicycles, cranes,
pumps and chain saws, give us any insight into how the
internal combustion engine works? Does the ecological theory
of mating systems in birds and mammals (Orians 1969; Emlen
& Oring 1977) allow us to predict (if we did not know
already) whether or not the ducks have an organ of intromis-
sion? I thought that Johnston would avoid the logical fallacy
when he made the useful distinction between principle and
process. But then he went on to blur the issue by arguing that
a functional principle can be used to explain the character of
the mechanisms. For all that, Johnston may be right in saying
that one approach helps the other, even though he has given
the wrong reasons for why it might do so. I believe that an
understanding of the adaptedness of a behaviour pattern can
help us indirectly to understand how that form of behaviour is
controlled. Functional explanations are commonly expressed
in teleological terms. Biologists protest, of course, that the
teleology is merely a shorthand, but they implicitly make the
point that the language is actually helpful. Since we are all
enthusiastic planners of our own lives, thinking of the
outcome of an animal's behaviour as a goal can help us get our
minds round the complex processes that lead to that outcome.
So the teleology can provide us with a means of thinking
about the whole system.
A different point is that in examining what Johnston calls
the task description, we are alerted to the conditions in which
the character of behaviour changes. Knowledge of those
conditions is crucial when we start to design experiments in
which inevitably only a small number of independent vari-
ables are actually manipulated, while the others are held
constant or randomised. The experiment is a waste of time if
the parameter values that are not subject to explicit manipula-
tion are badly chosen. This is the relevance of the frequently
stated point that we need to know our animals before we can
do anything really interesting with them.
It was on the issue of developing an adequate knowledge of
learning that Johnston did not really do justice to the so-called
biological boundaries theorists. Admittedly, the terms
"boundaries" and "constraints on learning" are unfortunate.
Indeed, at the end of a conference that was later turned into a
well-known book (Hinde & Hinde 1973), there was consider-
able discussion about what the book should be called. I, for
one, argued against the use of the word "constraint" in the
title because I felt that the whole notion lay too comfortably
in the framework of existing learning theory. It does not
adequately stress the active behavioural processes that predis-
pose learning to occur in particular contexts (Bateson l973,
p. 102). As a compromise, the members of the conference
agreed to the use of "predisposition" in the subtitle. That was
not enough, as it turned out, and the general process theorists,
like Revusky (1977), could easily dismiss the constraints-
on-learning approach as nit-picking and obscurantist. Mind
you, if Revusky really believes that asking grand questions
necessarily guarantees the importance of the science, he
should think again. Pretentiousness is not the same as quality.
In any event, the rear-guard rhetoric was not directed at the
most damaging criticism of classical learning theory. It was
not simply that the theory was wrong, but that the approach
that generated it was misconceived. The grand theorists were
attempting to run before they could walk. The case for a
more open-ended approach to the study of learning is not that
it immediately produces a counter-theory, but that it provides
a much more secure basis on which to formulate general
principles. This was a major message of Hinde's (1973)
critique. Inasmuch as Johnston echoes that message, he is very
much a part of the company of thinkers whom he claims to be
superseding.
An ecological approach toward a unified
theory of learning
William R. Charlesworth
Institute of Child Development, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn
55455
Johnston's paper is important; it is refreshing and distinctive
It starts off, however, with an unfortunate weakness. Its title
should have begun with "An ecological approach ....." rather
than with "Contrasting approaches  for the paper's
significant contribution to research in learning is the ecologi-
cal perspective, and it would be very unfortunate if potential
readers passed over this because they have already read too
many comparisons of learning theory.
Those who are better informed about learning theories will.
of course, find points to pick apart, but this paper is less a
comparative analysis than it is a pioneering thrust. Pioneers
do not have to elaborate fine points; they do, however, have to
go in the right direction. Johnston does. He offers an exciting
expansion of learning research as part of a wider ecological
revolution that is gradually building momentum in various
behavioral sciences. Examples of this revolution are the late
James Gibson's (1979) imaginative views on visual perception
[see also Ullman: "Against Direct Perception" BBS 3(3) 1980];
McGurk (1977) and Bronfenbrenner's (1979) efforts in devel-
opmental psychology; Sackett,s (1978) thrust to expand obser-
vational research in mental retardation; and Shaw and Brans.
ford,s (1977) interesting collection of papers covering a wide
range of psychological topics.
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The approach presented here actually has more roots in
comparative psychology and classical ethology than those
mentioned by Johnston. Wesley Mills (1898), a comparative
psychologist and naturalist, was an early proponent of field
research. His approach contrasted with what he termed
"mere closet psychology," which was widely practiced at the
time in armchairs and laboratories.
In classical ethology, a phylogenetic version of the ecologi-
cal approach was foreshadowed in Konrad Lorenz's (1941)
paper, which viewed Kantian thought categories in the light
of evolutionary biology. Lorenz's thesis was that the cognitive
apparatus of animals represented an evolutionary adaptation
to external environmental conditions present during phylo-
genesis. This thesis emphasized the phylogenetically acquired
dimensions of cognitive function, as well as the evolution of
learning abilities that make possible individual adaptation to
idiosyncratic conditions during early ontogenesis; the latter
emphasizes the importance of environmental factors in
directly shaping behavioral ontogeny. Indeed, the whole
imprinting literature deals with the attempts of young
animals to take advantage of local social and physical
resources for survival purposes, and with their being signifi-
cantly changed as a result of those attempts. Immelmann's
(1975) paper on the relationship between ecological factors,
imprinting, and early learning expands on this thesis both by
citing research literature on "ecological imprinting," which
leads to the establishment of food preferences, home area
selection, habitat preference, and host selection in parasites,
and by speculating on the relevance of environmentally-
induced modifications for speciation. [See also Rajecki et al.:
"Toward a General Theory of Infantile Attachment" BBS
1(3)19781 So it is not completely true that ethologists have, as
Johnston claims, offered little in the way of an alternative to
psychological theories of learning. The clearest and most
conceptually elegant formulation of an ethological/evolution-
ary view of learning can be found in Ernst Mayr's (1974)
paper on genetically "open and closed programs. -
Johnston,s claim that the biological boundaries approach is
methodologically subservient to the general-process tradition
seems correct, but he undermines his claim by enlisting
"modern philosophers of science" who argue that there is
nothing like a conceptually neutral methodology. If we define
methodology as a manner or mode of procedure (as is done in
standard dictionaries), then it is difficult to see how methods
per se can be anything else but neutral. What is not neutral is
the decision to choose one method over another. Theoretical
predilections, personal biases, etc. influence choice of meth-
od, but, once chosen, the method neutrally runs its course.
There are at least two important reasons why field research is
chosen less often than lab research: The first is convenience
(ever try following a goose all day to watch it learn?); the
second is publishing time (ever try to turn out a sufficient
number of good observational studies to meet the annual
demands of an institution's reward system?).
Johnston,s point that much research on learning empha-
sizes the logical rather than the ecological structure of tasks is
well taken. The same point can be made of most psychomet-
ric research on human cognition and intelligence. Piagetian
research, as Brainerd (1978) points out, is a good example.
Aimed at studying the cognitive products of individual/
environmental interaction (a general learning process), such
research focuses almost exclusively on the logic of cognitive
structures. With the exception of Piaget's own classical obser-
vational research with his three infant children, there has
been little serious empirical concern in Piagetian circles for
the ecological representativeness of the test items used to tap
cognitive structures or the possible adaptive value of the
cognitive structures measured. [See also Sternberg: "Sketch of
a Componential Subtheory of Human Intelligence" BBS 3(4)
1980.]
Johnston has pushed us a significant step closer to a unified
theory of learning. This unified theory will be an updated,
expanded version of what Darwin actually had in mind for
behavior in general. As Reed (1979) so aptly argues, Darwin's
insight was synoptic enough to include within the same
theoretical framework proximate causes as well as selection
pressures and their consequences. Learning has form, cause,
and function; it takes place inside an organism that is interact-
ing for very important reasons with an environment; and both
the organism and the environment have short and long
histories of great relevance for our understanding of adapta-
tion. Now that we have got that settled, let those of us in
different disciplines get our separate acts together. It is the
only way that makes sense.
The nature of learning explanations
John Garcia
Departments of Psychology and Psychiatry, University of California, Los
Angeles, Calif. 90024
Johnston divides all learning theory into three parts: A, the
ecological approach; B, the biological boundaries approach;
and C, the general process approach. To set up B, he cites
Garcia & Koelling (1966) and Garcia, Ervin & Koelling
(1966), and then lists three criticisms indicating why B is
inferior to A in the historic movement away from C. These
criticisms are (1) "the biological boundaries approach lacks
generality, . . . (2) it is in some respect subservient to the
general process tradition, and (3) its ecological content is in
too many cases limited to ex post facto adaptive explanations
of learning skills." Furthermore, we once wrote a paper
entitled "Biological constraints of conditioning" (Garcia,
McGowan & Green 1969), which was reprinted by Seligman
& Hager (1972) in Biological Boundaries of Learning and
cited by Johnston, who wrote, " . . the very use of terms like
`boundaries' and 'constraints' implies that something (a
general process?) is being constrained. - Admittedly, we
should have watched our language, but I respectfully submit
that if the content of our papers is examined, it will be
obvious that we were on approach A.
To protest (1), lack of generality, I point to two papers.
First, Garcia et al. (1966) indicated that taste is by far the
most effective conditional stimulus (CS) for a poisonous
unconditional stimulus (US), particularly when the US is
delayed for a half hour or more. We referred to the natural
niche of the wild rat and pointed out that temporal and
spatial parameters of conditioning depend on what the rat is
learning to do. Soon after, Garcia and Ervin (1968) argued
that the poisonous effect possessed great generality, noting
that the taste CS and the noxious visceral US converged via
neural routes to the same relay station in the medulla oblon-
gata of the salamander, an arrangement that is apparent in a
wide phylogenetic array of species, including man. Rapid
taste-poison learning has been demonstrated in many related
species; it has also been demonstrated in unrelated species,
such as the mollusks, which may have acquired similar
mechanisms through convergent evolution, because toxic
plants are prevalent throughout the earth (Garcia & Hankins
1975).
To protest (2), subservience to general process, I quote
from our "constraints" paper (Garcia, McGowan & Green
1969): "It is our task to devise hypotheses from field (natural-
istic) observations and to design (laboratory) experiments .. .
where the relevant ecological variables could be experimen-
tally manipulated." We belabored approach C because we
were told that it did not matter whether we studied pigeon,
rat, or monkey (Skinner 1959), and that there was no need for
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neurophysiological specification (Spence 1947). Spence
substituted the "black box" for the behaving animal, and
Skinner searched for his general laws among the environ-
mental interactions surrounding the black box. It is ironic that
Johnston begins by giving us an illustration of a "general
principle" in the Skinnerian mode. His equation (Q prod +
Q„„ — Qloss = 0) cannot distinguish between a panting dog
and a sweating human, much as Skinner's scallops, shaped by
a fixed-interval (FI) schedule, could not distinguish a pecking
pigeon from a manipulating monkey.
We went farther down approach A than Johnston himself
when we said "Evolutionary explanations invoking natural
selection are aversive to most psychologists because ... the
evolutionary determinants appear to be lost in history and
cannot be directly verified. But the end product of natural
selection exists in the anatomical structure of the organism
and there, theoretical learning propositions can be indepen-
dently tested" (Garcia, Palmerino, Rusiniak & Kiefer 1980, in
press). Johnston stops short, offering us half of approach A. He
begins by discussing the "natural environment," then,
belatedly and parenthetically, he mentions that behavior
must be specified, ".  . (ultimately, though not necessarily
immediately, in physiological terms)" (emphasis added).
Johnston is pushing a new line of "ecologically designed"
black box models with a rebate, a promissory note, to be paid
off in physiological currency at some vague future time.
To protest (3), ex post facto adaptive explanations, I say,
"better late than never, but they must be neurophysiologic
and phylogenetic ones. -  This is the only way we can escape
the circularity of interpreting behavior with more behavior,
as Johnston does when he explains, . . . avoidance of noxious
foods is mediated by different cues in different species, .. .
determined by the way in which food is typically selected by
each species. -  In fact, when poisonous effects are delayed,
learning appears to be mediated by taste in both mammals
and birds, as if the taste-visceral, neuropil contains an "and-
gate" which allows other cues to become food cues when they
are contiguous with taste. Even a taste that by itself appears to
be an ineffective signal for a given poison dose can potentiate
a weak cue into an effective one. (For a review see Garcia &
Rusiniak 1980; Garcia, Palmerino, Rusiniak & Kiefer 1980).
A superabundance of approach C experiments have shown
that, with appropriate training procedures, animals can be
taught to avoid a place where they have been ill, or to drink
more fluid in a safe place than in a place where they became
ill. These data are difficult to reconcile with the taste-visceral
hypothesis because the sensory inputs are rarely isolated, and
the neural routes are not even suggested. The potentiation
phenomenon makes some of these experiments even more
difficult to interpret, but that is the concern of approach C.
I confess that I am one of those who still believe " . . that
`facts' exist to be 'collected' by a convenient methodology,
like collecting pebbles on the beach. -  Bulldozing the entire
behavioral beach and sifting it into an orderly array of grains,
pebbles, rocks and boulders of adaptation is too much like
work. I'm glad to learn that "this view has been almost
universally abandoned, with good reason, by modern philoso-
phers of science. -  We need them about as much as poets need
literary critics.
The relevance of phylogenetics to the study
of behavioral diversity
Michael T. Ghiselin
Department of Biology, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah 84112
I would like to reformulate the problem of biological bounda-
ries versus general-process approaches in the light of taxo-
nomic theory. Everybody seems to agree that evolution is
important here, but they do not agree on what to do about it.
Much of the trouble may stem from efforts to treat psychol-
ogy as if it were a kind of physics rather than a branch of
biology. Behavior is viewed as something static, and the
history of an organism's lineage is viewed as a mere
annoyance. The attempt to model psychology upon physics is
particularly apparent in the work of Hull (1945), who hoped
to write equations for the general processes using "empirical
constants" to get rid of the embarrassing load of particulars.
Such approaches to behavioral diversity evidently involve
searching for generalizations that are called, perhaps mislead-
ingly, "laws." The data that complicate the application of
these laws are taken to be the result of special conditions, to be
dealt with from a naively teleological point of view. It is
assumed that the organisms are adapted to their environment
without the qualifications that follow from what is known
about evolution. The addition of more "laws" about what is
"good" in each environment would allow one to screen out
the diversity as so much irrelevant "specialization." But, as
Johnston points out, there are certain ancestral constraints
that pose serious difficulties.
It is most unfortunate that the generalizations of taxonomy
are so often confounded with laws of nature. The diagnoses of
taxa are statements about known historical fact. They are a
different kind of generalization. What is universally true of
the learning of mammals might be true because some law of
nature necessitates that all learning will have certain proper-
ties. It may also be true because all mammals live under those
conditions where the law applies. Or it may be true because it
was true of the common ancestor of mammals and the
descendants did not change.
In principle, at least, we can construct a phylogenetic
history of the various features of all organisms. Some of those
features have recently evolved and tend to be less widespread
than others. Perhaps in the history of animals the basic
mechanisms of learning go very far back, are monophyletic,
and have not changed. Other mechanisms of learning, such as
color vision, seem to be later, polyphyletic acquisitions with
secondary losses. Thus the rats studied by Galef and Osborne
(1978) not only have a long history of not responding to the
appearance of food because they were fed in the dark, but
they, as well as numerous other diurnal feeders, are also
color-blind. It would seem that color vision is not readily
acquired, even in niches where it would have great survival
value. Organisms are not adapted to their environments
simpliciter. They do, as their ancestors did, whatever
happened to maximize their ancestors' reproduction, in what
happened to be their ancestors' environments, with whatever
happened to be their ancestors' legacy to them.
The existence of diversity in a range of organisms helps us
to sort out the interplay among history, environment, and in
by using phylogenetics. A straightforward example of such a
study in psychology is Darwin's work on climbing plants
( Darwin 1876 and earlier versions). The faculty of climbing I
has evolved several times. Plants climb by using severs' 1
different organs: stem, shoots, petioles, and even roots. Which
organ gets used is a characteristic of species and higher taxa as
well. The diversity shows that what gets used in climbing is
not very general and results, in part, from historical accident .
Yet Darwin,s physiological research did reveal some more
widespread general principles, such as a circling movement. 
Some features of behavior ought to be common to both plants
and animals; they might even evolve in extraterrestrial
beings. I cannot agree with Smart (1963) that there are no 
biological or psychological laws. I do suggest, however, that 
these laws would have to be something other than generaliza-
tions about a single species, genus, or other taxon. The way to
find laws is through the study of such convergences as have
appeared in the evolution of vertebrates and cephalopods.
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But one cannot know that convergence has happened unless
one knows the actual phylogeny of the organism.
The historical aspect of adaptation is all too often over-
looked. As I have pointed out (Ghiselin 1966), there is
adaptation as a state, adaptation as a process, and adaptation
as a state resulting from that process [see also Ghiselin:
Categories, Life, and Thinking" BBS 4(2) 19811 The mere
fact that a benefit seems to accrue from a feature does not
suffice to demonstrate that it is an adaptation in the sense that
it was produced by selection. To do that, one needs to study
the historical record. If one can show that a series of modifica-
tions began to be produced when the ecological circumstances
and selective regimen changed, one has compelling evidence
that adaptation has occurred.
On the what and how of learning
R. C. Gonzalez and Matthew Yarczower
Department of Psychology, Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, Penn. 19010
Johnston,s outline of what he terms an "ecological approach
to the study of learning" is actually an outline of an ethologi-
cal approach to the study of animal behavior, which leaves
room for the study of learning, but gives no hint of how the
processes of learning are to be elucidated.
Johnston argues, in effect, that behavior theory should be
developed in relation to the natural environment of orga-
nisms, with special reference to what animals actually do
under natural circumstances. "Local" principles of adapta-
tion are to be identified to account for the behavior of
individual species, and commonalities among these species
are to serve to establish general principles of behavior.
Johnston's criticism of the "biological boundaries
approach" (with its reliance on ex post facto adaptive expla-
nations and its inherent pessimism about common processes)
is well taken. His treatment of the learning issue in general,
however, leaves much to be desired. He fails, it seems, to
grasp the distinction between a theory of learning and a
theory of behavior and to see the relation between the two.
Theories of learning are directed to the understanding of
what organisms learn, that is, the products of learning (e.g.,
associations and their nature, relations among environmental
events and their representations, etc.); of how they learn, that
is, the necessary and sufficient conditions of learning (e.g.,
contiguity, contingency, effect, etc.); and of how learning is
transformed to performance, that is, the processes that trans-
late the products of learning into behavior. Theories of
behavior are much broader in scope. They include learning
postulates among a wide array of other determinants of
behavior (e.g., perceptual, motor, motivational, maturational,
instinctual, etc.) and must deal with the interrelations among
the various determinants.
When Johnston sets out to answer the question "What does
this animal learn to do?" he has already set aside a major issue
in learning theory by asserting that what animals learn is, in
fact, to do. ( Thorndike came to essentially this conclusion, but
on the basis of his research. Other theorists, of course,
disagree.) His six-point program for answering the question
"How does the animal learn to do that?" is directed not to the
issue of the conditions of learning, but rather to the various
determinants of the behavior in question (including learning)
in the broadest terms. It is difficult, therefore, for a student of
learning to accept the proposition that Johnston is dealing
here with "an approach to learning theory." And he is
mistaken in his evaluation of some efforts in the comparative
psychology of learning.
It is correct to note that, in experimental psychology,
behavior theory has been dominated by learning theorists
who, with a few notable exceptions, have tended to assume, in
the manner of Thorndike, that the same processes of learning
operate everywhere in the animal kingdom — that animals
differ not in method of learning, but only in proficiency. It
should be noted that Thorndike came to his conclusion on the
basis of the results of his own experiments, which were
designed to test this very proposition (Thorndike, 1911).
Thorndike's failure to find objective evidence of qualitative
differences in the modes of solution of problems posed to
chicks, cats, dogs, and monkeys — despite marked differences
among the animals in their rate of acquisition — led him to
conclude that observed differences in behavior among
animals are to be accounted for in terms of quantitative
differences in the operation of the same processes of learning.
In retrospect, it is easy to see that Thorndike simply lacked
the technological facilities (readily available today) to carry
out experiments that would adequately detect the operation
of distinct processes. (Few of his results have stood the test of
replication.) He was not limited, however, in his conceptual
approach to the problem.
It is quite true that, in general, students of learning since
Thorndike have adopted the Thorndikian conclusion as a
matter of conviction rather than treating it as a hypothesis for
experimental testing (and the result has been that their choice
of subjects for research tends to be made rather cavalierly —
primarily in terms of convenience). However, it is not true,
contrary to what Johnston implies, that a comparative
psychology of learning is beyond the scope of the learning
theorist's laboratory, or that there is some inherent limitation
to analytical work done outside the natural setting. In his
criticism of one such comparative enterprise, Johnston asserts
that "It is not sufficient merely to compare animals on an
(ecologically) arbitrary array of learning tasks. Rather, the
tasks used should reflect the real adaptive problems that the
various species encounter in their natural environments." But
"learning tasks" (experimental contingencies) that seem to be
arbitrary ecologically may be far from arbitrary in relation to
the processes of learning that they engender, a fact that may
require considerable sophistication in both the theory and the
technology of learning to appreciate fully. Some of these
"arbitrary tasks," in fact, have been the ones that have finally
begun to yield objective evidence of the operation of qualita-
tively different processes of learning in mammals and
nonmammals (e.g., Bitterman 1975; Gonzalez, Ferry &
Powers 1974; Gonzalez, Potts, Pitcoff & Bitterman 1972; Pert
& Gonzalez 1974). To the extent that such results bear on
anagenesis, they have clear evolutionary significance (Yarc-
zower & Hazlett 1977), despite the fact that the "arbitrary
tasks" involved were not dictated by the ecological impera-
tive.
It should be noted, too, in relation to the claim that
laboratory work in the tradition of the learning theorist is
sterile with respect to the understanding of behavior in the
ecological niche, that behavioral principles (as distinct from
theories of learning) derived from laboratory work on learn-
ing have proved useful in understanding phenomena in
natural settings. Hailman (1969), for example, has made use
of principles of classical conditioning to account for the
development of the precise pecking by laughing gulls at the
mother's red bill. And Hoffman and Ratner (1973) have
brought behavioral principles derived from both classical and
operant conditioning to bear on the analysis of the phenome-
non of imprinting.
What, then, is there to be said about Johnston's approach?
In our opinion, its contribution is its provision of an outline of
a unified, coherent scheme of ethology whose merits (which
may be considerable) are ultimately to be judged by its
usefulness to investigators of phenomena in natural settings. It
has little, if any, relevance to the development of a theory of
learning.
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Discussing learning: The quandary of
substance
Jack P. Heilman
Department of Zoology, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisc. 53706
Whenever I read an apparently sensible article like Johns-
ton's, in which I can find nothing of substance to challenge,
two possibilities occur to me: either the author's biases are
totally coincidental with mine, or else the article has no
substance. If the former be true, it is unlikely that I can fulfill
the role of critic — or I would have done so long ago and
consequently changed my views. The only course of action is
therefore to see if a case can be made for the target article's
lacking substance. I will do my best.
As this is a theoretical article, there are no data, apart from
a brief summary of a few results from the literature, and
there are no alternative interpretations of existing data. Johns-
ton does not deny that general processes of learning exist; he
merely separates processes from principles by definition.
From this separation one might expect principles to be
articulated, even if the processes cannot be, but no such
articulation occurs. Johnston simply asserts that we need to
know what an animal learns and how it learns it. By analogy
with the example on thermoregulation, this is the equivalent
of saying that one must measure the heat produced, gained,
and lost; the general principle lies in stating that the sum of
the first two must equal the third, but no such principle is
forthcoming concerning learning phenomena. The author did
not promise the reader any of these things, so that (apart from
some very general orienting attitudes) the substance of the
argument must lie in the details of the "what-and-how
approach" to learning.
The relevant details appear to consist primarily of two
points about adaptation, six questions relating to local princi-
ples, and three "dimensions along which we should search for
global principles." Let us consider these in turn. First, the two
points about adaptation are (1) that adaptation is a relation
between animal and environment, and (2) that not all charac-
teristics of an animal are necessarily adaptive. The former
point is logically a restatement of the definition of adaptation,
and the second is virtually self-evident — although I would
admit that some biologists need convincing (Hailman 1977a).
As to the exemplary six questions about local principles, the
list differs in no substantial way from similar lists that have
been in the literature for a long time (e.g., Hailman 1967, pp.
129-31). The remaining three "dimensions" are familiar
strategies of research. The first, which is designed to show
that a particular characteristic of an animal works admirably
in given circumstances, is what C. Richard Tracy (Burtt 1979,
p. 422) dubbed the "engineering" approach when he charac-
terized my analysis of visual signals (Hailman 1979). Basical-
ly, the reasoning of the engineering approach is that if
something does the job well then it probably evolved to do
that job; this is so common a mode of approach that it is rarely
explicitly emphasized. The other two points — correlating
animal characteristics with taxonomy on the one hand and
with environment on the other — are simply an incomplete
statement of the comparative method familiar to all evolu-
tionary biologists (see, for example, Hailman 1976 or 1977b,
pp. 13-15 for the complete logic of the comparative
method).
I can thus find nothing new in Johnston's viewpoint, except
possibly this: if the article is aimed at psychologists who do
not already know all these things, then everything is new, and
indeed, quite substantial, in an important sense. If Johnston
can persuade psychologists to study learning in a relevant
biological context, then just possibly he or someone else might
eventually pursuade biologists to insert learning phenomena
into ethology and deliver us from the instinct—theorists in
their latest guise of "sociobiology."
Biological approaches to the study of
learning: Does Johnston provide
a new alternative?
Robert A. Hinde
MRC Unit on the Development and Integration of Behaviour, Madingley,
Cambridge CB3 8AA, England.
Any step toward continuing or extending the dialogue
between psychologists and biologists interested in the devel-
opment of behaviour is to be welcomed, and one hopes that
Dr. Johnston's paper will stir up further debate. It is, however,
not immediately apparent that it involves as big a step
forward as he suggests.
Johnston is inaccurate in supposing that the learning theo-
rists of the last fifty years believed that "all examples of
learning are manifestations of an underlying general
process." And he is wrong to suppose that a biological
approach to learning (which he inappropriately calls the
"biological boundaries approach") denies the existence of
general principles of learning. Furthermore, most ethologist
interested in these problems have had no intention of replac-
ing or providing an alternative to the work of the learning
theorists; they have attempted, rather, to marry the two
approaches, specifying limitations to the earlier generaliza-
tions. Over these latter issues Johnston reveals a misunder-
standing of the nature of biological principles — perhaps this is
because he, like many philosophers of science, sees the biolog-
ical psychologist as striving after something akin to the
physicist's e = mc2. Apart from the theory of evolution by
natural selection, we are not as yet in sight of a master key to
the phenomena of behavioural development, and we must
seek for relatively short-range principles, each coupled with a
statement about the range of its validity. The more precisely
each principle is stated, the smaller the range of phenomena
to which it will apply, but either to deny or to assert the
existence of principles would be to miss the point.
Johnston's distinction between "task description" and how
the task is achieved is similar to the distinction between the
problems an animal has to solve and how it solves them. This
is, of course, a commonplace in biology (e.g., Pantin 1951,
1952; Tinbergen 1951); indeed, the analogy of the engineer
building a bridge, used by Johnston, was also Pantin,s favour-
ite. But as Johnston points out, "task description" sometimes
embraces quite a bit of analysis, and he uses it both for the
problem the organism has to solve ("Bridge that river"; or
"Steer in a given direction") and for the description of a
solution ("Use a cantilever structure" or "Use the Pole star").
I find that the task description is difficult to distinguish from
the functional description long emphasized as an essential
first step by ethologists.
Johnston,s next phase is a phase of causal analysis, aimed at
a description "ultimately, though not necessarily, in physio-
logical terms," but in the short term involving precisely those
questions that any ethologist would ask about development,
that is, "What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for
the behavior to develop?" "Is there a sensitive period for
particular experiential factors?" etc. Again, I find it difficult
to distinguish this analysis from what all ethologists interested
in development have been doing for a long time.
Johnston's final stage involves searching for general princi-
ples that will embrace the answers to the "how" questions
about particular examples of learning in particular species, in
the light of the complementary diversity of animals and their
environments. This is a laudable goal, and one toward which
little progress has been made by either ethologists or compar-
ative psychologists (however, see Schneirla 1949). But I find it
difficult to see how it can possibly be an alternative to the
work of learning theorists. The generalizations that emerge
will be in functional terms and not in terms of "mechanism
As Pantin pointed out, there are many different ways to build
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a bridge: the generalizations that emerge from "global princi-
ples of adaptation" will be functional generalizations compat-
ible with, but in no way replacing, the generalizations that
emerge from learning theories.
A funny thing happened on the way to
comparative psychology
James W. Kalat
Department of Psychology, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, N. C.
27650
Early comparative psychologists, especially prior to the 1920s,
focused on comparisons of many species in many learning
situations. Every species, from pigs to pigeons to porcupines,
was tested for delayed response, alternation, maze learning,
detour, and other complex responses (Maier & Schneirla
1935). Most of these tasks would qualify as "ecologically
arbitrary," to use Johnston's apt phrase, as the goal was to
map out the phylogeny of intelligence, which was assumed to
be a single entity. It was naively assumed that the learning
abilities of animals could be rank ordered along a single
dimension from protozoans to humans. There was little
consideration of the animals' natural ways of life, except
when it was necessary to modify the dimensions of the
apparatus. J. 0. Cook (1953) remarked that this kind of
research generally led to a "plethora of data and a paucity of
theory. -
When such great system-builders as Hull and Tolman
superseded the early comparative psychologists, they investi-
gated a single species - the rat - in a few situations. But while
they abandoned early comparative psychology's method of
interspecies comparisons and its interest in the phylogenetic
distribution of intelligence, they remained faithful to the
assumption that animals' learning abilities differed only
quantitatively. In fact, this assumption was quite consistent
with their exclusive attention to the rat. If learning is a single
process, differing only in quantitative parameters across
species and situations, then someone interested in its processes
and mechanisms has no reason other than convenience to
study one species rather than another.
T. D. Johnston's position represents an interesting reversal
of the revolution that occurred in the 1920s. Instead of
abandoning the method of interspecies comparisons but
maintaining the assumption that intelligence is a single entity,
Johnston argues that we do the opposite: we return to early
comparative psychology's method of interspecies compari-
sons, but we abandon its assumption that all learning involves
the same processes. However, we would restrict our compari-
son of species to studies of how they cope with real-life
problems. In fact, Johnston is calling for the kind of compara-
tive psychology that we should have established long ago - a
field that relates the behavioral capacities of animals to both
their evolutionary history and their adaptation to their natu-
ral environment, in a manner truly analogous to that of
comparative anatomy and comparative physiology.
One example that Johnston gives is quite illustrative of the
kind of generalization toward which this field could strive:
"... we might find, for example, that the number of encount-
ers (trials) that an animal requires in order to learn to avoid
noxious food items is a function (possibly complex) of the
harmfulness of noxious items, the relative frequency of
noxious items, and the energetic costs associated with the
capture of a single food item." If we ever reach the point of
establishing statements of that form, we may come to regard
the psychology of animal learning, as it has existed until the
present, as a monumental detour on the way to comparative
psychology.
I find that I am highly sympathetic to Johnston's position.
As he remarks, it is in many regards similar to the position of
Rozin & Kalat (1971). Where I differ from Johnston is in his
insistence that his position is an alternative to both the
general-process and the so-called "biological boundaries"
approaches. The disagreement between those two approaches
relates to processes and mechanisms and to whether they vary
across species and situations. Johnston's interests and goals run
almost orthogonal to this whole controversy. In his words,
"Note that any such general principle [of adaptations of
learning] is quite neutral with respect to the existence of
general processes of learning. -
If one is interested in understanding the processes and
mechanisms of learning, regardless of whether one believes
that learning involves a single set of mechanisms or many sets
of mechanisms, one is apt to experiment on the roles of
reinforcement, attention, interference, delays between stim-
uli, and so forth. That is, it is no accident that the "biological
boundaries" investigators borrowed many experimental
designs from the "general process" people - many of those
designs are amply suited to elucidate processes and mecha-
nisms. If and when those interested in an ecological approach
to learning investigate the processes of a particular kind of
learning, it would not be surprising if their experiments also
resembled the traditional paradigms. What Johnston seems to
be proposing is not new answers to the standard questions
about the processes of learning, or new experimental
approaches to those questions, but a new set of questions. The
new questions will focus on what each animal learns and on
how this learning is integrated into overall behavior. Ques-
tions of this type would not necessarily replace the old
questions; however, there would still be a place for investiga-
tions of mechanisms and processes, and for the controversies
that have occurred concerning general processes versus
biological boundaries of learning.
Answers to Johnston's questions will not come easily; the
"study of the general" can emerge only from a great many
studies of the particular, especially when we are talking about
ecological principles. Progress will require a persistent,
systematic approach, but the payoff could be a genuine
understanding of the evolution of behavior.
Ecology and learning
Alan C. Kamil
Departments of Psychology and Zoology, University of Massachusetts,
Amherst. Mass. 01003
I believe that Johnston is correct in arguing that we must take
a more ecological, adaptive approach to the study of learning.
In this commentary I will supplement Johnston's paper by
discussing recent theoretical and empirical developments in
the ecological investigation of foraging behavior and their
relation to the psychological study of learning. There are
three points I want to make.
The first point is that there is no necessary conflict between
psychological and ecological hypotheses about behavior.
Consider a flycatcher sitting on a perch watching insects fly
by. Suppose there are several types of insects that vary in
dietary value and ease of capture. Which insects will the bird
attempt to capture and which will it ignore? This question
could be answered in terms of psychological mechanisms such
as instrumental conditioning, discrimination learning, or
attention and memory. It could also be answered in an
evolutionary framework, for example by attempting to
discover which available strategy is most adaptive. Assume
that each theoretical approach was developed to the point
where each yielded accurate predictions. The predictions of
the two approaches would have to be similar, since each
attempts to predict the same behavior. Thus the two
approaches should be complementary, and we should try to
take advantage of this complementarity. The research strat-
Johnston: Learning theory
©1981 Cambridge University Press THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1981), 4 147
egy Johnston suggests - find out what animals learn under
natural conditions and then analyze how they learn it - will
emphasize this congruence.
The second point I would like to make is that the develop-
ment of task descriptions is well under way in the area of
foraging behavior, and these task descriptions suggest many
problems of considerable psychological interest for anyone
concerned with learning. Let us return to the flycatcher and
his diet selection problem. Ecologists have attacked these
kinds of questions by developing mathematical or graphical
models of foraging problems that are then solved for their
optimal solution, usually the solution that maximizes rate of
intake while foraging (see Krebs 1978; Pyke, Pulliam &
Charnov 1977, for reviews). MacArthur and Pianka (1966)
developed one of the original models for diet selection. Time
spent foraging in the case of the flycatcher can be divided
into two components: search time (time spent sitting on the
perch) and pursuit time (time spent chasing, capturing and
consuming prey). Let us assume that the prey types can be
ranked in terms of harvest value gained per unit of pursuit
time. Then the optimal solution to this problem can be seen as
follows: start with the highest ranking prey type as the sole
item in the diet and keep adding additional prey types one at
a time. The addition of each prey type will reduce search
time per unit of food, because, as more prey are included in
the diet, less time will be spent waiting for an acceptable prey
to come by. But each addition will also increase pursuit time
per unit of food, because the prey are ranked in terms of
pursuit time. If the flycatcher adds prey until the decrement
in search time equals the increment in pursuit time, the bird
will maximize its rate of intake while foraging.
This analysis of the diet selection problem suggests that the
animal needs a considerable amount of information to behave
efficiently. Does the animal have such information, and, if so,
how is it obtained? The model assumes that the animal does
have the information, or at least that the animal acts as if it
does; this generates some interesting predictions. For exam-
ple, the MacArthur and Pianka (1966) model predicts that
whether a relatively low-ranking prey item is taken or not
should depend on the relative availability of higher-ranking
items; it should be independent of the availability of the
low-ranking prey. This prediction has been confirmed both in
the field (Goss-Custard 1980) and in laboratory simulations
(Lea 1979; Krebs, Erichsen, Webber & Charnov 1977). In the
case of diet selection, task description is well under way, and
the results are raising significant questions whose answers will
involve learning.
The optimal foraging approach is also being used to study
other foraging problems (Krebs 1978; Pyke, Pulliam & Char-
nov 1977). In addition to the optimal foraging literature,
there have also been a large number of field studies on
foraging behavior in the last 10 to 15 years. Many of these
studies report on the foraging behavior of individual animals
over time, which is exactly the data needed to construct task
descriptions for naturally occurring instances of learning
(Curio 1976; Kamil & Sargent 1980). This literature makes it
clear that, despite occasional claims to the contrary (Lockard
1971), learning can be important under natural conditions.
This brings me to my third and final point: given that
psychologists have long been interested in animal learning,
and given that what animals learn in the field is important, it
should prove beneficial for animal learning psychologists to
become more cognizant of, and involved in, the study of
learning in the field. Three benefits seem most likely. First, as
Johnston points out, many of the phenomena of the tradi-
tional animal learning literature may be artifactual, with little
or no significance outside of the laboratory. Taking an ecolog-
ical approach will allow empirical determination of the extent
of this problem. Second, there are probably many learning
phenomena that are most apparent only under natural condi.
tions (e.g., Kamil, Peters & Lindstrom in press). Taking a
more naturalistic approach will help resolve this problem,
which will increase the range of learning phenomena under
study. Third, the behavioral mechanisms suggested by many
field studies of foraging behavior are complex. If animal
learning psychologists would bring their expertise to bear on
these problems they could contribute significantly to improv-
ing our understanding of the natural world around us and the
manner in which animals have adapted to it.
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The ecological approach to learning
John Kruse and Edward Reed
Center for Research in Human Learning, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis -
, Minn. 55455
I
Johnston's paper is a very useful and provocative contribution
to the discussion of the role of learning theory and research on
learning within contemporary psychology. The optimism of
proponents of general process learning theory has proved
unfounded. Although phenomena such as autoshaping and
learned taste aversion have expanded the domain of inquiry
in learning theory, there are nevertheless a number of impor-
tant evolutionary and experiential factors that do not seem
amenable to traditional associative analyses. The realm of
learning theory has shrunk. Whereas previously it encom-
passed virtually all of psychology, now it covers, at most,
cautious generalizations beyond the laboratory by means of
highly specific models of normal or pathological situations.
Modern ethologists and "biological boundaries" theorists
have, quite properly, emphasized the importance of species-
specific aspects of behavior; but in so doing, they have never
been brave enough even to attempt significant generaliza-
tions across species of ecological niches. Johnston is to be
lauded for his attempt to transcend the limitations of previous
approaches.
The ecological approach to learning advocated by Johnston
differs from all previous approaches (general process or
biological constraint alike) in two fundamentally important
ways. Because Johnston is not as explicit about these differ-
ences as we would have liked, we shall attempt to heighten
these contrasts in this commentary.
First, the ecological approach to learning differs from
traditional approaches in how it motivates experimental
research. Traditional learning theorists derived their
empirical questions and methods logically from the several
theories of stimulus-response (S-R), stimulus-stimulus (S-S)
and response-stimulus (R-S) associations. (Ultimately, modern
learning theory derives from British empiricism.) Under the
influence of Pavlov and Thorndike, learning research became
a systematic inquiry into how elements such as Ss and Rs
become connected by virtue of neural plasticity as a result of
experience. The assumption was widespread, if tacit, that
these connectionist experiments could reveal the general
processes of learning. The biological boundaries theorists
deny this last assumption, but they still conduct their research
within the connectionist framework. In contrast, Johnston
urges learning theorists to derive their theories ecologically,
not logically. While he is willing to assume that general
principles may evolve out of ecologically focused studies, he is
not willing to assume that general transspecies processes exist.
111-11.7;11411, generalize  from
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studies done in disregard of relevant species ecology. Johns-
ton,s position makes sense, for we are more likely to prove
that general learning processes exist by testing hypotheses
derived ecologically from a variety of species than by assum-
ing that some such processes must exist just because laws of
physical causality are species-transcendent.
The ecological approach to learning differs from other
approaches in a second, perhaps more profound, way. Tradi-
tional psychological theories have been theories about animals
and their capacities. In direct opposition to all of these earlier
theories, ecological psychology attempts to formulate theories
about animal-environment interrelations. Ecological psychol-
ogy is as much a science of what there is to be behaved toward
as it is a science of behavior. The fundamental concept of
ecological psychology is that of the affordances of the envi-
ronment for the behavior of animals (Gibson 1977; 1979;
Reed & Jones 1979; Shaw & Turvey in press). Affordances are
the things that exist in the environment toward which behav-
ior can be directed: they are what the environment offers
each animal for its behavior. The affordances of an animal's
environment are the psychological characteristics of its
ecological niche (its fundamental niche, not its realized
niche, cf. Hutchinson 1978).
Johnston does not do justice to the radical nature of
ecological psychology and affordance theory. If affordance
theory becomes accepted, the entire edifice of associationism
and connectionism will crumble. Affordances are not stimuli,
nor do they cause stimuli or responses in organisms. Orga-
nisms are not sensitive to affordances, nor can there be
thresholds for perceiving or acting on affordances. Affor-
dances do not reinforce behaviors. Affordances cannot be
associated, for they cannot get into an organism (as they are
relations between an organism and its environment). To
perceive an affordance is to perceive a meaningful aspect of
the environment, but these meanings are neither innately
given nor acquired via experience. With experience, an
animal can become more acute at perceiving affordances and
more adept at using them, but this improvement is not based
on mechanisms of association, it is the result of the differen-
tiation of organized skills of attention and action.
Affordances can be perceived, if there is information for
them, by means of an active perceptual system attuned to
pick up that information (Gibson 1966; 1979). Once
perceived, an affordance can be acted upon (but it need not
be) and, if the attempt is successful, the affordance may be
realized. A long stick affords raking an object outside a cage
into the cage, as Köhler's (1925) ape Sultan discovered. But
not all manipulations of sticks are successful rakings. Af ford-
ance theory emphasizes that behaviors are evolved achieve-
ments of an individual in an environment. From an ecologi-
cal point of view, behavior is not touched off by stimuli,
potentiated by drives, or reinforced after certain responses;
behavior is, rather, an attempt to realize an affordance, an
attempt that may succeed or fail. By and large, learning
theorists no longer believe that there are laws that explain
how Ss are connected to Rs; whether laws will be developed
that explain how affordances are realized is very much an
open question. The significant contribution that Johnston's
paper makes is to raise this question.
General process theory, ecology, and
animal-human continuity: A cognitive
perspective
Janet L. Lachman and Roy Lachman
Department of Psychology, University of Houston, Houston, Texas 77004
Few explanatory systems in natural science have the power
and generality of Darwinian natural selection; indeed, in the
science of living systems, natural selection has no equal. One
might, therefore, expect evolution and ecology to be among
the most central themes guiding contemporary behavioral
research. But they are not. Despite ritual espousals, no major
psychological system has incorporated Darwinian theory into
an effective, programmatic behavioral research enterprise.
Johnston would place the realities of adaptive specializa-
tion at the conceptual center of a behavioral theory and
research program. We believe that eventually his position, or
a similarly motivated one, will prevail. This is not to say that
we agree with every detail of his criticism of existing
approaches to the study of animal behavior, for we do not; but
more on that later.
Our field is cognitive psychology, where the relevance of
animal learning to human higher mental processes has been
largely denied for two decades (Lachman, Lachman &
Butterfield 1979). It has been claimed that human higher
mental processes and animal behavior are discontinuous —
that entirely different analogies and models are needed to
explain the learning of animals and the cognition of humans.
In the case of humans, one astute analyst has argued in this
journal (Pylyshyn 1978) that there are no differences between
systems of artificial intelligence and cognitive psychology. In
our view, Pylyshyn's claim absolutely ignores two profoundly
significant facts about human cognition: first, that it exists in
an organism with a history of adaptive evolution, and second,
that cognition developed in the service of the organism,s
biological needs, not its intellectual ones. Human minds may
play chess and do calculus, but it was their contribution to
eating, mating, and escaping that gave such minds their
staying power.
As advocates traditionally do, Johnston has set forth alter-
native positions in sharply competitive terms. On the one
hand there is the ecologically motivated position he espouses,
and on the other there is the traditional approach: "general
process theory" and its derivative, the "biological bounda-
ries" approach. Johnston's evaluation of the prospects of
general-process theory is hopelessly pessimistic; this pessim-
ism is based largely on the grounds that the commitment of
general process theory to the existence of general learning
processes has fostered ecologically arbitrary research methods
that yield no insight into what animals actually learn in their
natural environments. Admittedly, general process theory,
along with other relatively mature paradigms in psychology
and various disciplines, has generated its share of mindless
parametric variations on research designs justified largely by
expedience. However, general process theory is not philo-
sophically and intellectually irreconcilable with an evolution-
ary orientation. "Ecologically arbitrary" research can play a
valuable role in defining a set of capacities that operate in a
given animal's natural environment or in any other environ-
ment in which it happens to find itself.
The "general capacities approach" can be viewed as an
effort to discover those capacities of an animal that operate in
all possible worlds. The question, "What can a rat (or dog, or
human) learn in whatever environment it happens to find
itself?" is a legitimate question that is not independent of
natural history, since significant evolutionary development
stemmed from abrupt, sometimes catastrophic, environ-
mental alterations. Johnston,s question, "What does a rat (or
dog, or human) actually learn in the single context of its
expected environment?" is also legitimate; and, as Johnston
argues, it has been badly neglected. But that neglect imbues
the question with exclusive legitimacy.
Capacities, in fact, are not handled well in Johnston's
approach, although they have preoccupied cognitive psychol-
ogists for two decades and must certainly play a significant
role in any theory of learning. An animal learns to respond
adaptively to its environment only within the constraints set
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by its capacity to perceive, conceptualize, and remember.
Thus, capacities are analytically separable from either of
Johnston's two queries: "What does the animal learn to do?"
and "How does it learn to do it?" It appears that Johnston has
merged the question of capacities with the question of what
the animal learns, and thereby obscured a valuable analytical
distinction. To illustrate, Johnston gives examples of research
on "what behavioral problems an animal must solve" by
citing Emlen,s (1972; 1975) work on the indigo bunting,
which orients itself by referring to configurational informa-
tion distributed over groups of stars. Discovery of these birds'
orienting responses required the prior discovery that indigo
buntings are capable of perceiving, organizing, and forming
representations of patterns that consist of points of light on a
dark field, and that of all the things they might respond to
when trying to solve orientation problems, these patterns
somehow recommend themselves. These are capacities, but it
is not clear whether they are part of Johnston,s "what"
question or part of his "how" question. It would be analyti-
cally sharper, in our view, to devise such ecologically derived
learning questions as "How does the animal learn to use the
capacities it has to solve the problems it faces?" or, put
another way, "How does the animal learn to do what it can to
get what it needs?" There are three subquestions: (1) What
behavioral problems must the animal solve? (2) What capaci-
ties does it bring to the solution of these problems? and (3)
How does it match its capacities to the problem at hand? The
general process approach may be well-suited to answering the
questions of the second type.
Despite these criticisms, we are fully sympathetic with
Johnston's call for an ecologically motivated approach to
learning. In our own area of human cognitive psychology, we
have recommended "evolutionary postulates" as a major
heuristic in constraining models of cognition (Lachman &
Lachman 1979). However, there are unique difficulties in
applying an ecological approach in the area of human higher
mental processes. First, the adaptation par excellence of
human intellect is its profound generality of purpose - its
ability to solve a range of behavioral problems far greater
than that of any other biological species. This adaptation
makes it uncommonly difficult to answer the question "What
behavioral problems must the (human) animal solve?"
Second, unlike other species, humans have deliberately (and
"artificially") altered their own environment. This alteration
makes it inordinately difficult to distinguish "ecologically
valid" from "ecologically arbitrary" research settings in the
case of human beings. To these difficulties must be added the
fact that the target behaviors of major social significance
often involve behavioral problem-solving in the most artificial
contexts human ingenuity has been able to invent (e.g.,
schools, submarines, spacecraft, courtrooms, inner cities, and
the United Nations, to name only a few).
These difficulties do not mean that taking the ecological
approach is impossible in cognitive psychology, for without it
we will never understand human learning. The fact is that
humans solve their vast array of ecologically arbitrary behav-
ioral problems with mental machinery adapted to a prehu-
man environmental niche. No explanatory system can
succeed if it does not deal with this stubborn, undeniable
reality. On the other hand, ecological theorists who work
primarily with nonhuman species should not underestimate
the difficulties faced by an ecological approach to human
learning. It may be impossible to bring ecological consider-
ations to bear on the study of human cognition as directly as
possible in the study of animal learning. Progress may depend
on creative interplay between those cognitive theorists who
incorporate evolutionary ideas and those who do not. Such
interplay might begin with evolutionary interpretations of
robust phenomena in human cognition. For example, one
such phenomenon in human memory studies is the finding
that sentences are more memorable if they are easily imaged.
This effect was discovered in human memory research, which
is similar to the animal research generated by general process
theory in that neither has ecological or evolutionary  motiva-
tion. Better recall is of ten attributed to better initial compre-
hension (i.e., imageable sentences are easy to recall because
they are easy to understand). But why should imageability
facilitate comprehension? In artificial intelligence or general
process theory terms, there is no apparent reason. But an
answer can be proposed in terms of human phylogeny.
Human vision is essentially primate vision - it is three-
dimensional and acute. Such a specialized visual system
probably developed as an adaptation to arboreal life, but it
also facilitated the perception and memorial representation of
objects. Because vision was acute enough to support it, fine
distal discrimination among objects could emerge, and an
equally refined conceptual ability could develop. In this view,
the objects labeled by later primates (probably late Australopithecines}
pithecines) were visually-derived mental representations. If
language developed in this way (i.e., parasitically on the
visual system) it would not be surprising to find that the most
facile applications of language are those that are most visual-
izable (i.e., imageable). In our laboratory, we have failed to
eliminate visual processing effects in our studies of picture
naming - or even to isolate them from semantic and lexical
effects (Lachman & Lachman 1980). Despite heroic efforts,
we have not been successful, which suggests that linguistic
and conceptual representations may be tied more closely to
the visual system than to other modalities. [See also Parker &
Gibson: "A Developmental Model of the Evolution of
Language and Intelligence in Early Hominids" BBS 2(3)
1979.]
Explanatory efforts such as the one just described suggest
new directions for human cognitive research. But perhaps
equally significant is the potential for a new relationship
between theories of human and animal learning. The rela-
tionship would require that one neither naively assume nor
reflexively deny continuity of process in human and nonhu-
man learning, but rather that one use the natural history of
the human species, coupled with an ecological approach, to
suggest specific and investigable continuities. Such an
approach would capitalize on current efforts in the study of
both human and animal behavior, and at the same time
support the needed development of an ecological focus in
both areas.
Species differences and principles of
learning: Informed generality
A. W. Logue
Department of Psychology, State University of New York at Stony Brook
Stony Brook, N. Y. 11794
Johnston,s article is quite correct in criticizing the anima
learning researchers for lacking specific strategies for dealing
with species differences in learning. Yet this lack is not it
general due to these researchers' ignorance of species differ
ences (contrary to what Johnston and many others - e.g.
Seligman & Hager 1972 - have claimed). Instead, it is base
on a choice made by most past and present animal learning
researchers to study only phenomena that they believe to be
general and not species- or task-specific.
For example, in the early twentieth century, when the
experimental study of animal learning was just beginning k
take shape, E. L. Thorndike (1965) - known primarily for hi
description of The Law of Effect, which formed the frame.
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work for the study of reinforcement in animal learning - also
emphasized the effect of species differences on learning: - All
[species] are systems of connections subject to change by the
law of exercise and effect. The differences are: first, in the
concrete particular connections, in what stimulates the
animal to respond, what responses it makes, which stimulus
connects with which response, and second, in the degree of
ability to learn - in the amount of influence of a given degree
of satisfyingness or annoyingness upon the connection that
produced it" (pp. 280-281). J. B. Watson, the founder of
behaviorism, was so convinced of extensive species differ-
ences that he stated that it is impossible to generalize from
animals to humans (Logue 1978). Skinner's (1959) work also
has evidenced an acute awareness of species differences. He
stated that "Difficult problems of idiosyncrasy or individu-
ality will always arise as products of biological and cultural
processes, but it is the very business of the experimental
analysis of behavior to devise techniques which reduce their
effects except when they are explicitly under investigation"
(p. 375). In more recent times there have been numerous
attempts to incorporate species differences into models of
classical and operant conditioning and motivation (e.g. de
Villiers 1977; Rescorla 1980).
Despite the clear recognition of species differences, all of
the animal learning researchers are repeatedly accused of
constructing general principles of learnig where no generality
exists. This is because animal learning researchers who have
chosen to focus on the study of general principles of learning
have tended to give the impression that they are aware only
of general principles (Logue in press a; in press b). In truth,
animal learning has at times been hindered by an adherence
to general principles where there is little generality. Yet the
major challenges to such incorrect allegiances have come
from within the animal learning community itself, such as
Brown and Jenkins' (1968) study of autoshaping and Bolles'
(1970) study of avoidance learning. In fact, some of the
researchers who Johnston states have gone too far in abandon-
ing general principles were themselves originally members of
the field of animal learning (e.g., Shettleworth).
The history of the study of illness-induced food (taste)
aversion learning provides an excellent illustration of how the
animal learning community has and has not adequately
handled species differences. Garcia encountered resistance
when he first tried to publish his findings that rats more easily
avoid tastes when the tastes have been paired with illness than
when the tastes have been paired with shock (Revusky 1977;
Seligman & Hager 1972, p. 8). Later findings showing that
such predispositions differed between species (Wilcoxon,
Dragoin & Kral 1971) also met with disbelief and attempts to
dismiss the research as a result of inadequate controls (e.g.,
Bitterman 1976). Many members of the animal learning
community had, in fact, focused on general principles of
learning for so long that they could not believe that such
differences could exist. These researchers had forgotten - or
they had never been aware of - the reason for animal
learning's original commitment to the study of general princi-
ples: that general principles are one aspect of learning whose
study can be quite useful, since information thus obtained
will apply to different species and situations (Logue 1979).
At present the existence of species differences in taste
aversion learning is almost universally accepted in animal
learning. Yet taste aversion learning is still pointed to as an
example of the inadequacies of the animal learning approach.
Johnston would avoid such embarrassments to the study of
learning in the future by first observing animals in environ-
ments as much like their natural environments as possible in
order to see what behaviors are adaptive for those particular
environments. Unfortunately, the incidence of taste aversion
learning in the wild is small. Taste aversion learning is a rare,
but essential part of an animal's existence, so it is doubtful
whether it would ever have been discovered through natural
observation alone. This is one area in which the animal
learning psychologists, working in an "artificial" laboratory,
have had a great deal to contribute.
The ethologists recognize this contribution and do not
criticize animal learning's description of the principles by
which taste aversion learning takes place, although these
findings were virtually all obtained in what the ethologists
consider to be an unnatural environment. Apparently this is
because these principles include species- and task-specific
differences. Yet it is illogical to accept laboratory findings
when they show such differences, and then to dismiss other
laboratory findings of regularities, attributing the latter to the
regularities of the laboratory setting. Recent taste aversion
learning findings have shown, contrary to what was once
believed, that although birds can easily form illness-induced
aversions to visual stimuli (Logue 1980; and Wilcoxon,
Dragoin & Kral 1971), tastes may be the easiest stimuli to
associate with illness for all species (Lett 1980; Logue in press
c). Will the ethologists now reverse their position and
denounce the principles of taste aversion learning, discovered
by animal learning researchers, as the result of contrived
laboratory situations?
In evaluating data from learning experiments, it is essential
that a researcher have a firm grip on the ways in which
species- and task-specific principles may arise and on the
ways in which general principles may arise. Johnston lists
three important ways in which general principles of learning
may come to exist, but there is a fourth way. There are
problems that all species face under many different situa-
tions. Because these problems have optimal strategies for
solution, it is reasonable to expect that the same strategies
would occur across different species and tasks. Johnston is
concerned with how particular strategies are acquired during
development; animal learning theorists are concerned with
studying the strategies once they have been acquired. Exam-
ples of strategies include how an adult animal reacts to
delayed reinforcement or to a choice between two intermit-
tently available food sources. Different species can, and do,
demonstrate similar behaviors in such situations, and such
similarities are entirely consistent with evolution.
Yes, animal learning has at times neglected species differ-
ences, and yes, animal learning at present contains no consis-
tent theory about how to incorporate species differences into
learning principles. Such criticisms have inundated the litera-
ture for the past 10 years. But general principles of learning
do exist and, as objects of study, they are as valid as species-
and task-specific principles of learning. Why not recognize
the contributions of both the animal learning and the etholog-
ical approaches? Both are necessary for the study of the whole
organism.
A fourth approach to the study of learning:
Are "processes" really necessary?
John C. Malone, Jr.
Psychology Department, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, Tenn. 37916
Johnston describes three approaches to the study of animal
learning, each of which is unsatisfactory, and all of which,
taken together, do not exhaust the available approaches. The
first view, general process learning theory (GPLT), posits a set
of laws that are unconditionally general and thus apply at all
times and under all conditions to all organisms. I have argued
that such "laws" are no more than caricatures of the classical
and instrumental learning paradigms and derivative princi-
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pies, and are always cast in the terms of a simple association-
ism (Malone 1973; 1975; 1978). The general paradigms have
been successful in commercial animal training and human
behavior modification but have not been spectacularly useful
in advancing our understanding of learning in general.
The origin of the GPLT view is usually attributed to
Pavlov, Thorndike, and Skinner by critics such as Seligman
(1970). Actually, GPLT is a caricature of the message of these
so-called exemplars; it is probable that few proponents or
critics of GPLT have carefully read Pavlov (1927; 1932) or
Skinner (1931; 1966). Otherwise, the origins of GPLT would
be more fairly placed with the distillations of textbook writers
and derivative theorists.
The biological boundaries group is indeed cut of the same
cloth and, in the stressing of "exceptions" to the "laws" of
GPLT, almost gives the laws themselves an added legitimacy.
Johnston points out beautifully the subservient relation of this
approach to GPLT, and no further comment is required. I
might only point out that the recent popularity of the
biological boundaries position has led to an extremely frus-
trating state of affairs for those of us who are interested in
learning but who have never given credence to GPLT,
because our criticism of the biological boundaries view is
taken by our colleagues in psychology and in zoology to be an
implied acceptance of GPLT!
There must be alternatives to these approaches, but Johns-
ton's "ecological view" is not the best, because it incorporates
some of the same preconceptions that are imposed on the two
approaches above. What is needed is the discovery of more
empirical generalizations (principles) that describe orderly
relationships between aspects of the environment and behav-
ior. Pavlovian conditioning and the law of effect are two such
empirical generalizations, and both have already been shown
to be immensely useful in dealing with a wide range of
important phenomena in animal and human learning. Their
value lies in the range of situations to which they apply, and
there is nothing to be gained in attempting to discover the
real processes that underlie them. They are not in need of
explanation because they are explanations.
However, if these and other principles are expressed in
skeletal form, and if they are viewed as unconditionally
general "laws," then we surely find that there are "excep-
tions." It is sad but true, as Johnston seems to realize to some
extent, that we must take into account our species, its past
experiences, its current environmental conditions, and our
specific ways of defining environmental and behavioral
events.
A concern with underlying processes, which Johnston's
approach exemplifies, is very harmful at this stage of our
knowledge. In sketching his ecological view, Johnston
espouses a fairly specific theory of behavior that includes
some very questionable assumptions. Despite his early argu-
ment against the supremely vacuous term "adaptation," he
assumes that it is indispensable; that is, he believes that all
animal behavior must be interpreted with reference to a set of
"goals" in its environment. There is "natural" behavior and
there are "natural" environments, and (natural) organisms
are problem solvers that solve "adaptive problems." Our
observations of natural organisms therefore take the form of
the information processer's "task description." From these
admittedly grossly biased ethograms we must glean the
"what" of behavior, which henceforth is guaranteed to be
limited to instances of problem solving. Subsequent work,
whether in the laboratory or elsewhere, will seek the "how,"
the underlying processes/mechanisms.
Johnston's final summary of views proposes a general
framework for guiding the long-term research of a large
group of like-minded people who are concerned with devel-
oping a comprehensive theory of principles and processes for
organisms in general. The ecological group studies behavior
that is classified according to observer-defined notions of
"tasks"; traditional comparative people study learning within
taxonomic groups; and the third group studies populations
that are oddly defined in terms of habitats or salient aspects of
lifestyle.
These groups do not appear to be anything new; Johnston,s
ecological group in particular appears simply to involve the
compiling of task descriptions (the consciously biased etho-
grams) and the study of principles of adaptation that would
require years to describe the simplest behavior. An alternative
overlooked by Johnston suggests that we ignore processes, if
processes are to be construed as the "secrets behind the
phenomena." Instead, we should study any organism avail-
able under any conditions, including the most arbitrary or
"unnatural," with no guiding theory other than the belief that
there is order in behavior and that careful observation will
reveal it. One gross regularities are found in one situation and
in one species, we will have clues to guide us in our attempt to
find order in the behavior of other species or in the same
species under different conditions and in different situations.
For us, "natural environment" simply means that setting in
which we wish to be able to make predictions, whether it be a
laboratory, a school, or a peat bog. We assume that orgainisms
interact with their environments, and "adaptation" is accept-
able in that sense. But adaptation, like "reinforcement," has
acquired so many meanings and implicit theories (such as
Johnston's) that both terms are best abandoned. As Kantor
(1971) has pointed out, we need to know more about what
organisms do, and we need more empirical generalizations
that describe whatever order may be found in their behavior.
If we insist that animals are "associating," or "solving prob-
lems," or doing the latter by means of the former, we will not
advance our understanding far.
Learning theory: Behavioral artifacts or
general principles?
John A. Nevin
Department of Psychology, University of New Hampshire, Durham, N.H.
03824
One of Johnston's major arguments is that the study of
behavior in arbitrary, artificial laboratory settings may tell us
nothing at all about regularities of behavioral organization 
and modification in the natural environment. I want to pose a
complementary argument: that research in highly con-
strained, arbitrary environments may lead to principles that
can guide analysis and interpretation of behavior in the wild.
From an ecological point of view, nothing could be more
arbitrary than the study of simple operant behavior, main•
tained by schedules of food reinforcement or shock avoid-
ance, and repeated during brief daily sessions until stable
performance is achieved. Nevertheless, some principles of
considerable generality have emerged from this line of
research. For example, behavior is sensitive to the long-term
statistical correlation between its rate of occurrence and the
rate of food reinforcement (Baum 1973a), or to the proportion
of food reinforcers that are dependent on response (Rachlin
and Baum 1972; Lattal 1974). In a related fashion, avoidance
behavior is sensitive to the relative reduction in shock rate
that it achieves (Herrnstein & Hineline 1966) or, stated
otherwise, avoidance behavior is sensitive to the statistical
correlation between response rate and shock rate (Gibbon,
Berryman & Thompson 1974). When food or shock termina•
tion is arranged to occur at different rates for two different
responses, the ratio of the two response rates or of the times
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allocated to the two responses roughly matches the ratio of
food or shock termination rates (Herrnstein 1970; Baum
1973b; for a review, see deVilliers 1977). Finally, responses
that are reinforced are frequently more resistant to changes
induced by a variety of operations than are responses that are
less often reinforced (Nevin 1974; 1979).
Because these findings have been replicated systematically
in several species, using diverse apparatus arrangements,
stimuli, and response classes, it is unlikely that the findings
are artifacts of a particular experimental method. However, I
agree with Johnston's distinction between principles and
processes. The matching relation, for example, is quite
general across species and situations, but it may result from
somewhat different processes in different cases. Diversity of
process does not weaken the value of the principle, and
indeed may strengthen its generality. General principles of
the sort summarized above suggest several observations:
1.The relations between behavior and environment may
be studied effectively at a molar level, which involves
extended time periods and many repeated episodes of behav-
ior and stimulation. Rates, rate ratios, and correlations are
necessarily estimated over large samples, and individual
episodes become significant only when they contribute to the
samples. The behavior-environment relation may then be
conceptualized in terms of feedback at a molar level where
behavior over extended time periods alters the environment
and is in turn affected by it (Baum 1973a).
2. It is very unlikely that molar principles of the sort
summarized above would be suggested by naturalistic obser-
vation designed to define task descriptions. The reason is that
sensitivity to event rates, rate ratios, and correlations can be
demonstrated only when the events recur reasonably often
under stable conditions. When these conditions change from
time to time, associated changes in behavior can be observed.
Behavioral observation in natural environments, and the
subsequent experimental analysis that such observation may
suggest, is more likely to concentrate on rapid changes in
behavior in discrete episodes (see Bolles 1970 on acquisition of
avoidance), than are effects that require only one or a few
trials for their expression (see Revusky & Garcia 1970 on taste
aversion), or sequences of events that occur only once in an
individual,s lifetime (Marler, 1970, on acquisition of bird
song). Thus, research in artificial settings is necessary.
3. Because there is reasonable evidence of the generality of
principles developed in laboratory settings, the molar rela-
tions between behavior and environment cannot be ignored.
These relations reflect properties of the behavior of real
organisms and must be presumed to be adaptive in the
natural world as well as in arbitrary environments. Properties
of behavior that is isolated in the laboratory are no less
relevant to behavior in the wild than are the properties of
vision, worked out under the artificial constraints of the
psychophysics laboratory, to the perception of the natural
world. It is at least as valuable to consider naturally occurring
behavior in the light of principles that are worked out in
artificial situations as it is to take naturalistic descriptions as
primary and then engage in an experimental analysis.
In conclusion, the study of behavior is a two-way street.
Observation of behavior that is of obvious significance in the
natural environment affects the interpretation of findings in
arbitrary environments, and conversely, generalizations from
the laboratory affect what we see as significant in the natural
environment. Ideas about evolutionary fitness, ecological
factors in behavior such as foraging and mating, and princi-
ples of behavior such as those summarized above are joined in
a recent book that brings together workers with biological,
psychological, and economic orientations (Staddon 1980).
Cross-disciplinary exchange of this sort is far more likely to
achieve generality in the understanding of behavior than is a
viewpoint that discounts the findings of research in artificial
environments as mere artifacts.
A functional view of learning
Lewis Petrinovich
Department of Psychology, University of California, Riverside, Calif. 92521
Johnston has reviewed the arguments that have led investiga-
tors to question general process views of learning. These
views, since the time of Thorndike, have dominated the
classical position of learning psychologists (see Petrinovich
1973 for a brief review of this history). The use of a term such
as "constraints" involves a tacit acceptance of a uniformity
view that holds that there is a general associative mechanism
that typifies learning processes, and that this general law is
abridged, or amended, by special factors. This view has little
more appeal than any empirical generalization such as
Thorndike's weak version of the law of effect, and it has little
heuristic value to deal with ecologically relevant situations.
( The term "weak" is not used in a value-laden sense. It is used
to indicate that there is no commitment regarding the nature
of the underlying motivational processes.) Such low-level
inductive approaches result in a catalogue of behavior in a
variety of situations and experimental conditions and has not
led to strong general explanatory principles. The problem
with such weak empirical generalizations is that they offer
only a descriptive system in the guise of explanatory mecha-
nisms.
An examination of the changes in general process theories
over the years supports the conclusion that most of the classic
general processes have been abandoned: the concept of
primary reinforcement as a necessary condition for learning
has been abandoned; the idea of plasticity regarding the
associability of conditioned and unconditioned stimuli has
been abandoned; and even the principle of contiguity as the
basic law of association adopted by learning theorists from
John Locke and all of the British empiricists, through Pavlov,
Thorndike, and the learning theorists of the 1940s and 1950s
has been seriously questioned.
We have, then, a situation in which our general laws have
very limited applicability. Yet the commitment to traditional
epistemological beliefs continues to govern interpretations of
the data field. The general process laws seem to apply to
neutral sets of events (neutral in the sense that they have little
meaning to the behavior of animals in their natural environ-
ment). Thus our general processes may be operative in
neutral situations where a major task for the organism is to
discover what the concealed game is (Argyris 1975); or in the
classical conditioning of a neutral conditioned stimulus to an
arbitrarily selected unconditioned stimulus (one that is arbi-
trary in the sense that it has been chosen because it has an
unprepared response (Seligman 1970). Thus we have a set of
general laws of learning that might hold for certain classes of
adult human behavior (perhaps that is why we cherish them)
and that can be applied to the understanding of the acquisi-
tion of artificially created symbol systems: learning vocabu-
lary, memorizing scientific postulates, remembering tele-
phone numbers, converting currency, and other cherished
human occupations.
In short, we have an artificial and anthropocentric system
of laws. When we consider the behavior of organisms in their
natural environment we find that the special "constraints"
accountfor more of the variance than do the general laws.
We should seek the molar functional principles that involve
the teleonomic directions toward which behavior moves as a
result of evolutionary principles (Petrinovich 1976). These
principles consider behavior to be goal-directed through the
operation of a program that is the result of natural selection.
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"Each particular program is the result of natural selection
adjusted by the selective value of the achieved end point"
(Mayr 1974).
This view leads to a research program similar to that
advocated by the ethologists. Such questions as what must an
animal do to survive and reproduce, to what stimuli must it be
responsive, what is the range and nature of the ecological
conditions to which it must adapt, what are the other orga-
nisms with which it must interact, what is the nature of social
systems, and what are the relevant social signals must be
asked. This approach produces an understanding of what an
animal can learn at certain times and in certain situations,
and of how and where it responds to certain kinds of stimuli.
Such an understanding will be difficult to obtain if the
organism is viewed as an amended or constrained associative
medium.
There is an important contrast between — as Johnston has
phrased it — general process theory and general principle
theory. This is not a trivial difference since the two theories
lead to quite different methodological strategies which, in
turn, produce radically different sciences.
General process theories tend to be organism-centered, to
seek molecular-reductionistic explanations, and to rely as
much as possible on systematic laboratory experimentation.
General principle theory, on the other hand, tends to place
equal weight on organismic and situational variables, to
develop molar-functional explanatory principles, and to rely
on nonmanipulative and representative research strategies as
much as possible. The essential differences forced by a
preference for systematic as opposed to representative designs
have been discussed at length elsewhere (Petrinovich 1979; in
press) and will not be repeated here.
Abandoning the organismically centered approach with its
attendant molecular-reductionistic bias will result in a more
satisfactory functional science of learning. This science will
be characterized by the recognition that both the environ-
ment and the organism's input and output systems are proba-
bilistic in nature (Brunswik 1952). The focus should be, as
Tinbergen (1951) has argued, not on such questions as what
can an animal learn, but rather on what an animal actually
does learn under natural conditions. This emphasis moves the
focus from hypothetical models of the mind to an analysis of
the environment that the animal's behavior has been shaped
to meet. Perception, learning, and memory, like evolution,
are surely a matter of discovering what the environment is
really like and adapting to it.
Functionally oriented research programs will allow us to
understand the behavior of organisms in relation to en-
vironmental demands, to identify the potential avenues of
stimulus-response mediation, and to move toward an under-
standing of the internal processes that mediate in the adjust-
ment of the organism. Theories of behavior must be devel-
oped within the context of the environment because it is the
environment that provides both the stimulation and the
response supports for behavior.
The major problem in the development of behavioral
theory has not been with the controlled experimental testing
of alternative theories: psychologists excel at, and delight in,
the design and analysis of complex experiments. The problem
has been to discover the variables that should be included in
our attempts to understand behavior. The very power of the
experiment to magnify the effectiveness of a variable through
control of other variables renders it almost useless for estab-
lishing functionally accurate probability estimates regarding
the effect-size of variables.
These comments are not only germane for those who are
interested in theories of learning. If one accepts the fact that
the behavioral systems of organisms have been developed,
through the agency of natural selection, to cope with the
demands of the environment, it is equally likely that the
nervous system is subject to the same organizational princi-
ples. If one is to understand the function of the neural systems
involved in learning, then one would be well advised to
consider such systems within the contexts to which they have
been adapted.
Is an ecological approach radical enough?
H. C. Plotkin' and F. J. Odling-Smee b
'Department of Psychology, University College, London WC FE 6BT, and
°Departments of Applied Biology and Psychology, Brunel University,
Uxbridge UB8 3PH, Middlesex, England
We have great sympathy with Johnston and agree with
almost everything that he says regarding the limitations and
errors of general process and biological boundary theory. We
also have little quarrel with the general program of observa-
tion and experimentation that he proposes. Our principal
reservation is that the theoretical framework that he offers is
not sufficiently different from general process theory in one
very important respect. Johnston appears (see below) to view
learning mostly in isolation from other forms of adaptation.
As a consequence, workers who follow an ecological view
may do things that are rather different from what they do
now, but in their isolationist thinking they will not be concep-
tually far from the currently prevailing general process theo-
rists. What is required is an even more radical departure. We
have argued (Plotkin & Odling-Smee 1979) that learning can
be fully understood only if it is seen within the context of all
the other ways that animals have of gaining and storing
information about their world. This would include, at a
minimum, changes in gene frequencies in the gene pool of
the population to which they belong, variable development,
and indeed, sociocultural information gain and transmission,
if it occurs. We have also suggested a scheme as to the
relationship of these different forms of information gain and
storage and why learning ever evolves at all. Such a larger
theoretical framework encourages a radically different way .
of thinking about learning, and it is this larger framewor
that we miss in Johnston's target article.
We use the phrase "mostly views learning in isolation"
because sometimes Johnston does not. He seems to posit some
kind of association between learning and development, but in
doing so he blurs the distinction between the two. We
recognize that this criticism is premature, since Johnston is
currently working on this very point, but nonetheless, in the
present paper, the result is a conceptual tangle that is well
illustrated by his phrase "ontogenetic adaptation. -  Where
does development end and learning begin? In this regard we
would like to raise three specific points:
1. Not all development is variable or plastic. Mayr (1974)
captured the distinction between invariable and variable
development using the notion of open and closed gene
programs.
2. There are many instances of variable development (open
gene programs) that cannot possibly be considered to be
learning. Plants, for example, show a very high degree of
developmental plasticity. Even the plastic development of the
mammalian nervous system as seen for instance, in the
variable development of columns of cells in the visual cortex
of kittens as a function of early visual experience, is
frequently not attributable to learning if we use the term
"learning" in its accepted sense.
3. The converse, that all learning is development, runs into
certain difficulties. In the case of learning, the site of storage
is always the nervous system. Variable development, on the
other hand, is not necessarily organ-specific (this distinction is
discussed at some length by Plotkin [1981]). Furthermore,
development is characterized by a high degree of irreversibil-
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ity, whereas learning is characterized by a high degree of
reversibility. It is possible, of course, for prior development to
be compensated for by subsequent development, but
compensation is not the same thing as reversibility. Similarly,
although no learner can ever return fully to some original,
prelearning state, thereby indicating that the reversibility of
learning is limited, we would still argue that the reversibility
of learning makes it qualitatively different from develop-
ment.
The other major criticism that we have of Johnston's article
concerns the position adopted regarding a possible distinction
between the logical and ecological structures of a task. First,
in asserting that animals need only learn about ecology,
Johnston is guilty of the error that he accuses others of
committing; that is, he is assuming a truth rather than stating
an hypothesis. Second, if he were to push his own ecological
approach far enough, then we think that his distinction
between the logical and the ecological would in any case fall
away. Surely an alternative and testable position is that some
properties of the environment are so basic (the arrow of time,
for instance) that they are common to all known environ-
ments of all known learners. If this is true, then we should
expect the processes of learning in all learners to reflect these
common properties somewhere in their actual learning, as a
function of convergent evolution. There should, therefore, be
some universals of learning. In any given instance, of course,
these are likely to lie well hidden behind a plethora of
relatively superficial animal-specific, task-specific, and local
environment-specific variables. However, they might be
expected to show up in the abstract logical structure of the
task itself. If this is true, then Johnston's downgrading of the
logic of learning must be premature. If Johnston broadens his
ecological horizons sufficiently, we feel he should agree with
us. One other disadvantage to his position on this issue is that
it leads to the closing down of some potentially valuable lines
of research. Prominent among these are investigations into
the ways in which early learning facilitates later learning,
since it is possible that learners can learn logic from their
learning of ecology, and hence may learn future ecological
tasks more easily.
Our other reservations are minor. It is probably a matter of
emphasis (and there is clearly room in Johnston's position for
it), but we missed Piaget's (1971) point that learning is an
active enterprise. Learners not only change their worlds, but
they are also themselves changed by the act of learning. In
Johnston's terms, learning is a dynamic interaction by which
animals not only learn about their ecology but also change
that ecology and in turn are changed by it.
Finally, we are not told how the question "What does this
animal learn to do" can be translated into an empirical
program. Let us pose a question: Is it possible to observe an
animal under normal, free-living conditions, and, without
any preconceptions as to what learning does and how it is
different from other forms of adaptation, to say what the
animal learns? For us, the answer is no. It is impossible. To use
Johnston's example, Emlen (e.g., 1975) had to have a defini-
tion of learning that set it off from other adaptive responses,
even if unarticulated, before he could take birds into a
planetarium and even begin to know what to look for. Merely
talking about "behavioral problems" involved in migration
obscures the distinction between solving a problem using
learning and solving it using other adaptive processes. In
other words, being able to recognize learning by observing an
animal in its normal environment requires at least an implicit
statement as to the rules or conditions concerning an animal,s
interaction with its environment that describe and define the
learning requirement and demarcate it from other forms of
adaptation. The answer to this takes us back to our original
point: the relationship between learning and all other forms
of adaptation. [See also Plotkin & Odlin-Smee: "A Multiple-
Level Model of Evolution and its Implications for Sociobiolo-
gy" BBS 4(2) 1981.]
Learning theory in its niche
Howard Rachlin
Department of Psychology, State University of New York at Stony Brook,
Stony Brook, N. Y. 11794
I wish Johnston the best of luck if and when he begins the task
of trying to create a general theory of learning from the mass
of casual observation, half-hearted experimentation, and
theoretical guesswork that goes by the name of ethological
research. It might be a good idea if he would take the trouble
to learn the aims and techniques of general process theorists
in their natural habitat, so to speak, before setting foot on this
path. Otherwise, ignorant of the pitfalls of general process
theory, he might well be compelled to fall into them all over
again. If it is not easy to discover the aims and goals of
animals in simple, "unnatural" environments, it must be still
more difficult to discover their aims and goals in "nature,"
where aims and goals will certainly be disguised. A snake
slithering across the jungle floor may be in its niche, and is, by
hypothesis, surviving. But what are its aims? What are its
goals? If drive reduction theory stumbled because it was
forced to postulate exploratory, manipulatory, and curiosity
drives, I wonder how far a general ecological theory will
progress as it tries to decide what that snake is trying to do. Is
it avoiding the elephant,s foot, looking for food, taking
exercise, doing all three at once (a more likely but more
complex scenario). Or perhaps it has some particular snake-
like desires for which there is no word in the English
language. This, I am afraid, is a jungle from which Johnston
and those who follow him will never emerge.
The ambitious set of questions that the theory is supposed
to move on to as soon as it disposes of the preliminary
question, "What does the animal learn to do?" will never be
asked, because the preliminary question will never be
answered. The question will be especially difficult to answer
if the intrepid ecologists, along with Johnston, make no
distinction between learning and development. Because then
it seems that what the animal learns to do is exactly what it
does - and that gets us nowhere. It does not help to restrict the
search for the snake,s goals to those that " . . comprise what-
ever state of affairs must be brought about, typically recur-
rently, in order that the animal may survive and reproduce";
many species of animals survive and reproduce quite well in
the laboratory. Are all the experiments of the general process
theorists thereby relevant? If the snake on the jungle floor
turns out to be just out for a slither, must we assume that it can
learn nothing during that recreational time? And if it is
claimed that recreation is also necessary for survival and
reproduction, what can a snake do that is not then necessary?
We are back again to the circularity (encountered previously
in the several "liberalizations" of Hullian drive reduction
theory) that has been dubbed the Harvard law of animal
behavior: "Under the most precisely controlled conditions
animals do as they damn please." It seems that animals, under
"ecologically meaningful" conditions, (i.e., imprecisely
controlled conditions) must be at least as willful.
It is particularly interesting that Johnston sees Small's
Hampton-Court maze as ecologically meaningful (at least
potentially), whereas the T-maze is held to be irrelevant. This,
on the curious grounds that in the T-maze the rat can learn
only "the logical structure of the task to the complete exclu-
sion of its ecological structure." But, according to Johnston,
animals cannot learn logic. Johnston does not seem to realize
that the purpose of the T-maze is to exhibit the logical
structure of the task to the experimenter, not to the rat.
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Although Johnston has doubts about rats learning logic, he is
confident that " . they must learn about their ecology."
Does he really think that what the rats learned in Small's
maze is better described as "their ecology" than as a series of
left and right turns? Even Small (1901), who described the
rat's behavior in mentalistic terms ("disgust" was one such)
must have been less optimistic than this about their chances
(as students as opposed to subjects) in college biology courses.
If Johnston thinks that the T-maze is the logical conclusion of
the development of laboratory apparatus to study the behav-
ior of the white rat, I wonder what he must think of the
Skinner box - probably beneath contempt; certainly beneath
notice, since neither Skinner nor his box is referred to in the
article. This is understandable, because Skinner's general
process theory obviously does not fit Johnston,s characteriza-
tion.
Johnston says that general process theory "searches for the
invariant properties of animals," whereas the ecological study
of learning is "a search for invariant relationships between
animals and their environments." Perhaps Hull's theory
might fit this characterization (I do not think it does), but
Skinner's certainly does not. All agree that interaction
between an animal and its environment is crucial. The
question comes down to this. Will invariant relationships
between animals and their environments be found in rela-
tively simple environments or in relatively complex environ-
ments? It is conceivable that study of more complex environ-
ments will be more fruitful, although given those invariant
relationships that have so far been found (there are several;
interested parties may write to me for some examples), my
money is on the simple environments. But the issue is between
simple and complex environments, not between natural and
unnatural environments. Johnston says "Natural phenomena
are those that exist independently of our own investigations of
them." But this is either true of all phenomena or (if you are a
Berkeleyan idealist) none. In this context, "natural environ-
ment," like "natural breakfast cereal" and "natural underarm
deodorant," is a term appropriate to advertising, not science.
[See also Rachlin: "Maximization Theory in Behavioral
Psychology" BBS 4(3) 1981 (forthcoming).]
Known general principles of learning cannot
be ignored
Sam Revusky
Department of Psychology, Memorial University of Newfoundland, St.
John's, Newfoundland A lB 5S7, Canada
Johnston proposes to study learning under natural conditions
by setting up task descriptions and determining how animals
acquire the necessary behaviors. These task descriptions
would be more specific than the abstract paradigms used in
traditional studies of learning. The use of such methods would
probably help to counteract the tendency of traditional
students of learning to ignore ecological factors and types of
learning that do not fit into traditional paradigms. But they
will not produce a satisfactory overall picture of learning
because they ignore clear evidence that learning is a general
biological process.
Johnston accepts the classical behavioristic assumption that
learning is an acquisition of behaviors. He infers from it that
the existence of a general learning process, or even general
principles of learning, is problematical because "of the wide
diversity of phenomena which are revealed when learning is
studied from a more naturalistic standpoint." In fact, the
biological underpinning for most of learning is at the level of
the nervous system rather than at the level of specific behav-
iors. This is why a wide diversity of learning phenomena, at
least in vertebrates, follows the same basic underlying rules .
Learning is largely prediction of the future based on the past .
The rules for accomplishing this, like the rules of human
logic, are trans-situational, and the vertebrate nervous system
is adapted to them. I made this argument in more detail in a
paper (Revusky 1977) cited by Johnston. Underlying similari-
ties in the learning of such different tasks as poison avoidance,
shock avoidance, and T-maze discriminations show that they
all depend on the same basic principles. These principles are
not species-specific or situation-specific. Johnston's methodol-
ogy would obscure them because they are not obvious under
natural conditions. Had Pavlov followed Johnston's advice, he
would not have supposed that principles observed mainly in
the study of salivation in dogs apply to a great variety of
animals in a great variety of tasks. There is also a related
general process of how instinctive reactions become attached
to neutral stimuli that Moore (1973) delineated in pigeons,
Pavlov in dogs, and Sevenster (1973) in stickleback fish. I do
not see how these known general principles of learning can
possible become irrelevant under natural conditions.
Dependence of a biological function on a common biologi-
cal substrate in a variety of animals has classically been
allowed to define a common biological process. Learning is
such a process both because it depends on the vertebrate
nervous system, and because there are similarities underlying
learning under a wide variety of conditions. It cannot be
supposed that the nervous system completely restructures
itself for each condition. The parade example of independent
evolution is flying in bats and birds, but these depend on
different organs and are different in detail. Independent
evolution occurs when a function is necessary in some species
but is useless and expensive to maintain in related species.
Learning is different because it is important for all verte-
brates, despite various unwarranted claims that certain verte-
brates do not bother to learn under natural conditions.
In the study of biological processes, ecological consider-
ations usually have a secondary role. Johnston himself has
demonstrated this in his reference to Wall,s (1942) work on
the vertebrate eye. The curvature of the lens must vary under
different ecological conditions so that light will be focused on
the retina so as to allow the general process of vertebrate
vision to operate. Regardless of how many pages Wall
devoted to specific adaptations, the general considerations are
central to his book and make his analyses of lens curvature
physiologically meaningful. Similarly, although specific
adaptations of learning exist, and although their past neglect
has been harmful, they cannot be properly understood with-
out emphasizing the general process that they modify.
Johnston claims that the cues used in food aversion learning
depend on the habits of the specific vertebrate species. But a
closer analysis based on very recent work of Clarke, West-
brook, and Irwin (1979), Galef and Osborne (1978), Garcia
and Rusiniak (1980), and Lett (1980) shows that there is a
common primary process of selective association of tastes
with sickness in nearly all vertebrates. There is also a secon-
dary process, called potentiation, that allows ancillary cues
like the odor and color of food to become associated with
delayed sickness in the presence of a taste. There are, of
course, such species-specific adaptations as the capacity of a
few bird species to associate the appearance of food directly
with delayed sickness. These reflect the habits and environ-
ments of different species but, like the different curvatures of
different lenses, they are modifications of a basic biological
process and can be properly understood only within that
context.
I think Johnston can ignore all this because he adheres to
the antiphysiological bias of those ethologists who seem like
embittered veterans of the long civil war in biology between
naturalists and physiologists. Only this can account for his
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claim that most "of the experimental designs in the poison
avoidance literature are minor variants" on "biologically
arbitrary" designs. The study of how food is avoided when it
produces poisoning necessarily involves manipulation of
properties of the food and properties of the poisoning. Calling
the food or its stimulus properties a conditional stimulus (CS)
and the poisoning an unconditional stimulus (US) sets a
general task description and defines the real scientific prob-
lem of how the animal learns that the CS and US are
associated. It does not exclude analysis of specific develop-
mental and ecological factors, which have been emphasized
by many who find this vocabulary useful. Johnston has
offered no useful alternative but has simply referred to
"allegiance to the associationistic tradition." Nor has he
identified any important learning effects analogous to the
stain and fixation artifacts that occur in studies of anatomy.
The capacity of any animal to learn anything whatsoever, no
matter how natural or unnatural the experimental situation is,
is relevant to the study of learning.
A few important instances of learning, perhaps birdsong
and navigation, may turn out to be independent of the
general process. In such cases, of course, ecological studies
need not take the general learning process into account, and
Johnston,s approach may be the best. It may also be useful for
dealing with invertebrate learning. Furthermore, it may well
be desirable for some investigators to use Johnston's approach
in situations where I believe it is inappropriate, since they are
likely to uncover phenomena that people holding to the
approach I have outlined would not notice. But still, Johnston
criticizes too much and ignores too much.
Explaining diversity and searching for
general processes: Isn't there a middle
ground?
Paul Rozin
Department of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Penn.
19104
I wish we weren't always pushed into choosing between
partially correct alternatives. I'm afraid the middle ground,
which is often correct, is just not as appealing or attention-
getting as more extreme views. Johnston's paper is an intelli-
gent and literate statement of an ecology-diversity position,
but it stakes out a position that is too extreme and promises
more than it can deliver. However, this may be the only way
to drive a basic biological point home to those learning
psychologists who try to ignore adaptive ecological-
evolutionary perspectives or sharply limit their relevance to
the study of learning (Rozin, 1977).
Johnston describes the "biological boundaries" positions
with considerable sensitivity to the substantial differences
among them, but he then proceeds to treat these positions as
one. Yet the view put forth by Kalat and myself (Rozin &
Kalat 1971; 1972; further amplified in Rozin 1976a; 1977) is
in most respects more similar to Johnston's view than it is to
those of most of the other biological "boundarists." In particu-
lar, I don,t think that our position is subject to any of the
criticisms except perhaps the third one that Johnston makes of
the biological boundaries position(s).
I have tried elsewhere (Rozin 1977) to explain why the least
biological explanations of "anomalies" in the learning litera-
ture (Seligman 1970) have been most influential in psycholo-
gy. I agree with Johnston that "constraints" or "biological
boundaries," the widely accepted nomenclature for this set of
positions, is inappropriate. Kalat and I used the term adaptive
specialization (a term that is not congenial to psychologists) in
order to emphasize shaping by environmental characteristics.
The constraints terminology focuses on the limitations of
adaptations rather than on their unique qualities. It implies
that specializations are carved out of a general process orga-
nism. A modest extension of the boundaries approach would
have us describing birds as constrained to fly, which is a
clumsy and unproductive formulation.
I agree (as should be clear from my writings over the last 10
years) that task descriptions (functional analyses) should ordi-
narily precede mechanistic analysis. Imagine how much
easier a process explanation of football would be to under-
stand if one had an idea of the purpose of the game. I have
tried to develop such an approach to explaining the mecha-
nisms that omnivores or food generalists bring to bear on the
problem of identifying useful sources of nutrition and avoid-
ing toxins (Rozin 1976b).
We (Rozin & Kalat 1971) selected the same major example
as Johnston — Gordon Walls's (1942) classic work on the
adaptive radiations of the vertebrate eye — to make our point
concerning the value of studying diversity and organism-
environment fit. But the vertebrate eye story illustrates what
is wrong with Johnston's position if it is taken as an exclusive
prescription for the direction of research in learning, for the
most impressive thing about vertebrate eyes is their similarity:
goldfish, sparrow, and human eyes are remarkably alike. In
fact, a more or less "general process" approach to vision has
been very successful in psychology.
The problem and virtue of the ecological approach is that it
focuses on the differences among species and environments.
This is an extremely important perspective that is presented
well by Johnston, and it is a view that psychology continues to
ignore. But we cannot forget that all animals live in a world
governed by a common set of physical laws and that there is a
great deal that all environments have in common: events
move forward in time, preceding events may help to predict
subsequent events, temporally contiguous events are more
probable predictors and causes, spatial contiguity is normally
a condition for causation, and many events occur in cycles.
These and many other commonalities could reasonably lead
to some common principles across motivational systems
within the species, and across species. One might argue that
universal aspects of the world would normally be built into
organisms, leaving the less predictable matters to be dealt
with by plastic mechanisms. However, in some cases the
universals are relations (such as the temporal sequence of
prediction), and experience must fill in the particulars (e.g.,
what predicts what, and what objects in a general spatial
scheme hold what locations).
In terms of evolution, I am much more sympathetic to the
strong position outlined by Johnston. It is hard to imagine how
general process types of solutions could evolve de novo; it is
much more likely that they arose as adaptive specializations
(Rozin 1976a). However, given the frequency of common
problems in the environment, the high incidence of many
useful adaptations (e.g. homeostatic systems, inhibition), and
the fact that types of solutions are constrained by the proper-
ties of the nervous system and the sequence of development,
it is quite reasonable to assume that mechanisms that evolved
to deal with local adaptations become, in some cases, more
and more widely available to solve new problems in the
course of evolution. This increased accessibility view of the
assembly of more general systems from specific adaptations is
the core of a theory of the evolution of intelligence that I have
developed (Rozin 1976a).
Animals face the problem of developing useful representa-
tions of the world and effective plans of action to deal
adaptively with the problems they face. I agree that func-
tional or ecological analyses are an important step toward
understanding and analyzing the role of experience in solving
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these problems. Johnston and I also agree that the traditional
learning paradigms probably account for only a small
percentage of the plastic mechanisms and adaptations
evolved by animals, and that there is absolutely no reason to
assume that processes of learning have not undergone an
adaptive radiation. Johnston has laid out a sensible program to
explore the diversity and organism-environment fit of these
adaptations. But we should not limit ourselves to explaining
the general principles of diversity. Recent psychological
research has exposed an ability to learn about contingencies —
the learning of associations only insofar as the prior event
predicts the occurrence of a biologically meaningful event
(Rescorla 1967). This finding makes biological sense, and links
with a universal aspect of the environment. (Note that think-
ing in terms of the shaping of learning mechanisms to fit the
environment might have moved us to this position earlier, but
nonetheless, this important advance did come out of nonbio-
logically oriented psychology). There is some evidence of
surprising "general problem solving" abilities in some animals
(Premack 1976), an adaptive ability that is again compatible
with a general process view.
Therefore, while I feel that Johnston is suggesting valuable
directions for research in learning, I think we should also be
thinking of how universal environmental features are repre-
sented in animals, and how this might relate to general
processes. I think it is reasonable to concentrate on either
function or mechanism, on diversity or commonality. But it is
not reasonable to forget that we are dealing with animals with
an evolutionary history, who have to get around in real worlds
and solve real problems. Johnston's position has value as a
corrective for a strong and detrimental bias in the psychology
of learning, but the universals in ecology hold out real hope
for some general processes.
Adaptive modification of behavior:
Processing information from the
environment.
Wolfgang M. Schleidt
Department of Zoology, University of Maryland, College Park, Md. 20742
T. D. Johnston's view evokes in me the feeling of déjà vu. I
agree with his view, find little to argue with, and nothing to
attack. I do find, however, that several points in his paper blur
under closer scrutiny, and I have chosen to discuss briefly
three points that I consider important for the ongoing discus-
sion.
First of all, Johnston never states what he means by
learning. It remains unclear whether proponents of any of the
three views (general process, biological boundaries, and
ecological) can agree on one single definition of learning.
Hovland (1951), for example, defines learning as "the change
in performance associated with practice and not explicable on
the basis of fatigue, or artifacts of measurement, or of
receptor and effector changes." This view is useful for the
connoisseur of human cognitive skills, whose orientation is
toward the higher functions of the central nervous system
(CNS) in man, but whose focus is much too narrow for both
the ethologist and ecologist. The latter must deal with the
adaptive actions and responses of a variety of organisms,
independent of the supporting structure (the "hardware" or
"software" that stores and processes information concerning
the organism's environment).
Habituation to specific, recurring features of the environ-
ment is a very common form of adaptive process which, in
"lower" animals without a clearly defined CNS, is likely to
occur at the receptor level. In an ecological approach to
learning, habituation, fatigue, and receptor and effector
changes must be included in the definition of learning as
potentially adaptive responses to certain environmental infor-
mation. The key phenomenon to be dealt with is the individ-
ual organism, which "feeds" on information from its particu-
lar environment (as well as on energy) to maintain its stakes in
the game of "inclusive fitness." We are not satisfied to know
that information has entered the organism and changed its
behavior. We must have proof that this information enhances
inclusive fitness — that the change is "adaptive." "Adaptive
modification" (Lorenz 1965) is a concept that seems to fit this
requirement quite well. It encompasses those processes of
behavioral change due to environmental information that
were previously barred from the definition set forth by the
general process proponents (habituation, sensory adaptation,
etc.), and includes the bulk of the original "learning" (leaving
open, for the moment, the question of whether or not most
learned people have the highest inclusive fitness).
A second point, which is not spelled out clearly enough for
my taste, is the question: What makes Johnston,s approach
"ecological"? Traditionally, ecology is especially concerned
with interrelations between groups of organisms and their
environment (Odum 1959). Those groups are usually popula-
tions of conspecifics and, as populations, they are character-
ized by statistical measures; the variables interacting with
other statistical variables in a "typical" environment, are
conceived of as an n-dimensional niche (Hutchinson 1957).
When Johnston presents his "ecological approach to learn-
ing," however, he describes problems that concern the inter-
action between organism and environment on a one-to-one
basis. The branch of biology that deals with this problem is
ethology. I realize that, as a label for a new approach to a
difficult problem, the word ecology sounds better to the ears
of some scientists than does ethology or sociobiology.
However, since we are dealing with an especially difficult
problem, it is important to scrutinize its epistemological basis
and to clarify the topography of the elements, especially the
relationship between an organism and its environment
(Schleidt & Crawley 1980) and the levels of organization on
which these interactions occur (Novikov 1945; Odum 1959;
Schleidt 1981).
The nature of the environment is the third point I shall
address. Johnston has outlined the problem very well and has
emphasized the necessity for a careful description of the
environment. I feel, however, that some problems must be
solved very early in order to prevent conceptual blunders.
"Environment" has a wide range of meaning, from the
simple presence of a specific stimulus (light on the retina) to
an all-encompassing animistic power. More specifically, the
general process proponent will view the environment as a
complex (sum?) of all stimuli associated with a response; the
classical ethologist is likely to imagine the individual orga-
nism surrounded by its personal Uexkullian Umwelt bubble
(Uexkull 1957); the ecologist, however, will see the environ-
ment as an abstract hypervolume to which the species adapts
(Hutchinson 1957). For the ecological approach, as visualized
by Johnston, the Stimulus—Response concept is too simplistic,
and the "collective environment" of a group is not applicable
in the individual case. The most promising course, in my
view, is to refine the Umwelt bubble concept: The subject
under consideration is surrounded by objects, each carrying
potentially vital information, and each having the potential
to influence the subject's energy balance. These objects can be
food, conspecific competitors or potential mates, predators,
tools, obstacles, or neutral items, bathed by the rays and gases
of the atmosphere, and held to the ground by gravity. The
subject interacts in this general setting with one or more
objects, managing its time-budget according to a strategy that
maximizes the chances for achieving high inclusive fitness. It
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will take great epistemological skill and sophistication to
devise a useful format with which to describe the environ-
ment where learning, as an adaptive process, takes place.
The ecology of learning: The right answer to
the wrong question
Barry Schwartz
Department of Psychology, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Penn.
19081
Today, the idea that "everything important in psycholo-
gy ... can be investigated in essence through the continued
experimental and theoretical analysis of the determiners of
rat behavior at a choice-point in a maze" (Tolman 1938, p.
34), must seem a grandiose vision built on massive ignorance.
Indeed, the growing influence of ethological ideas on learning
theory, together with the development of cognitive psychol-
ogy as a viable experimental science, makes it appear as
though studying rats in T-mazes is about the surest possible
way to learn nothing at all about anything - except perhaps
rats in T-mazes. And Johnston makes clear in his target article
precisely why "general process" learning theory has turned
out to be misguided. He argues convincingly that if one wants
to understand how learning influences an animal,s adaptation
to its environment, one must begin by understanding the
challenges that a particular species' environment poses. The
problem is that although behavioral ecology may be the way
to answer questions about how animals solve problems of
survival, those are not the questions that motivated learning
theory. Thus Johnston's alternative may be the right answer
to the wrong question.
To appreciate what learning theorists were after, one must
connect learning theory to its history. Most major learning
theorists, including Watson, Thorndike, and Skinner were
seeking laws of human nature. They studied animals as a
methodological convenience, a convenience justified by a
commitment to empiricist epistemology, which largely deter-
mined what they thought an account of human nature would
look like. The legacy of British associationism suggested that
human nature was shaped by experience; that experience
built simple elements into complex combinations via mecha-
nisms of association; and that there were no significant
pre-established categories of knowing that required that the
learning theorist, in order to arrive at an understanding of
human nature, study people directly, as they learn the things
they normally learn. This constellation of ideas made quite
plausible the belief that one could construct a picture of
complex human activity by studying simple creatures in
simple situations. The natural sciences had already taught us
that this was the way to discover the key elements - the
general principles.
As learning theory has developed, and as research issues
and methods have grown increasingly complex, the relation
between minor theoretical controversies and the experiments
designed to resolve them on the one hand, and the big,
motivating questions about human nature on the other, has
grown increasingly obscure. Indeed, many modern learning
researchers are interested in problems of animal learning for
their own sake and participate in the field for that reason. For
the current generation, Johnston's criticisms and suggested
alternatives are apt and appropriate. But the sins of the
children should not obscure the aims of their parents. Watson,
Thorndike, and Skinner never lost sight of their goals. This is
clear from their persistent efforts to apply principles of
learning derived from the animal laboratory to complex,
human settings. Indeed, the appeal of using successful human
applications for validating laboratory principles continues to
characterize the research of Skinner and many of his disci-
ples.
If one appreciates that the aim of learning theory was to
discover universal principles of human nature, one can under-
stand some of the shortcomings of the demonstrations of
"constraints on learning" identified by Johnston. In the last
decade, a number of findings have indicated two things: first,
that much of what any given species learns, it learns in
specialized ways; and second, that phenomena peculiar to
particular species creep into experimental environments that
were thought to be purged of such phenomena. These two
separate types of findings have led people to conclude that
typical learning procedures will tell us nothing important
about people - and very little about the animals we study.
Johnston criticizes this literature as being one that takes pot
shots at learning theory without offering an alternative. Much
of the literature contains ad hoc argument, and all of it is
parasitic upon the very ideas it criticizes. I think Johnston is
right. Indeed, I have made similar arguments myself
(Schwartz 1974). However, if one appreciates that the goal of
learning theory was to render an account of human nature,
the pot shots are enough. They make it clear that learning
theory won't tell us much about human nature. There is no
need for a programmatic alternative like Johnston's unless
one is interested in animal behavior. Learning theory was
not.
If the reformed learning theorist retains the goals of his
past, but seeks new means to attain them, are Johnston's
means the right ones? At present, there is certainly no reason
to believe so. Johnston himself points out that the enthusiastic
application of sociobiological ideas to human behavior is
hardly more than an optimistic handwave at present, and
perhaps even less than that (Lewontin 1979). And the alterna-
tive program outlined by Johnston seems to have limited
applicability to the task of explaining human nature. First,
consider the idea of a "task description." This implies that
there are set tasks to be described. This may be true of some
species, and it may be true of many aspects of human
childhood (e.g., learning language, learning number
concepts, learning to walk, etc.), but it hardly seems plausible
once early childhood is passed.
What are the "tasks" faced by human adults? Which
"natural" environments should we observe to derive our task
descriptions? As a rule, people do not live in natural environ-
ments. They live in environments of their own construction. I
think the general learning theorist knew this and intentionally
constructed artificial environments precisely because flexibil-
ity was such an insistent characteristic of human behavior
that it was important to avoid studying "natural," though
perhaps parochial, aspects of human nature.
And what does it mean to say that a behavior is "natural"?
Johnston suggests that "natural phenomena are those that
exist independently of our investigations of them. " Even in
the domain of nonhuman behavior, this idea is fraught with
difficulty. As Johnston points out, "methodology interprets
the world and it does so in terms of the theoretical predilec-
tions of its designers. " What he perhaps fails to appreciate is
that this is just as true of simple observation as it is of anything
else. What we see as natural phenomena will be at least partly
determined by the theoretical apparatus that gets us to look.
Phenomena do not come in interesting classes. What we look
for will be influenced by what we think is important to find.
And what we think is important to find will influence what
we see in nature. In this sense, there are no phenomena of
interest to science that exist independent of our investigations.
For Skinner, it is a "natural" phenomenon that human
behavior is governed by its consequences in lawful ways, just
as it was for Adam Smith. But one can look at the same
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phenomena that Skinner looks at and conclude that the
full-blown instrumentality of human behavior is the product
of modern, industrial capitalism and not something "natural"
at all (Polanyi 1944). Learning theory fails as a general theory
of human nature - but not because it is unnatural. It follows,
therefore, that attempts to replace learning theory with
something that is closer to natural events will not necessarily
solve learning theory's problems.
To summarize, I am confident that Johnston's alternative to
learning theory will provide valuable answers to questions
about the determinants of animal behavior. However,
because learning theorists have different questions, a solution
to their problems probably lies elsewhere.
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"Biological boundaries" to learning have been threatening to
become mere adjustments to parameter values, while theorists
ignore their implicit message that learning is best understood
as part of an animal's adaptation to its natural environment.
Johnston is to be commended for his accurate analysis of the
shortcomings of existing "biological boundaries theories" and
for his attempt to develop a broader biological framework for
the study of learning. But, as someone who is basically in
agreement with his goals, I must disagree with his strategy.
However broadly it is defined, learning can be analyzed in
terms of three aspects or levels. The most basic aspects are the
learning paradigm, a description of the experience that is
supposed to cause behavioral change in the situation of
interest, and the learning phenomenon, or how behavior
changes. Learning principles are then paradigm-
phenomenon relationships, that is, statements about how
given types of experience affect behavior. This definition of
the word principle agrees, therefore, with Johnston's. Learn-
ing theory traditionally goes beyond principles, however, to a
concern with learning processes - the mechanisms (not neces-
sarily physiological) that are responsible for observed
paradigm-phenomenon relationships. For example, in the
case of habituation, the paradigm is repeated exposure to a
single stimulus; the phenomenon is the waning of some initial
response to the stimulus. Thus the habituation process has
been hypothesized to be either specific to the particular
stimulus-response relationship or to constitute sensory or
motor fatigue. Observation of the effect of a novel stimulus
on the habituated response (a dishabituation experiment)
differentiates between these two classes of processes.
It can readily be seen from this analysis that, as Johnston
points out, natural selection can act only at the level of
learning principles. It acts only indirectly on learning
processes. Moreover, as the history of learning theory amply
illustrates, a given paradigm-phenomenon relationship can
often be produced, in principle, by any of several mecha-
nisms. Therefore, a concern with how learning is adaptive -
that is, the function of particular behavioral outcomes from
particular sorts of experience - is orthogonal to the traditional
concern with mechanism. This does not mean the two sorts of
concerns are independent (Shettleworth in press), but without
further development a framework based on the adaptive
function of learning has little place for the traditional
concerns of learning psychologists.
Johnston calls for a descriptive catalogue of the ways in
which experience affects behavior in the normal course of
development on the assumption that something general will
eventually fall out of the catalogue. The principles, he
suggests, may be in terms of taxonomy or functional catego-
ries (feeding, sex, etc.). At the very least, the effects of
experience will be classifiable as being maintaining, facilita-
tive, or inductive. This is not a theory that deals with learning
mechanisms, however, and I think the possibility is quite
remote that anything general will emerge from it concerning
the mechanisms by which experience affects behavior. The
problem is, as D. S. Lehrman (1970, p. 28) put it, that "Nature
selects for outcomes, not processes of development." In the
case of bird song learning, for example, the adaptive outcome
(or task description, in Johnston's terms) is uttering a reason•
able approximation to the species-typical song in the right
situations. The pathways by which this ability develops are
varied indeed (Marler & Mundinger 1971). Some species
must hear their species-typical song at a certain period of
development; others are stimulated to produce species-typical
vocalizations through contact with juvenile conspecifics;
others may sing effective songs with no experience of conspe-
cific vocalizations at all. There still seems to be no compre-
hensive account of the functional correlates of this tremen-
dous variation in the way song develops, and perhaps none is
possible.
The problem is even more severe with developmental
phenomena like those studied by Gottlieb (e.g. 1978), which
Johnston considers important material for an ecological
theory of learning. Such phenomena as the development of
auditory preferences in ducklings are far from the traditional
concerns of learning theory in those cases where there is a
need for adjustment within the animal's own lifetime to
events that are in principle unpredictable, except on the basis
of individual experience, and that may vary within the
animal,s life (cf. Plotkin & Odling-Smee 1979). [See also
Plotkin & Odling-Smee: "A Multiple-Level Model of Evolu-
tion and its Implications for Sociobiology" BBS 4(2) 1981.] In
addition, concern has usually been with how an animal,s
experience of environmental events affects its behavior with
respect to those events. In cases that have these characteris-
tics, the requirements of adaptation should constrain quite
narrowly the form that learning principles may take, thus
indirectly determining learning-mechanisms. An ecological
theory of learning can more profitably begin with a concern
with experience of this sort rather than with the broad
atheoretical description suggested by Johnston. Indeed,
collecting analyses of development carries no guarantee that
any but the most unspecific effects of experience will be
found.
For learning that is narrowly constrained by the require-
ment to adjust to a priori unknown events, a detailed and
productive ecological theory may be possible, and indeed, is
already starting to develop (Hollis in press; McNamara 11
Houston 1980; Shettleworth in press). In order to optimize
some parameter that is presumed to be related to reproduc-
tive success (such as rate of energy intake while foraging)
animals must sometimes have information about some aspect
of their individual environment such as the location and
distribution of food. In such cases, we can predict what the
properties of learning or memory in that situation should be.
Possible mechanisms that could generate the optimum or near
optimum behavior can be hypothesized and data can be
collected to determine which behavior the animal is using.
This is already going on in the analysis of foraging (Lea 1979;
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McNamara & Houston 1980). As in Johnston's approach, this
enterprise will lead in the short run to "local principles," but
these will deal with the relationship between mechanism and
adaptive function. It is interesting that McNamara and Hous-
ton,s (1980) investigation has already provided an example of
how a learning mechanism that can produce an adaptive
outcome in a natural situation is less than optimal in some
laboratory partial reinforcement paradigms.
In summary, Johnston has made a valuable contribution to
learning theory by carrying to their logical conclusion the
implications of "biological boundaries" data. But in one
respect he has gone too far: he expects learning theorists to
broaden their concerns to phenomena that are too remote
from those with which they have traditionally been
concerned. In another respect, he has not gone far enough: his
program is too unfocused and atheoretical. There already
exist examples of how the analysis of adaptation in particular
situations can make contact with the details of learning
mechanisms. Further developments of this sort are more
likely than Johnston's program to bring some ecological
content into theories of learning.
Missing variables in studies of animal
learning
Wally Welker
Department of Neurophysiology, The University of Wisconsin, Madison,
Wisc. 53706
The aggregate behavioral-neurobiological sciences have
revealed that "learning" phenomena consist of multiple
processes, are anatomically distributed, and are polydetermi-
nate. There are many kinds of learning. All levels of the
nervous system play a role in learning. In fact, neural
substrates of learning phenomena are not localized to any
structure or circuit. Rather, they appear to be distributed
among several neural systems. To properly understand
phenomena of learning, six major codeterminants must be
addressed: environmental stimulus contexts, nonneural
anatomical characteristics, perceptual selectivity, cognitive
competence, motivational pertinence, and the available
behavioral repertoire. Johnston's review emphasizes the
importance of environmental and behavioral factors, particu-
larly those that occur in "natural" environments.
All learning is dependent on spatiotemporal features of the
environment, and Johnston does well to emphasize that the
study of animals in "natural" stimulus contexts is the most
pertinent strategy, evolutionarily and developmentally, for
analyzing adaptive learning. Ethologists and ecologists have
known about and demonstrated this for over a century, but
the most numerous, convincing, and articulate demonstra-
tions have been produced during the last 25 to 50 years.
Johnston rightly advises learning theorists to acknowledge
such cumulative wisdom.
All studies of learning have been forced to deal with, to
describe and measure, specific behavioral sequences — the
second half of the Stimulus-Response (S-R) equation. Here
too, Johnston acts as spokesman for the many ethologically
and ecologically oriented behaviorists who have demon-
strated the importance of studying the alterations of specific
"natural" behaviors in their "natural" situations.
Topics that are not dealt with (but surely implied) in
Johnston,s discussion of the three contrasting approaches to a
theory of learning are (1) an animal's specialized skeletal
muscular and other nonneural anatomy, (2) its sensory-
perceptual neural specializations, (3) its cognitive capabilities,
and (4) its unique motivational dispositions. A large body of
experimental, analytic, and descriptive research attests that
an essential contribution to learning phenomena has been
made by these several neurobiological substrates. Because this
is true, such features, which are "natural" features of each
animal's makeup, are as important as "natural environments"
and "species-typical" behaviors in assessing an animal's learn-
ing capabilities. It certainly must be clear by now that the
spatiotemporal organization of the circuits and systems of the
brain comprise the biological substrates to which any biologi-
cally adequate theory of learning must be addressed. This is
particularly important because each animal's "natural" adap-
tive behavioral transactions, and the modification of behavior
by learning, are directly determined by the several "natural"
specializationsof its brain anatomy and physiology.
I do not see how purely environmental and behavioral
theories of learning can proceed far if they do not concur-
rently examine neurobiological phenomena in depth. "Natu-
ral" environments and "natural" behaviors constitute only
two of the essential ingredients that must be examined,
understood, and utilized in searches for understanding of the
growth, modification, and development of an animal's adap-
tive transactions with its environment.
There are several other issues to which theories of learning
(general and special) must attend. First of all, there are
several varieties of learning phenomena, that are operation-
ally distinguishable from one another and that are referred to
by such terms as "conditioning," "imprinting," "association,"
"adaptation," "familiarization," "incubation," "fixation,"
etc. These abstractions only touch the surface of the problem.
To be credible, general theories of learning must consider
these several aspects.
There is also a problem regarding the dichotomous use of
the terms "natural" and "artificial" in referring to either
environments or behaviors. Although it is important to study
learning in environments within which an animal group has
evolved, I think the case is somewhat overstated when it is
explicitly assumed that any response an animal makes under
the constraints of laboratory environments is not "natural."
Indeed, it seems well demonstrated that all animals are able to
respond to some stimulus energies and patterns that they
rarely encounter in nature, which indicates only that they are
often constitutionally prepared to deal adaptively with novel
niches, or at least with niches different from those in which
they may now exist. I think that the more appropriate
emphasis for an ecological approach to learning would be one
in which "task descriptions" are made for several environ-
ments that are parametrically varied so as to include a wide
variety of possible situations, including some laboratory
conditions which may otherwise be characterized as "artifi-
cial." If such an approach were followed, it is possible that an
animal's specific learnings would be found to be tailored to
environments that differed from those in which it was origi-
nally found. Such a possibility cannot be excluded a priori. It
is certainly known that many animals inhabit widely chang-
ing niches or habitats — some complex and diverse, some
simple and constrained — such as occur in normal diurnal,
seasonal and annual cycles. The question is: What and how do
animals learn in these different situations?
These few comments are to be viewed as addenda to, not
critiques of, Johnston's suggestions for promoting more envi-
ronmentally relevant studies of learning. His critiques of
alternate approaches, and his ecological and species-typical
emphases are valuable and constructive. His fine review
should provide another corrective contribution to a short-
sighted controversy of long standing, for the issue is still not
fully resolved.
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majority of laboratory paradigms, this matter still
remains to be investigated. If such conditions did not
occur, then clearly the general principles that were
based on them would indeed be irrelevant in nature.
Nor do I claim that general learning principles are
necessarily irrelevant in nature (cf. the last sentence of
Nevin's commentary), for that would simply be
Author's Response
An ecological approach to
a theory of learning
Timothy D. Johnston
North Carolina Division of Mental Health, Research Branch, Dorothea Dix
Hospital, Raleigh, N.C. 27611
Of the various kinds of criticism one's work may elicit,
there are two that I find most valuable: The first kind
comes from those who agree enthusiastically with one's
effort and, in that spirit, offer suggestions for its
improvement. The second kind comes from those who
feel that the whole enterprise is thoroughly misguided,
and so force one to defend the assumptions on which it
is based. Having elicited both kinds of criticism (as well
as some other kinds), I hope that I can use this response
to gratefully acknowledge my supporters and, perhaps,
to encourage my detractors to reconsider their objec-
tions. Some highly sympathetic commentators have
received less attention in my response than they
deserve. The commentaries of Charlesworth, Kamil,
Kruse & Reed, Lachman & Lachman, Petrinovich,
and Welker, in particular, raise a number of important
points that amplify and extend my arguments — points
with which I am in substantial agreement. For obvious
reasons, I have concentrated instead on providing
rebuttals to those commentators who have been espe-
cially critical. In addition, I have organized my
response in the way that I have found most helpful as a
reader of previous issues of this journal: in terms of
topics, cross-referenced with the names of commenta-
tors (see Table 1). This will, I hope, make it easy for
both readers and commentators to evaluate the
strength of my rebuttals.
1. Generality and theories of learning. Several com-
mentators argued that the very existence of general
principles propounded within the general process
tradition is an effective argument against my position.
Logue suggests that one may focus either on general
principles of learning, or on species typicalities; she
contends that psychologists have simply chosen to focus
on the former rather than the latter. However, it seems
logically muddled to claim that principles exist as
objects of study in the same way that, say, the phenom-
ena of food selection do. General principles are
constructed, not studied directly, which is demon-
strated by the fact that they can be declared wrong or
inapplicable, and then discarded. The point at issue is
whether the general principles constructed by learning
theorists are applicable to the natural phenomena of
learning and, if not, whether we should retain them.
Revusky's argument is similar in spirit to Logue's:
He claims that the general principles successfully
constructed from studies of learning under artificial
conditions must also be important for learning under
natural conditions. I cannot accept the logic of this
argument. It is surely an empirical matter whether or
not the conditions under which such principles hold in
the laboratory also occur in nature; for the great
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making Revusky's error in reverse. However, so long as
those studying learning in the laboratory show no
inclination to find out what conditions obtain in the
natural world, we will never know one way or the
other.
There are a number of good ecological reasons to
suppose that there exist general principles that are
applicable to learning under natural conditions. The
existence of phyletic constraints on the evolution of
learning (Ghiselin) is one, and the probable similarity
of adaptive problems faced by many species is another.
Plotkin & Odling-Smee and Rozin make the latter
point cogently, and I see no reason to doubt that they
are correct in principle. However, it will be important
to determine which of the adaptive problems faced by
different species exhibit the relevant similarities, and
that issue cannot be decided by reflection [See also
Plotkin & Odling-Smee: "A Multiple-Level Model of
Evolution and its Implications for Sociobiology" BBS
4(2) 19811
Revusky claims that logical rules for predicting the
future are transsituational and that, insofar as learning
involves predicting the future (a metaphor with which
I am not entirely happy), principles of learning must be
transsituational too. That argument takes too much for
granted. The rules of logic are one way of predicting
the future, and they have been developed by logicians
precisely because they are transsituational. But that is
no reason to suppose that a set of rules that successfully
predicts the future for a particular animal in its partic-
ular environment must either look like the rules of logic
or be transsituational beyond the limited range of
conditions that the animal must face. What is impor-
tant for the animal is that it be able to learn in the
particular environment it does inhabit, not in all envi-
ronments it might inhabit. The fact that animals can
learn the rules of logic to some degree is certainly
interesting, but it does not demonstrate that those rules
are of any significance to the animal in its natural
environment. That bears can learn to ride bicycles does
not mean bicycle riding plays any role in the animal's
relationship with its natural environment; it is only, in
Dennett,s (1978, p. 569) elegant phrase, "a surprising
fact of elusive theoretical significance. - This does not
mean that it has no theoretical significance, but rather
that whatever significance it may have is not apparent
and requires demonstration. [See also Cohen: "Can
Human Irrationality Be Experimentally Demon-
strated?" BBS 4(3) 1981.]
It may well be, as Logue and Revusky suggest, that
the ecological methodology I propose would obscure
the general principles of learning discovered in the
laboratory. That would surely be a fault of the princi-
ples, not of the method; general principles are not
important only because they are general. As Bateson
rightly remarks, they must also be relevant. If the
ecological approach obscures the prominence of exist-
ing general principles of learning, it is because such
principles are of relatively limited relevance in nature.
I do not mean to imply that the ecological approach
has no faults; I am sure that it does, but obscuring
existing general principles of learning does not count as
one of them. Nevin also seems to feel that the fact that
the traditional approach has produced general princi-
ples constitutes a point in its favor that I have over-
looked. I question neither the existence of those princi-
ples, nor their applicability to the psychological labora-
tory; what I question is their relevance to the world
outside that laboratory (see also topic 4, below).
2. The functions and mechanisms of learning. The
question of the relation between functional and
mechanistic explanations of learning pervades much of
the current debate in the field and was raised in a
number of ways by several commentators. Although
the ecological approach emphasizes functional expla-
nations - partly by redressing the imbalance that char-
acterizes much of the study of learning - no adequate
theory of learning can be either purely functional or
purely mechanistic.
Several commentators (Bateson, Hinde, Kalat, and
Shettleworth) claim that an ecological theory of learn-
ing will be purely functional, and they criticize me for
implying that an understanding of mechanisms will
follow from an approach based on functional consider-
ations. It is certainly true, as Bateson, Hinde, and
Shettleworth remark, that knowing the functional
context in which a particular kind of learning normally
occurs does not yet make it possible to predict its
mechanisms. I suspect that the opportunism of natural
selection means that this kind of prediction will always
be rather imprecise, but I see no compelling reason to
rule out the possibility that certain kinds of adaptive
problems will turn out to be associated with particular
kinds of learning mechanisms. Surely such correlations
are precisely the kinds that have been explored so
successfully by behavioral ecologists studying foraging
behavior, mating systems, and social communication,
providing the basis for our evolutionary understanding
of these phenomena. It turns out that certain kinds of
foraging behavior (mechanism) are best adapted for
the consumption of certain kinds of food (function),
although the fit is certainly imprecise. I hypothesize
that there will turn out to be equivalent relationships
between learning mechanisms and the functions that
they serve. The precision of those relationships will
have important implications for our understanding of
the evolutionary lability of learning, that is, the extent
to which phyletic constraints limit the adaptive tailor-
ing of learning mechanisms (see topic 3, below).
Both Kalat and Shettleworth suggest that functional
concerns are orthogonal to mechanistic concerns,
implying that there is an even weaker relationship
between ecological principles of learning and the
mechanisms by which learning occurs. Certainly it is
possible to study either mechanisms or functions inde-
pendently; indeed, nonfunctional investigations of
mechanism characterize the tradition in psychology
that I criticize. My argument is that functional consid-
erations should be used to provide a focus for studies of
mechanism, the focus being defined by task descrip-
tions. Task descriptions identify functions for which we
must then supply mechanistic explanations, using the
experimental paradigms currently available when
possible, and devising new paradigms when existing
ones fail us. Thus, in my view, the ecological approach
to learning involves a much closer relationship between
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functional and mechanistic explanations than Kalat
and Shettleworth believe, but it is not necessarily a
relationship in which functional explanations entail or
predict mechanistic ones (cf. Bateson and Hinde).
Kamil provides an excellent statement of the proper
relationship in his commentary; I am in close agree-
ment with the points that he makes in this regard.
But is it not possible, as Gonzalez & Yarczower,
Kalat, Nevin, Revusky, and Shettleworth suggest, to
use functional principles to interpret the results of
mechanistic studies executed in the absence of any
ecological concerns? In principle it is, but I think a
research strategy that puts functional considerations
before, rather than after, the analysis of mechanisms is
greatly to be preferred for at least two reasons: First, as
past experience has shown, it will probably be difficult
enough to understand learning without expending a lot
of needless effort studying mechanistic phenomena
that have no functional significance. Putting functional
considerations first could help to eliminate a lot of
work that might prove in the end to have been unnec-
essary. Second, by continuing to put the study of
mechanisms first, our investigations are likely to be
constrained by the experimental paradigms and theo-
retical questions already characteristic of a nonfunc-
tional tradition. This would reduce the chance that
important functional questions not readily apparent
from the traditional perspective could ever be
answered, or even posed, except by accident. I think
that Revusky recognizes this at the end of his commen-
tary when he acknowledges that the traditional
approach may cause some kinds of learning to be
overlooked. My concern is that, from a functional point
of view, these kinds of learning may turn out to be
among the most important.
Garcia would place the study of mechanisms, espe-
cially physiological mechanisms, at the center of
research on learning. While I agree that understanding
the physiological bases of learning is an important goal,
I do not agree with Garcia that nonphysiological
accounts of learning are necessarily circular. Explain-
ing the fact that an animal avoids certain foods on the
basis of prior (behavioral) encounters of a particular
(perhaps species-typical) kind seems to me to provide a
valuable extension to our understanding of learning.
Incidentally, the history of comparative psychology
does not bear out Shettleworth's claim that functional
issues are "remote" from the traditional concerns of
psychology (see Hull 1929, 1937; Brunswik 1952; Petri-
novich 1979). Like Kalat, I think that a return to the
traditional functional orientation of comparative
psychology, an orientation that was abandoned in the
middle of the century, would be in order.
3. Adaptation and the evolution of learning. Any
approach to the study of learning that takes functional
considerations seriously will have to deal with problems
of the evolution of learning and the question of adapta-
tion. Like most investigators concerned with ecological
and evolutionary problems, I consider the concept of
adaptation to be central to any ecological understand-
ing of learning (Johnston & Turvey 1980). Thus I am
surprised that Malone writes that I argue "against the
supremely vacuous term 'adaptation'. - I did issue some
cautions about its use, suggesting that the term was
often abused in biology, but I did not imply that this
diminished its importance if the concept was used
correctly. Rigorous treatments of the concept of adap-
tation are available (e.g., Sommerhoff 1950), and I
doubt that any biologist would seriously consider aban-
doning it altogether.
Ghiselin points out that organismic structure and
function are not completely determined by adaptive
processes, and I appreciate his valuable comments on
phyletic constraints in the evolution of learning (see
also Gould 1980). This is an important consideration
(also raised tangentially by Barlow & Glickman) that is
all too easily overlooked when one approaches a prob-
lem with an ecological rather than an evolutionary
emphasis. I also agree with the suggestions of Alley &
Shaw and Plotkin & Odling -Smee that the overall
adaptive and evolutionary context must be considered
by the ecological approach, and with Welker's under-
scoring of the relation between learning and other
aspects of the animal's biology.
Revusky raises the issue of phyletic constraints when
he notes the evolutionary conservatism of the verte-
brate nervous system. However, the relevance of such
conservatism to the issue of general phylogenetic prin-
ciples of learning must depend on the extent to which
the nature of learning is determined by those aspects of
brain function that remain unchanged in evolution.
Our present understanding of the neural basis of verte-
brate learning does not seem secure enough to support
Revusky's strong assertions on this point. Although I am
sure that some such general effect of neuroevolutionary
constraints will be found to exist, I am reluctant to
assume this as a basis for research into animal learning.
I also doubt that there is an adequate basis for
Revusky's remarks about independent evolution and
the usefulness of learning. Intuitive assessments of how
"useful" a trait may be to a given animal are exceed-
ingly misleading in discussions of evolution. The poten-
tial usefulness of a trait has nothing whatever to do
with the probability that it will evolve; this probability
depends instead on the selective benefits conferred by
the trait and on the available genetic and phenotypic
variability in the population (see Williams 1966, for a
clear discussion of this issue). The phylogenetic gener-
ality of learning cannot be defended by claims of
"general usefulness." If Revusky wants to make the
modified claim that "learning is always of selective
benefit, - then he will have to gather evidence to
support that claim, and I doubt that such evidence will
be forthcoming (Johnston, in press).
These problems with the concept of adaptation also
conflict with Hailman's suggestion that my remarks
about adaptation are self-evident. They may well seem
self-evident to an evolutionary biologist, but I doubt
that they do to many students of learning. There is, for
example, an unfortunate tendency to regard every-
thing an animal does as necessarily adaptive, just
because the animal does it. Nevin's remark that "prop-
erties of the behavior of real organisms . . . must be
presumed to be adaptive in the real world just as in
arbitrary environments" shows that my concern on this
point is not unfounded. In describing taste aversion
learning as essential to the existence of all animals,
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Logue seems to believe that the adaptiveness of partic-
ular kinds of learning can be determined intuitively.
This is the "adaptive story-telling" that has been so
vigorously criticized by Lewontin (1979). The mere
fact that we can tell a good universal adaptive story
about taste aversion learning does not mean that it is in
fact universally adaptive. Nor, I might add, does it
mean that all animals necessarily learn taste aversions
under natural conditions, regardless of what they do in
the laboratory. The adaptiveness of a trait must be
demonstrated, not assumed or assessed intuitively, and
this is never an easy undertaking. Nevin's analogy with
processes of vision is in fact a poorly chosen one in view
of recent work by Breitmeyer (1980) on visual mask-
ing, which strongly suggests that at least some "proper-
ties of vision, worked out under the artificial
constraints of the psychophysics laboratory," (quote
from Nevin's commentary) are indeed irrelevant to the
perception of the natural world.
Barlow & Glickman suggest that the concept of
adaptation would be made more useful if it were
defined in more-or-less rather than all-or-none terms. I
agree, but I do not think that the route they propose to
take is the right one. Although the issue continues to be
debated by evolutionary theorists, I think that there are
compelling arguments against treating adaptation and
fitness as synonymous terms (Dobzhansky 1956, 1968).
Fitness is a measure of reproductive success; hence
Barlow & Glickman's strategy produces, for example,
the odd result that a mule is not adapted to its environ-
ment because it has zero fitness.
Alley & Shaw chide me for not respecting the
mutuality of animal and environment in my discussion
of adaptation, but I see the concept of adaptation as a
way to unpack that mutuality, rather than simply as a
statement of it (Johnston & Turvey 1980, p. 155 ff ).
Indeed, Alley & Shaw seem to place too much empha-
sis on adaptation and come perilously close to asserting
that animals are necessarily adapted to their environ-
ments in every respect, despite cogent arguments to the
contrary (Lewontin 1978; Gould & Lewontin 1979).
While I am certainly sympathetic with their thorough-
going ecological attitude, I have difficulty translating it
into a program for research on learning without first
taking some intermediate steps that will unpack the
intimate relationship that they espouse between the
animal and its environment — a relationship about
whose existence I agree. I am proposing that we
attempt to begin that unpacking.
Two commentators raise a point that may be rele-
vant to the issue of preadaptations (Bock 1959) — those
traits that an animal already possesses and that later
turn out to be adaptive under changed environmental
conditions. Lachman & Lachman and Welker suggest
that an animal's performance in ecologically arbitrary
learning tasks may say something about the species'
ability to deal with a novel niche. This kind of perfor-
mance calls to mind Kuo's (1967) concept of a behav-
ioral neophenotype for which he made much the same
claim. I would like to see further discussion of potential
insights that this idea may produce.
Garcia suggests that studies of the physiology of
learning should form the basis for our attempts to
understand the evolution of learning. However, the
Functional properties of learning abilities, rather than
their physiological basis, gives them their selective
value; and I suspect that adaptive explanations of the
physiology of learning will turn out to be virtually
unattainable. Physiological studies may help to answer
some questions about the evolution of learning, espe-
cially those that concern phyletic constraints on evolu-
tionary change, but I doubt that the relation between
physiology and function is sufficiently close to allow
physiological study to produce major insights into the
problem of adaptedness.
There is no doubt that it will be both conceptually
and empirically difficult to study learning from the
adaptive point of view. It may be, as Malone suggests,
that even for simple behaviors working out principles
of adaptation will take years, but I do not see this as a
cogent criticism of the ecological approach. If it turns
out to be difficult to understand learning, and I fully
expect it will, so be it. We will just have to live with
that fact and find ways to simplify the problems.
Shettleworth suggests that we focus initially on those
examples of learning in which there is a fairly direct
relation between the experience on which learning is
based and the skill being learned. This is a useful
suggestion, and the literature on foraging behavior to
which Shettleworth alludes, and which Kamil discusses
in more detail, is an excellent example of such a
strategy in action. More heuristic principles of this type
are needed
4. The concept of naturalness. The terms "ecology"
and "natural" have suffered from popular overexpo-
sure in recent years. Gould (1978, p. 119) remarked
that "Common usage threatens to make 'ecology' a
label for anything good that happens far from cities."
Both terms have legitimate technical uses, however,
and I think that Rachlin is too harsh when he dismisses
the term "natural" as more appropriate to advertising
than to science.
Arguments about the importance of the concept of
naturalness often seem to reflect a fundamental dis-
agreement about the aims of science; these arguments
are therefore philosophical rather than technical. This
is not the place for an extended philosophical discus-
sion, so I shall briefly describe my own philosophical
position (which is by no means an unusual one), and
then evaluate the commentators' criticisms of "natural-
ness" from that point of view. Science begins as an
attempt to explain such natural phenomena as the
movement of the planets, the existence of diverse
species, or the coordination of complex behavior. In
some cases, we employ experimental techniques to
elucidate the phenomena that interest us, and such
experiments are most useful when they test hypotheses
about those phenomena. If we hypothesize, for exam-
ple, that the specific anatomical connections between
nerves and muscles are responsible for the coordination
of some behavior, then we may test that hypothesis by
altering those connections and observing the behavioral
results of our intervention. Surgical manipulation of
the connections between motor nerves and limb
muscles in amphibians produces characteristic behav-
ioral abnormalities that are important in deciding
between competing hypotheses about the development
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of locomotor coordination (see Jacobson 1970, Ch. 7,
for a review of these experiments). But any neurobiol-
ogist who pursued the study of those abnormalities for
its own sake would be rightly accused of wasting time
and effort. He would have confused the phenome-
non to be explained (normal locomotion) with a
different phenomenon (the locomotor abnormalities),
which was created to decide between competing hypo-
theses. The experimentally produced abnormalities are
of no interest in themselves, but only insofar as they
help explain normal locomotion; if they did not help
explain normal locomotion, then they would be mere
curiosities — "surprising facts of elusive theoretical
significance" (Dennett 1978, p. 569). Although these
experimental abnormalities share certain physical
characteristics with normal locomotion (for example,
they involve movements of the same limb segments),
they occupy a logical position that is quite distinct, for
logically, normal locomotion and locomotor abnormali-
ties stand on opposite sides of the interface between
scientific inquiry and the phenomena to which that
inquiry is directed.
If the preceding example provides an accurate anal-
ysis of the experimental method in general, then the
relevance of the concept of naturalness to the study of
learning should be apparent. The learning in which
animals engage when we are not investigating them
("natural learning") is what we have to explain. In
pursuing an explanation, we may create certain devel-
opmental abnormalities ("artifacts"), such as chaf-
finches that sing a species-atypical song, or pigeons
that peck at colored keys. These phenomena are of
interest only insofar as they clarify the natural
phenomena of learning. If this example seems less
convincing than the locomotor example preceding it, I
think it may be for two reasons: First, normal locomo-
tion is much easier to observe and describe than is
normal learning, so the artificial nature of the locomo-
tor abnormalities is much easier to appreciate. Second,
the kinds of manipulations that produce developmental
abnormalities in studies of learning are much more
benign than those involved in studies of locomotion.
However, I maintain that these differences reflect
differences in technique, not in logical form.
According to this argument, it appears that Revus-
ky's claim that all instances of learning, under any
conditions, are equally relevant to the understanding of
learning, is too sweeping and imprecise. Some instances
of learning are relevant because they are natural;
others are relevant because they explicate natural
learning, and others are simply not relevant at all. A
decision, for any particular instance, as to which of
these characterizations applies cannot be made without
appealing to the concept of naturalness.
To call a stimulus, situation, or experience "natural"
isto identify it as characteristic of the animal's natural
environment, since what is natural for one animal may
be unnatural for another. Attempts to define "natural
environment" are, I freely admit, fraught with all sorts
of theoretical and empirical difficulties, but of course
that in no way reduces their importance. As a first step
toward an adequate definition, I have suggested that
we define the natural environment as that environment
which the animal occupies by virtue of its phylogeny
and species-typical ontogeny. There is in this definition
an attempt to treat the environment as a dynamic
entity with a temporal as well as a spatial structure
(Mason & Langenheim 1957). Environments change
through evolutionary time as well as through ontoge-
netic time; as the individual grows and matures, its
relationship to its surroundings changes (on the latter
point, see Alley & Shaw's commentary). The problem
of incorporating dynamic considerations into the defi-
nition of "natural environment" is a very difficult one,
for which I know of no solution at present. Further
development of the excellent points raised by Alley &
Shaw, Kruse & Reed, and Schleidt with regard to
environmental description (see topic 9, below) will, I
am sure, be part of any solution.
Defining the natural environment for some species
will be much more difficult than for others; Homo
sapiens is the most obvious problem case. Schwartz
correctly raises this issue and Lachman & Lachman
(1979) have made a very interesting attempt to resolve
it (see also Lachman & Lachman's commentary).
5. Experimental design and the ecological approach.I
am accused by Gonzalez & Yarczower and Nevin of
believing that research done under artificial laboratory
conditions is necessarily irrelevant to ecological
concerns. It is important to be clear on this point, so let
me reiterate what I stated explicitly a number of times
in my target article: The use of artificial experimental
conditions is essential to the understanding of learn-
ing from an ecological point of view. The important
point is that such conditions cannot be chosen arbitrari-
ly. The choice of experimental conditions must be
based on knowledge of the animal's natural environ-
ment. This has been accomplished, for example, in
studies of migratory orientation (Emlen 1972) and bird
song (Marler 1970). The particular experimental condi-
tions chosen by Emlen and by Marler for studying how
such skills are learned were designed to test hypotheses
based on their subjects' respective natural environ-
ments; these conditions were artificial but not arbi-
trary. Often the best way to analyze a complex devel-
opmental process is to simplify the conditions under
which it occurs, but the nature of the simplification
involved is crucial. Simplicity per se will not lead to
useful insights (contrary to Rachlin's thesis). The aim
of experimental simplification must be to tease out
relevant experiential contributions to development, not
simply to permit ease of measurement.
Gonzalez & Yarczower observe that some princi-
ples derived from nonecological experimental designs
have turned out to be applicable to ecologically rele-
vant forms of learning. This is true, but it is hardly a
good argument in favor of pursuing a nonecological
approach. What we would like to find is an approach
that allows us to formulate just those principles of
learning that explain the natural phenomena of inter-
est, not an approach that produces such principles only
sporadically. The ecological approach may not turn out
to be the best way to accomplish this, but it is a more
viable candidate than one that ignores the role of
ecological principles in experimental design.
6. What is a task description? The idea of task descrip-
tions for learning generated more disagreement and
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misunderstanding than I had anticipated. Some ethol-
ogists (Barlow & Glickman; Hailman; Hinde) felt that
I was trying to claim too much originality for this stage
in the analysis. Insofar as task description involves
describing behavior, of course I claim no originality
whatever; however, I do think that the systematic
application of the idea of task descriptions to the study
of learning would be a novel and important direction
for future research.
The task description defines what the animal does, so
that we can go on to determine how it learns (if it
learns at all) to do it. Barlow & Glickman, and Plotkin
& Odling-Smee attribute more to the task description
stage than I had intended. Description cannot deter-
mine what aspects of behavior depend on what kinds of
learning; rather, it provides a detailed account of the
behavioral skills possessed by the animal at different
times in its life. To determine how experience contrib-
utes to the development of these skills, that is, to
determine what the local principles of adaptation are,
requires that we go beyond description to experimental
analysis. I think that part of the confusion may arise
because these commentators would like to distinguish
learned from unlearned behavior, and they recognize
that observation alone will not suffice. However, I
question whether this is a useful strategy in any case
(see footnote 3 in the target article).
Bateson correctly observes that one contribution of
the task description stage is to set limits on parameter
values for experimental analyses of learning. I would
extend this role to cover those that are varied as well as
those that are held constant. In a similar, albeit more
general vein, this allows the investigator to define the
developmental problem in the laboratory in the same
terms as in the natural environment. The more precise
that definition can be made, the more penetrating will
be the resulting analysis of development.
I am puzzled by Malone's complaint that task
descriptions are "consciously" and "grossly" biased.
Certainly, as Schwartz points out, any description of a
complex event is bound to be selective — if that is what
Malone means by "biased." The aim of task description
is to make clear what one is selecting and why, and
ethologists have usually done very well in that regard.
But Malone's implied claim that the paradigms used by
learning psychologists are not selective is simply
bizarre! How a Skinner box can provide a less selective
account of an animal's behavior than does careful
observation of its behavior in nature is quite beyond
me. I am equally puzzled by Rachlin's apparent
concern that I propose to uncover animals' beliefs,
desires, and intentions in the task description stage.
Surely we are past the point of worrying about teleo-
logical implications whenever goals are mentioned in
discussions of behavior. Or is Rachlin still haunted by
the ghost of mentalism?
Gonzalez & Yarczower, and to a lesser extent Revus-
ky, criticize me for focusing on the animal's behavior
in formulating the question, "What is learned?" But
that is surely an appropriate focus for an ecological
approach, since it is behavior that determines whether
or not the animal will cope successfully with its envi-
ronment. No amount of cognitive processing or asso-
ciating of stimuli and responses is going to ensure
survival unless it gets translated into adaptive behavior,
as Lachman & Lachman point out. Learning skills
exist today because they generally produce adaptively
successful behavior in their possessors' natural environ-
ments; examining the nature of that behavior is there-
fore the most appropriate starting point for an ecologi-
cal study of learning.
The role of the task description may perhaps be
highlighted with reference to the example of the verte-
brate eye, which I discussed in my target article, and
which Revusky and Rozin both use as grounds for
proclaiming the value of a general process approach
(although Rozin proposes this as only a supplement to a
more ecological approach). It is true that there are
many important similarities in visual anatomy and
physiology throughout the vertebrate phylum, and that
a general process approach to vision has enjoyed great
success in many respects. I suggest that this is in large
part because the "task description" for vertebrate
vision is also very similar across a wide range of species;
the structuring of light by environments is, after all,
very closely determined by universal laws of physics.
Whether such close determination will turn out to
obtain for those aspects of the environment that set the
task descriptions for learning is a moot point.
7. The ethological tradition. If there were an ethologi-
cal tradition in the study of learning, then I am sure
that it would look very like the approach that I have
advocated. Many of the concerns reflected in my target
article are, as Barlow & Glickman, Charlesworth,
Gonzalez & Yarczower, Hailman, Hinde, and
Schleidt point out, the same as those that have moti-
vated ethological studies of behavior. However, ethol-
ogists have not produced the kind of broad, conceptu-
ally unified approach to the study of learning that has
emerged in the ethological study of other kinds of
behavior, such as mating systems, foraging strategies,
social organization, and animal communication. In all
those areas there is a broad consensus among ethologists
on a range of important theoretical questions to be
addressed, and there is abundant evidence of a
concerted effort toward resolving those problems. That
is not the case with regard to learning.
I do not believe, as Barlow & Glickman think I do,
that ethology is inherently limited in its ability to
produce general insights into learning. Rather, I feel
that because of the historical focus by ethologists on
problems other than learning, ethological studies of
learning have not, in fact, produced many such
insights. If my article had been about behavior in
general, rather than learning in particular, then my
arguments would indeed do a major disservice to the
ethological tradition; with regard to learning, I think
they do not.
8. What are psychologists really interested in? The
psychology of learning, Schwartz argues, is really
directed toward understanding human behavior, not
animal learning; he thus implies that the arguments in
my target article are simply beside the point. While
achieving an understanding of human behavior may
well have been part of the historical impetus for the
development of the field, and while it may also be a
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concern of some modern workers such as Skinner, I do
not think that Schwartz's arguments carry much criti-
cal weight. My own arguments are not concerned with
the question of the applicability or inapplicability of
studies of nonhuman animals to the understanding of
human behavior. They are concerned with the ques-
tion of whether current approaches to the study of
animal learning are the best way to advance our
understanding of animal learning. Unlike Schwartz, I
think that many psychologists regard the study of
animal learning not solely as a simple model of human
behavior, but rather as a means of searching for a
broader theoretical understanding of learning.
Some commentators argued that psychologists are
really interested in the mechanisms of learning, not in
the way those mechanisms are employed in nature.
Kalat and Shettleworth expressed that point of view
quite clearly, and Garcia, Hinde, and Revusky
implied it. My arguments against the cogency of that
argument will be found under topic 2, above.
9. Describing the environment. In contrast to the tradi-
tional approaches, the ecological approach requires
that a description of the animal's natural environment
figure prominently in the study of learning. That
requirement raises important conceptual and empirical
problems, and I am pleased that Charlesworth,
Petrinovich, and Schleidt recognize the significance
of those problems. Schleidt's reference to von Uexkull's
concept of the Umwelt is especially appropriate, and I
agree with his suggestion that refinement of the
concept is a promising course to pursue. J. J. Gibson's
concept of affordance (1977) illustrates what might be
done in the way of such refinement. Kruse & Reed
provide an outline of affordance theory and give refer-
ences to the pertinent literature (see also Johnston &
Turvey 1980). Alley & Shaw's comments are also in the
Gibsonian tradition, and emphasize the importance of
seeking animal-relevant descriptions of the environ-
ment, that is, descriptions that are given with respect to
the particular developmental characteristics of the
species of interest.
Detailed, sophisticated environmental descriptions
are the key to discovering general principles of learn-
ing that reflect environmental similarities among
different animal species. Surely such similarities exist,
as Plotkin & Odling-Smee and Rozin suggest, and
investigators concerned with the ecological study of
learning must devise ways to describe them. It is not
unreasonable to suppose that, as a result of convergent
evolution, more general principles of learning will hold
among animals that occupy broadly similar niches than
among animals that have widely different lifestyles. I
do not agree with Malone that such groups of species
are oddly defined. There are many well-known evolu-
tionary convergences in morphological and behavioral
traits among phylogenetically unrelated but ecologi-
cally similar species, and it is quite likely that the same
will be true in the case of learning.
10. Learning and development. The relation between
learning and behavioral development is obviously
close. Both involve changes in behavior over the course
of an individual's lifetime, and both emphasize the role
of experience in promoting such change. There are
perhaps some kinds of behavior (like food selection)
that seem best described as being learned, and other
kinds (like locomotion) that seem best described as
being developed. However, for me, most behavior does
not fit neatly into either category. Indeed, I think that
it would be a good idea to try to find some way of
transcending this particular dichotomy. The distinction
between behavior that is learned and behavior that
develops is very similar to the distinction between
learning and maturation, which is unpleasantly close to
the old dichotomy between learned and innate behav-
ior. Surely no one wants to resurrect that argument.
Those who would distinguish sharply between learning
and development will need to be wary of the unhelpful
intellectual baggage that seems fated to go along with
the distinction.
Although Plotkin & Odling-Smee call for a unified
approach to the study of adaptation, they think that a
distinction between learning and development is worth
preserving. However, the value of that distinction can
really only be assessed in relation to specific instances,
and Plotkin & Odling-Smee do not discuss enough
instances in sufficient depth to determine whether the
distinction is indeed worthwhile. They refer to an
"accepted sense" of learning, by which I think they
may mean conditioning, but it seems unwise to
prejudge the learning-development issue by making
learning synonymous with the nondevelopmental
concept of conditioning. There are certainly a variety
of mechanisms, of which conditioning is probably one,
that underly normal patterns of behavioral change, and
my suggestion that the hard-and-fast distinction
between learning and development should be moder-
ated is an attempt to foster a more unified study of
their operation. I agree with Schleidt's comments on
this point, although I would not insist, as he does, that
only adaptive behavioral changes are of interest to an
ecological theory of learning. The emphasis in the
approach that I advocate is on whether the change
occurs naturally, not on whether it is adaptive when it
does occur.
Rachlin also objects to my position on the learning-
development issue, although his reasons are not at all
clear to me. He seems to imply that it must somehow
be pointless to attempt to understand how learning is
involved in the development of species-typical behav-
ior. I confess that I do not understand the basis for that
position. Kruse & Reed, on the other hand, are much
more sympathetic to my position. They suggest that
learning is, in fact, a form of perceptual development.
in the course of which an animal becomes able to
detect the affordances of its environment. That is an
interesting suggestion, and one that might be further
elaborated as a conceptual paradigm for the ecological
study of learning.
11. Summary: Ecological thinking in the behavioral
sciences. The commentators on my article can be
divided into two groups: One group accepts the view
that ecological considerations must be given an impor-
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tant place in the study of animal learning, although
those who hold that view differ in their evaluations of
my contribution to that end. The other group denies
that ecology has any useful role to play in the study of
learning, except perhaps as a peripheral concern for
those whose interests lead them to study forms of
learning that resemble those typically found in nature.
It should be emphasized that these two opinions are not
merely differences in research interest or in preferred
methodology (although they may certainly subsume
such differences). Affirming rather than denying the
importance of ecological considerations is not equiva-
lent to expressing an interest in, say, territoriality
rather than escape conditioning, or a preference for
field studies over laboratory experiments. The latter
would be individual decisions of no real theoretical
concern. But science does not progress simply because
individual scientists follow their personal interests in an
uncoordinated manner; rather, it progresses because
those scientists harness their interests to a broadly
accepted set of theoretical problems and issues — what
Thomas Kuhn (1962) called a paradigm. The ecological
approach is, I think, such a paradigm, although at
present it is in a somewhat undeveloped state, and it
differs from other paradigms in the field in the theoret-
ical issues that it identifies as crucial for the study of
learning. Central among those issues, of course, is the
relationship between an animal's learning abilities and
its natural environment. That relationship is seen as the
fulcrum on which the analysis of learning must turn.
Several commentators pointed out the close similar-
ity between the ecological approach to learning and the
ethological approach that has been so productive in the
study of other behavioral problems. But it was also
pointed out (by Charlesworth and Kalat for example)
that ecological thinking has often played an important
role in psychology as well. Especially significant
ecological contributions to psychology have been made
by Barker and Wright (1955) in the field of social
psychology, by Brunswik (1952) and Gibson (1966) in
perception, and by Schneirla (1971) in comparative
psychology. Indeed, there are definite signs that
ecological thinking is becoming more and more impor-
tant in many fields of psychology. That trend is exem-
plified by the many recent articles in American
Psychologist (Miller 1977; Bronfenbenner 1977; Gibbs
1979; Petrinovich 1979), as well as by the volumes that
Charlesworth cites in his commentary. Two leading
spokesmen for the relatively new field of cognitive
science, a productive and rapidly-moving synthesis of
cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence, have
recently stressed the need for a deeper concern in that
field with the problems posed by the natural environ-
ment and with the way that intelligence tackles those
problems (Norman 1980; Simon 1980; see also Neisser
1976).
It seems that there is reason to hope that ecological
thinking may someday occupy as central a position in
psychological theory as it does in biology. The study of
animal learning is well-placed, by virtue of its subject
matter and the concerns of at least some current
practitioners, to play a decisive role in maintaining and
directing that trend.
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